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Abstract 
The Internet has provided an opportunity for businesses to offer their 
services as Web Services (WSs). WSs are used to implement Service Ori-
ented Architecture (SOA). They enable composition of independent services 
with complementary functionalities to produce value-added services, which 
results in less development effort, time consumption and cost, enabling com-
panies and organizations to implement their core business only and out-
source other service components over the Internet, either pre-selected or on-
the-fly. 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) based WSs are at risk of se-
curity vulnerabilities related to their specific implementation technologies 
such as Extensible Markup Language (XML) as well as those of their under-
lying platforms (e.g., operating systems and frameworks) and their applica-
tions (e.g., vulnerability to SQL Injection attacks). Cyber-attacks on WSs may 
cause unavailability, loss of confidentiality and/or integrity as well as signifi-
cant monetary penalties. Security issues become more challenging when Off-
The-Shelf Web Services (OTSWSs) are used since they are beyond the con-
trol of their clients.  
The central question underlying this work is: 
Can a self-reconfigurable Intrusion-Tolerant Web Ser-
vice, implemented using N-version programming and diversity formed by 
composing Off-The-Shelf Web Services that are selected through penetration 
testing, Principal Component Analysis, and Cluster Analysis process-
es mitigate XML-related security vulnerabilities? 
While aiming to answer the above question, this dissertation presents 
a novel framework to increase dependability by constructing an Intrusion-
Tolerant Web Service (ITWS) in which N-version programming and diversity, 
formed by composing SOAP-OTSWSs, is used. It describes how penetration 
testing can be used as a measure of security vulnerabilities of available 
SOAP-OTSWSs (that offer the required functionality) and the resultant ITWS, 
13 | P a g e  
 
how Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Cluster Analysis (CA) and be 
utilized to group the SOAP-OTSWSs based on their security vulnerabilities 
diversity and how a further penetration testing on each group of diverse 
SOAP-OTSWSs can be used to select the optimal set (most secure among 
the groups) for construction of ITWS. 
This dissertation also demonstrates how the dynamic reconfiguration 
of ITWS, created in Business Process Engineering Language (BPEL), can be 
enabled using a combination of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL exten-
sion approach and using only Java as BPEL extension approach. 
The novelty of the work presented in this dissertation is twofold. On 
the one hand, it is security informed and on the other hand, it demonstrates 
the use of Java (as BPEL 2.0 extension) to implement self-reconfigurable 
composite WS. It has the advantage of, at the same time, facilitating a de-
pendable service to users and exploiting existing standard technologies. This 
work also assesses the effectiveness of the proposed solutions through vari-
ous case studies and discusses the implications of the proposed framework. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                          Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation is concerned with improving the dependability of 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) based Web Services (WSs) when 
Off-The-Shelf Web Services (OTSWSs1) are employed. Its focus is on the 
security vulnerabilities related to WSs’ implementation technologies. It intro-
duces a novel framework to increase dependability by constructing Intrusion-
Tolerant Web Service (ITWS) in which N-version programming and diversity, 
formed by composing OTSWSs, is used. It also demonstrates how dynamic 
reconfiguration of ITWS can be enabled by using a combination of Business 
Process Engineering Language (BPEL) constructs and Java as BPEL exten-
sion approach and using only Java as BPEL extension approach. 
This chapter starts by describing the motivation for the problem ad-
dressed by this dissertation (Section1.1). It then presents the context of (Sec-
tion1.2) and the central question underlying (Section1.3) this work. Afterward, 
it enumerates the contributions (Section1.4) and lists the research distinc-
tions (Section1.5). Finally, it outlines the remaining chapters of this disserta-
tion (Section1.6) and presents its publication (Sec-tion1.7). 
                                                          
1 The focus of this dissertation is on the SOAP-based WSs and the term “*WS”, wherever used in this 
dissertation, refers to this type of services. 
1 
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1.1 Motivation 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a popular paradigm for system 
integration and interoperation. It employs services as fundamental elements 
for developing applications. A service is a self-contained unit of software that 
provides a particular function. WSs are an implementation of the SOA. A WS 
can be as simple as a logging service or as complex as an organization’s 
business logic that is decided to be exposed to the outside world [1]. WSs 
can advertise their services (e.g., OTSWSs) through a registry. Hence, desir-
able WSs can be looked up (via their description) and used individually or 
integrated into a composite WS.  
In WSs, all documents and data are in Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) format. This property has simplified the interoperability of the various 
technologies employed in the development of WSs [1]. It has also provided 
other attractive features such as simple request-response service exchange 
architecture (ease of use), platform independence, the ability to transport lots 
of information over the Internet and capability to compose loosely coupled 
components [1]. Because of these features, WSs are being employed in the 
development of various critical applications, such as banking, booking, e-
business, e-science, etc. [2], [3]. Hence, ensuring their security has received 
considerable attention from researchers: security standards [4], authorization 
[5], access control [6], [7], anomaly detection [8], etc. 
In addition to the above attractive features, XML has also introduced 
its specific security vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by Intrusion Detec-
tion and Intrusion Prevention systems. For example, a malformed message 
that does not comply with expected message structure can make the server 
unavailable or cause unintended operations. Use of WS-* security standards 
[4] and message validation (before they reach the business logic) are often 
cited as sufficient countermeasures to safeguard against attacks exploiting 
this type of security vulnerabilities [9]–[11].  
The WS-* security standards are members of WSs specifications and 
apply integrity and confidentiality through SOAP extensions (e.g., XML Sig-
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nature and XML Encryption). They also provide communication of several 
security token formats (e.g., Security Assertion Markup Language, Kerberos, 
and X.509). However, they have the following limitations: 
 Equipping a SOAP message with these standards may require chang-
es to the message's structure since their use may introduce additional 
elements which did not exist previously. 
 If their use is revoked, the message structure may require significant 
changes. 
 They may cause security vulnerabilities themselves. For example, 
McIntosh and Austel [12] have shown that the content of a SOAP 
message, which is protected by an XML Signature (as specified in 
WS-Security standard) can get changed without invalidating the signa-
ture.  
A SOAP message validator checks whether the message adheres to 
the specified schema and discards the message if it does not. However, this 
approach also has various limitations such as: 
 Often such validators rely on XML Schema Definitions derived from 
Web Service Description Language document or hand-coded by pro-
grammers, which may make them prone to cyber-attacks. 
 Similarly to the previous limitation, manual unguided schema updates 
that rely entirely on the skills of a programmer may also make the vali-
dator prone to cyber-attacks. 
 If the schema used by the validator is loosely defined, it may allow ma-
licious messages to pass through. 
 They cannot safeguard against some cyber-attacks exploiting XML-
related security vulnerabilities. For example, Jenson et al. [13] have 
shown that even the most restrictive XML Schema validators may fail 
to defend against XML Signature Wrapping attacks. 
The security issue gets more challenging when OTSWSs are em-
ployed since they are ready-made black boxes of unknown quality and their 
security is out of the control of their clients. However, any attacks exploiting 
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their security vulnerabilities will also affect the services offered by their cli-
ents. Also, OTSWSs may be updated (which may increase or decrease their 
security) or more secure OTSWSs (offering the same required functionality) 
may become available. Therefore, their clients should be able to replace 
them to maintain or even improve the overall security, if they wish to. The 
replacing to a more secure OTSWS may need to be done dynamically as 
switching off the client’s system might not be acceptable.  
To address these challenges, a self-reconfigurable, intrusion-tolerant 
WS remains an interesting choice, which is the motivation for the work pre-
sented in this dissertation and one of its key benefits is the possibility of en-
suring correct behaviour in the presence of attacks.  
This dissertation presents a novel framework to increase dependability 
by constructing ITWSs in which N-version programming and diversity, formed 
by composing OTSWSs, is used. It uses penetration testing as a measure of 
security vulnerabilities (XML-related) of available OTSWSs (that offer the re-
quired functionality) and the resultant ITWS. It employs Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) and Cluster Analysis (CA) to group the OTSWSs based on 
their security vulnerabilities diversity then performs further penetration testing 
on each group to select the optimal set (most secure among the groups) for 
construction of ITWS. It also investigates the dynamic reconfiguration of 
ITWS, created in Business Process Engineering Language (BPEL), using a 
combination of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL extension approach and 
using only Java as BPEL extension approach. 
1.2 Context 
This section discusses how the current work can be used.  
Assume a Stock Broker WS (SB-WS), which uses a third-party Stock 
Quote WS (SQ-WS). If this SQ-WS becomes unavailable for any reason or 
returns incorrect stock prices, it will affect the SD-WS business and reputa-
tion. These problems can be diminished through redundancy approaches. 
For example, through SD-WS using SQ-WSs (offered by various vendors) 
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simultaneously to get the stock price then performing majority voting on the 
returned stock prices. In this way, SD-WS can continue to provide reliable 
service as long as the majority of the employed SQ-WSs return the correct 
stock price. This approach (redundancy) can also improve the overall securi-
ty of the SD-WS if the utilized services have security vulnerabilities diversity. 
Otherwise, any common security vulnerabilities will be a window of opportuni-
ty for compromising all the SQ-WSs, having the targeted security vulnerabil-
ity, at the same time that will also affect the SD-WS’s business and reputa-
tion. Also, SQ-WSs may become upgraded (which may increase or decrease 
their security) or more secure SQ-WSs may become available. Therefore, 
SD-WS should be able to perform dynamic (since switching off SD-WS will 
cause significant monetary penalties) self-reconfiguration to use the optimal 
set of SQ-WSs (set of SQ-WSs with most security vulnerabilities diversity). 
The framework presented in this dissertation addresses the above 
needs of SD-WS as follows: 
1. Redundancy: through a composite WS constructed using BPEL (a de 
facto language for WSs composition). 
2. Security vulnerabilities diversity: by identifying the security vulnerabili-
ties of each available SQ-WS through penetration testing then group-
ing these services based on their security vulnerabilities diversity us-
ing PCA and CA approaches and finally selecting the optimal set 
(most secure) through a further penetration testing. 
3. Dynamic reconfiguration: through a combination of BPEL constructs 
and Java as BPEL 2.0 extension approach or using only Java as 
BPEL extension approach.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The central question underlying this work is: 
Can a self-reconfigurable ITWS, implemented using N-version pro-
gramming and diversity formed by composing OTSWSs that are selected 
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through penetration testing, PCA, and CA processes mitigate XML-related 
security vulnerabilities? 
1.4 Contributions 
In particular, this dissertation makes the following contributions: 
1. A general architecture for an ITWS (formed by composing OTSWSs) 
that mitigates XML-related security vulnerabilities. 
2. The integration of penetration testing, PCA, and CA to group OTSWSs 
based on their overall XML-related security vulnerabilities for ITWS 
implementation. 
3. An approach to reconfiguring the ITWS (implemented in BPEL) using 
a combination of BPEL constructs and Java snippets (as BPEL 2.0 ex-
tension). 
4. A method for reconfiguring the ITWS (implemented in BPEL) using on-
ly Java as BPEL 2.0 extension. 
1.5 Research Distinctions 
The major novelties of this work are as follows: 
1. Consideration of XML-related security vulnerabilities in selecting 
OTSWSs and implementing ITWS. 
2. Use of PCA and CA analysis on penetration tests results of OTSWSs 
in choosing a diverse group of services regarding their security vul-
nerabilities to implement ITWS.   
1.6 Outline 
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 further explains the motivation for the work of this thesis 
and describes its background. In particular, it elaborates on main areas that 
constitute the current context, namely, WSs’ architecture and characteristics, 
their security issues, their composition and self-reconfiguration capabilities 
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and penetration testing them as well as dependability (N-version program-
ming and diversity), PCA and CA approaches. 
Chapter 3 explains the architecture of proposed framework and the 
assumptions made. 
 This dissertation demonstrates the proposed framework through 
some case studies. Chapter 4 introduces the penetration testing tool, utilized 
in the case studies presenting the proposed service selection framework. It 
then demonstrates the feasibility of ITWS implementation based on penetra-
tion test results of the candidate WSs. 
Chapter 5 shows that BPEL could affect the XML-related security vul-
nerabilities of the candidate (for ITWS implementation) WSs and argues that 
these effects should be considered in service selection process.  
Chapter 6 shows, how penetration test results of the candidate WSs, 
PCA, and CA could be used to group WSs based on their XML-related secu-
rity vulnerabilities and how these groups could be sorted using further pene-
tration testing.   
Chapter 7 demonstrates the implementation of self-reconfigurable WS 
using a combination of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL 2.0 extension 
approach and utilizing only Java as BPEL extension approach through two 
case studies.  
Chapter 8 evaluates the work presented in this dissertation using the 
outcomes of the case studies covered in Chapters 4-7. 
 Chapter 9 reviews recent related work.  
Finally, Chapter 10 provides a summary, conclusions, and discusses 
future work. 
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Chapter 2 Background and Motivation 
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                          Background and Motivation 
 
 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) based Web Services (WSs) 
have attractive features such as simplified interoperability of the various 
technologies employed in their development. However, they may also have 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) related security vulnerabilities that can 
be mitigated through appropriate countermeasures such as the use of WS-* 
security standards and message validation (before a message reaches the 
business logic). But each of these approaches has its limitations especially 
when Off-The-Shelf Web Services (OTSWSs) are employed.  
This chapter presents the background and motivation for this disserta-
tion and identifies Intrusion-Tolerant Web Service (ITWS), created using N-
version programming and diversity (formed by composing OTSWSs with se-
curity vulnerabilities diversity), as an interesting choice to safeguard against 
cyber-attacks exploiting WSs’ security vulnerabilities (including XML-related 
security vulnerabilities). In this work, a combination of penetration testing, 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and Cluster Analysis (CA) approaches 
are employed to select a set of most diverse OTSWSs regarding their securi-
ty vulnerabilities and its motivation is given throughout this chapter. 
In particular, this chapter is divided into the following sections, each 
corresponding to a different dimension that shapes this dissertation: 
2 
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Section 2.1 provides an overview of the architecture and the charac-
teristics of the WSs. 
Section 2.2 provides an overview of security issues concerning WSs 
including their XML-related security vulnerabilities, the existing countermeas-
ures to safeguard against cyber-attacks exploiting this type of security vul-
nerabilities and the limitations of such countermeasures. It then concludes 
that an ITWS remains an interesting choice to protect against cyber-attacks 
threatening WSs including those exploiting XML-related security vulnerabili-
ties especially when OTSWSs are employed. 
Section 2.3 presents a concise overview of the concepts and tech-
niques of dependability and how intrusion-tolerance can be achieved using 
such methods.  
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 briefly discusses penetration testing, PCA, and 
CA approaches and explains how they can be employed to achieve diversity 
(regarding security vulnerabilities) for ITWS purpose. 
Section 2.6 provides an overview of WSs’ composition and how it can 
be used to implement ITWS. It then argues the usefulness of self-
reconfigurable ITWS for security and reviews the capabilities and limitations 
of Business Process Engineering Language (BPEL) 2.0 in this matter. 
Finally, Section 2.7 summarizes the discussions provided in this chap-
ter and the motivations for the work presented in this dissertation. 
2.1 Web Services Overview 
A publically available service is a self-contained process (deployed 
over standard middleware such as J2EE) that can be described, published, 
discovered and invoked over a network [14]. It can be as simple as a logging 
service or as complex as an organization’s business logic (e.g., holiday book-
ing service). 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an architectural style for im-
plementing software systems out of loosely coupled, interoperable services 
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[15]. This approach supports the development of rapid, low-cost and easy to 
compose distributed applications [14]. An SOA typically consists of the fol-
lowing roles (the operational architecture of the SOA roles is shown in Figure 
2.1): 
 Provider: is the owner of the service that hosts its implementation, de-
fines its description and publishes it to a registry [1]. 
 Requester: it can be either a person or another WS. It uses the ser-
vice registry to identify its desirable service(s) through its (their) de-
scription then binds to it (them) using the binding information provided 
in its (their) description [1]. 
 Registry: it is a searchable registry of service descriptions (published 
by their owners) [16]. 
 
Figure 2.1: The Service Oriented Operational Architecture [1] 
WSs are the standards-based realization of SOA [17]. They are modu-
lar, self-describing, self-contained software components, which are network 
accessible (e.g., they are accessible through HTTP) [14]. Each service con-
sists of an implementation (which is accessible over a network) and an inter-
face (which is based on XML). The interface contains the service’s descrip-
tion including its datatypes, operations, protocol bindings and the network 
location for its implementation (e.g., the URL for the service’s implementa-
tion) [1]. The characteristics of WSs include: 
 They are XML-based: XML is a specification language and can be 
used to transmit or store data. In WSs, XML is used for invoking the 
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services and representing the data. Forasmuch as it can accommo-
date any data type and structure, it enables interoperability of the 
technologies adopted in the development of WSs [1], [18]. 
 They are loosely coupled: in WSs, the client and the server logics 
are loosely coupled. Therefore, any changes in either of these inter-
faces do not require an update in the other interface [1]. 
 They are coarse-grained: unlike object-oriented technologies that 
expose the services through several fine-grained methods, WSs only 
expose coarse-grained services [1]. 
 They can be synchronous or asynchronous: WSs can be either 
synchronous (the client should wait until the last service invocation is 
completed before invoking the next service) or asynchronous (the cli-
ent can invoke different services concurrently) [1]. 
 They support RPCs: clients of the WSs can invoke procedures, func-
tions, and methods on remote objects through an XML-based protocol 
[1]. 
 They support document exchange: in WSs, complex documents 
can be represented in XML format, which enables WSs to exchange 
them [1]. 
2.1.1 Web Services’ Core Technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Simple WS Interaction [1] 
SOAP [19], Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [20] and Uni-
versal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) [21] are WSs’ major 
technologies [22], whose interaction is demonstrated in Figure 2.2.  
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SOAP 
  SOAP is a simple and lightweight protocol for exchanging the XML 
data over the Web [22]. It enables interoperability among the WSs’ heteroge-
neous clients and servers [1]. A SOAP message contains an Envelope (iden-
tifies the XML document as a SOAP message), a Header (contains Metadata 
such as timestamps) and a Body (contains call and response information) 
elements [1]. 
WSDL 
WSDL is an XML language for describing a WS including its data type 
definitions, the operations it offers, its input/output message format, its net-
work address, its protocol binding, etc. [22]. It assists the clients to under-
stand how the interaction with the WS can be set. 
UDDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Discrete Components in a WS Architecture [1] 
UDDI provides a registry where the WSs can be advertised and dis-
covered by their names, specifications, etc. [1]. In the example presented in 
Figure 2.3, an application is acting as a client, which has submitted the in-
formation (e.g., specification) about its desirable services to a UDDI. The 
UDDI has identified the suitable services, based on the client’s requirements, 
and has returned the location of their WSDL to the client. The client is then 
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communicating with the identified services through SOAP messages and 
contact information provided in their WSDL files. 
Sometimes the client may need to communicate with another client, 
which itself is communicating with a number of other WSs (see Figure 2.4) to 
perform a task. In this case, the target client and the WSs that it communi-
cates with can be combined and encapsulated to form a composite service 
[1]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Composite WS [1] 
2.1.2 Summary 
This section briefly presented the architecture of the WSs and showed 
that they are modular, self-describing, self-contained software components, 
which are accessible through HTTP. These features allow companies to save 
on their costs by speeding the application(s) implementation and integration 
processes [23]. On the other hand, WSs also have security issues that have 
to be addressed. The next section first explains the concept of security prop-
erties, vulnerabilities, and attacks as well as security in distributed software 
systems. It then presents security vulnerabilities concerning WSs followed by 
an overview of a number of existing countermeasures against cyber-attacks 
exploiting WSs’ XML-related security vulnerabilities (as the focus of the work 
in this dissertation is on this type of security vulnerabilities). It then explains 
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some of the limitations of these countermeasures and concludes that an 
ITWS is a suitable countermeasure to safeguard against cyber-attacks 
threatening WSs including those exploiting XML-related security vulnerabili-
ties, especially when OTSWSs are employed. 
2.2 Web Services’ Security Challenges and Issues 
Security Properties 
The security objective of computer systems is to protect the stored in-
formation and the data that should be transferred over the networked devic-
es. To achieve these objectives, the following main security properties should 
be satisfied [24]: 
 Authorization: to ensure that users do not take action or access the 
resources and information beyond their specified rights. 
 Authenticity: to ensure that the people or systems taking part in the 
communication are who they claim to be. 
 Confidentiality: to ensure that the information will only be disclosed 
to the authorised people. 
 Integrity: to ensure that the information will only be altered by the au-
thorized people. 
 Non-repudiation: to ensure that the involvement of the legitimate 
people or systems in a transaction cannot be denied. 
 Availability: to ensure that authorized parties can access the infor-
mation when needed. 
Cyber-attacks and Vulnerabilities 
Any action violating any of the above properties is an attack and any 
possibility (loophole in the security architecture of the computer system) ena-
bling an attacker to harm the resources is a vulnerability [24]. Cyber-attacks 
can be divided into Passive and Active groups. 
 Passive attacks: eavesdropping or accessing unauthorised data are 
the objectives of Passive attacks [23]. 
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 Active attacks: this type of attacks attempt to change the unauthor-
ised data by making a modification or adding false data [23]. Active at-
tacks can be further divided into the following groups: 
o Masquerade: one entity tries to gain access to unauthorised 
data or resources by pretending to be an entity with this access 
right [23]. 
o Replay: replaying the message back to the sender as if it was 
the reply from the receiver [23]. 
o Unauthorised access: getting access and using unauthorised 
data/resources [23]. 
o Unauthorised alteration: illegitimate modification, removal or 
alteration of the data [23]. 
o Repudiation of action: a party denies an action it has per-
formed [23]. 
o Unauthorised DoS: one party denies other entities authorised 
access to the resources [23]. 
Security in Distributed Software Systems 
 
Figure 2.5: UT Model [23] 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the association between the security properties 
(explained previously) and a distributed software system such as SOA, im-
plemented using WS technology. It is known as UT model [23], because it 
resembles the shape of the alphabet letters U and T. the legs of the U repre-
sent various layers of the distributed system and the T demonstrates the se-
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curity properties and their management that may be required across the lay-
ers of the distributed system [23]. 
2.2.1 Security Vulnerabilities Concerning WSs 
SOA Security Vulnerabilities 
Security vulnerabilities affecting SOA implemented using WS technol-
ogy can be divided into four major groups (see Figure 2.6); Classical Vulner-
abilities in hardware, operating systems and software used to build SOA 
middleware; Web Application (WA) vulnerabilities as SOA is commonly built 
on top of the Web protocols; and vulnerabilities due to the nature of SOA de-
sign, and new protocols and message formats supporting an SOA (the grey 
layers in Figure 2.6) [23]. All these security vulnerabilities are briefly dis-
cussed in the remainder of this section.   
 
Business Process Layer Vulnerabilities 
 
Web Services Layer Vulnerabilities 
 
Web Application Vulnerabilities 
 
Classical Vulnerabilities in Hardware, Operating Systems and Software 
 
Figure 2.6: Security Vulnerabilities Affecting SOA (implemented using WSs technology)  
Layers [23] 
Classical Security Vulnerabilities 
Classical security vulnerabilities refer to security vulnerabilities in the 
existing operating systems, software and hardware infrastructure that could 
be exploited without the use of more recent web technologies (e.g., buffer 
overflow) [23]. These vulnerabilities are listed and updated in the U.S. NVD 
[25], OSVDB [26], US-CERT Vulnerability Notes Database [27], MITRE 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure [28] and SecurityFocus [29]. 
The existing operating systems, software and hardware infrastructure 
are employed to implement and deploy WSs hence, their related security 
vulnerabilities (listed in the above databases) also affect WSs. 
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Web Application Vulnerabilities 
Web Application security vulnerabilities are related to the middleware 
and application layer of WSs. These vulnerabilities are classified in WASC 
[30], and a list of their most critical types is maintained by the OWASP [31]. 
WSs’ Specific Security Vulnerabilities 
This type of security vulnerabilities is due to the WSs’ specific imple-
mentation technologies. Jensen et al. [9], [32] have presented a list of such 
security vulnerabilities, which are identified through exemplary attacks on 
widespread WS implementations. According to them, some of these vulnera-
bilities are due to implementation weaknesses, but the majority of them are 
due to protocol flaws. Similarly, Suriadi et al. [33] have investigated WSs’ 
specific security vulnerabilities to DoS attacks in well-known WS platforms 
including Java Metro, Apache Axis, and Microsoft .NET. The results from 
their experiments indicate that the majority of the WS platforms cope well 
with attacks targeting memory exhaustion. However, they are still vulnerable 
to attacks that target the CPU-time exhaustion. A number of WSs’ specific 
security vulnerabilities are as follows: 
WSDL Scanning  
As explained in Section 2.1, WSDL is an interface of a WS and adver-
tises its operations, parameters, data types and network bindings. A WS may 
contain operations that should be accessed from the local network only, as 
well as operations that are intended to be offered to the outer network. In this 
case, separate WSDL, advertising the information about the external opera-
tions only, could be provided to the external clients to avoid these clients to 
get access to the internal operations. However, to invoke the external opera-
tions, the external clients should have access to the WS’s endpoint [32]. 
Therefore, an attacker can still try to guess the omitted operations and try to 
invoke them, which is called WSDL Scanning [32]. 
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Metadata Spoofing 
The metadata document of a WS contains all information, necessary 
for its invocation (e.g., message format, network location, and security re-
quirements). This document is published by the WS’s owner and is available 
to its clients. It is usually distributed using HTTP or mail communication pro-
tocols, which brings a Metadata Spoofing possibility. WSDL Spoofing and 
Security Policy Spoofing are two examples of attacks that exploit these vul-
nerabilities. For example, a WSDL Spoofing attacker may modify the network 
endpoint to perform man-in-the-middle attack for eavesdropping or modifying 
data [32].  
Attack Obfuscation  
As it will be introduced later, WS-Security [34] is a very flexible securi-
ty standard that allows signing and encrypting only parts of the message, 
which contain sensitive data. However, an attacker may use an encrypted 
part to conceal malicious code for cyber-attacks such as Oversize Payload, 
Coercive Parsing, etc. [32]. Hence, the encrypted parts of the message 
should be inspected for the existence of such attacks. To enable examining 
the encrypted parts, they should first be decrypted, which is a disadvantage 
of using this standard. This type of attack may affect the availability of the 
WS in two ways [32]: 
 If the message is decrypted after the schema validation: its mali-
cious contents may pass the validation. 
 If the message is decrypted before schema validation: the re-
quired XML and cryptographic processing may cause a long delay 
since decryption can be a performance-intensive process especially if 
the message contains malicious contents. 
Oversized Cryptography  
In WS-Security, there is no limit for the parts of the message that can 
be encrypted and for the size of the encrypted content. The flexibility of this 
standard allows a variety of security elements to be used in the WS-Security 
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header, which prevents strict schema validation and gives the possibility of 
the Oversized Cryptography attack [32]. This type of attack may affect the 
availability of the WS in three ways [32]: 
 If an oversized security header is used and the target system 
processes the entire security header: the attack can have a similar 
effect on the targeted WS as an Oversized Payload attack. 
 If chained encrypted keys are used within the security header: 
each encrypted key is used to encrypt the next key. Hence, the de-
cryption process produces a very high CPU load. 
 If the SOAP message contains a large number of nested encrypt-
ed blocks: a large number of cryptographic operations produce a very 
high CPU load. 
BPEL Scanning  
As it will be explained later, BPEL [35] is a de-facto standard and an 
executable business process modelling language enabling the modelling of 
the behaviour of a composite WS. Hence, it contains important information 
that can be used by an adversary to plot BPEL Scanning attacks (similar to 
WSDL scanning) on the business processes [23]. 
BPEL State Deviation  
Many instances of a BPEL process may run concurrently, and their 
communication endpoints will be open for incoming messages at any time, 
which can be used by an attacker to plot BPEL State Deviation attack [32]. 
Two examples of such attack are as follows [32]: 
 An attacker may flood a BPEL engine with messages that are correct 
in terms of their message structure but have no meaningful content 
(no correct instance identifier). These messages will eventually be dis-
carded by the BPEL engine but after a significant amount of redundant 
work (reading and searching all existing process instances for a pro-
cess matching the message). This redundant work can exhaust the 
computational resources of the BPEL.  
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 An attacker may use messages which contain correct instance identi-
fiers but target a receive activity that is not enabled in the running 
business process instance. 
SOAPAction Spoofing  
As described in Section 2.1, a SOAP message package consists of a 
transport protocol header and an envelope (which itself consists of a header 
and a body). The first child element of the body contains the operation ad-
dressed by the SOAP request [32]. If HTTP transport protocol is used, an 
additional operation identifier element called SOAPAction can be added to 
the request’s header [32]. However, it gives the possibility of SOAPAction 
Spoofing attack in the following cases [32]: 
 When the requested operation is solely identified based on the 
SOAPAction value: a man-in-the-middle attacker may try to invoke a 
different operation than the one specified in the SOAP body by adding 
the malicious operation to the SOAPAction header (HTTP header is 
not protected by WS-Security so it can be easily modified).  
 When the requested operation is solely identified based on the 
first child element of the SOAP body: an attacker may bypass the 
HTTP gateway if it is configured only to accept the value added to the 
SOAPAction header. Then the WS’s logic will execute the operation in 
the first child element of the SOAP body regardless of the SOAPAc-
tion value.  
XML Injection  
An XML Injection attacker targets the integrity of the XML stream (e.g., 
SOAP message) by overwriting its static portions (e.g., by adding some con-
tents containing XML tags) [32]. Using this method, an attacker may get ac-
cess to restricted data. 
XML Denial of Service 
Early steps in processing a request SOAP message include parsing 
and transforming the contents of the message to be usable for the WS’s 
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backend applications. Therefore, an XML parser is an essential part of the 
WS’s application logic. SAX [36] and DOM [37] are two typical XML parsers. 
DOM parsers read the whole XML stream into memory then create hi-
erarchical objects for each node (an element, an attribute, etc.) that is refer-
enced by the application logic. An attacker can plot a DoS attack on a DOM-
based WS by inputting a large XML file [38]. Such attacks (e.g., Oversize 
Payload and Coercive Parsing ) affect the availability of the WS by exhaust-
ing its resources and eliminate the legitimate user’s access [39].  
On the other hand, SAX parsers perform XML parsing at the start or 
end of a node without loading the whole XML stream into memory (they load 
a maximum of two elements into memory at a time) [38]. Whenever the par-
ser reaches a node, it triggers an event, and the program’s event handler 
starts processing the data [38].  
StAX is another event-based XML parsing approach. However, in-
stead of triggering an event, it waits for a method call to parse its correspond-
ing operation [40]. 
DoS attacks are one of the most popular attacks, which can be per-
formed through a variety of techniques. This type of attacks exploit the vul-
nerabilities in XML-based documents (e.g., SOAP messages) targeting the 
parsing mechanisms and other resources, affecting the availability of the WS. 
A large number of these attacks, targeting well-known companies such as 
VISA and PayPal suggests that they can be a serious threat to today’s IT in-
frastructure [41]. Some XML DoS attacks include: 
 HashDoS: hash tables can be employed within a SOAP message to 
store values and their references (e.g., attributes and their corre-
sponding namespace). Ideally, each key should represent a unique 
value. If different keys represent the same value, a collision will hap-
pen, which results in resource-intensive computation. An attacker can 
exploit the weak hash function to perform a DoS attack [42], [43]. 
 Oversize Payload: according to Meiko Jenson et al. [32], the majority 
of WS frameworks employ DOM-based XML processing models. 
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These parsers consume a memory much bigger than the size of the 
message (factor 2 to 30) [32]. Therefore, one easy way to perform 
DoS attack on WSs would be to query the service using a very large 
request message (Oversize Payload). 
 Coercive Parsing: making XML parsing as complex as possible using 
a large number of namespace declarations, oversized prefix 
names/namespace URIs or very deeply nested XML structures are 
other ways to perform DoS attack on WSs and is called Coercive 
Parsing [9], [32]. 
 SOAP Array Attack: an attacker may add a SOAP array (with a large 
number of elements) into the SOAP message, forcing the WS to re-
serve a large space in memory for these elements before parsing the 
message [44]. 
 XML Attribute Count Attack: XML does not limit the size of the con-
tents (elements, attributes and attributes’ value) between the XML 
tags. Hence, an attacker may add a large number of attributes into the 
SOAP message and perform XML Attribute Count attack if no such 
limit is enforced by the developers of the WS [45]. 
 XML Element Count Attack: similarly to XML Attribute Count attack, 
an attacker may add a large number of non-nested elements into the 
SOAP message and perform XML Element Count attack if no limit is 
enforced to the size of the contents between the XML tags by the de-
velopers of the WS [45]. 
2.2.2 Existing Countermeasures and their Limitations  
 The previous subsection (2.2.1) introduced a number of security vul-
nerabilities, specific to WSs. Here, we present a number of existing counter-
measures against these security vulnerabilities followed by a number of their 
limitations. 
Countermeasures 
 Some of the existing countermeasures against previously introduced 
WSs’ specific security vulnerabilities are as follows: 
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WSs Security Standards 
As described in Section 2.1, the communication between WSs is sup-
ported by XML-based protocols (e.g., SOAP messages) that are vulnerable 
to XML attacks [32]. As a result, organizations such as the OASIS and W3C 
consortia have developed various security standards, an overview of which is 
presented in Figure 2.7.  The most commonly implemented security stand-
ards are described below [46]: 
 
Figure 2.7: Web services Security Standards – National Reference Model [46] 
 WS-Security: it describes how to use XML to sign, verify, encrypt and 
decrypt SOAP message exchanges [18]. It defines a SOAP extension 
within the security header of the SOAP message, enabling the associ-
ation of the security tokens (UsernameToken, BinarySecureToken, 
and XML Tokens) with the message. In addition to message authenti-
cation, it provides message integrity and confidentiality through XML 
Signature and XML Encryption in conjunction with security tokens, re-
spectively. WS-Security is very flexible and allows signing and en-
crypting only parts of the message that contain sensitive data.  
 WS-Security Policy: the characteristic of the WS-Security, which al-
lows parts of the XML document to be signed and encrypted, requires 
WS servers and clients to negotiate a security policy. This security pol-
icy allows defining the WS-Security elements that can be used (e.g., 
the algorithms and the required security tokens) and requires the 
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SOAP message to contain all the defined security tokens as a mini-
mum. The WS-Security Policy standard provides the XML syntax for 
such security policy [47].  
  SAML: it defines how authentication should be securely exchanged 
among the services [48]. 
 XACML: it is an XML-based technology for writing access control po-
lices enabling developers to determine the resources that are allowed 
to be accessed by a user [49]. 
 XML Encryption: this standard provides data confidentiality by ena-
bling the encryption of fragments of an XML. The encrypted fragment 
will be replaced with an EncryptedData element containing the cipher-
text for the encrypted fragment. This standard also enables the crea-
tion of an EncryptedKey element, inside the security header, for hybrid 
encryption [50]. 
 XML Signature: this standard provides data integrity and authenticity 
by enabling the digital signature of fragments of an XML. The result of 
the signing operation will be added to the signature element of the se-
curity header [12]. 
Schema Validation and Schema Hardening  
 Schema Validation: this approach is effective in defending against at-
tacks that use messages not conforming to the WS’s description. It 
validates the incoming message against the XML schema generated 
from the WSDL of the WS [32]. 
 Schema Hardening: this approach is about restricting the WS’s de-
scription constructs to finite boundaries, removal of non-public opera-
tions from the WS description, etc. For example, Nils Gruschka and 
Norbert Luttenberger [51] proposed a system that generates XML 
schemas from the WSDL file of a WS, hardens it (e.g., converts the 
unbounded elements, maxOccurs=”unbounded” to a finite number of 
elements, maxOccurs=” finite number”), then advertises the modified 
description to the WS’s clients. It also validates the incoming messag-
es against this hardened description. 
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Possible usages of schema-hardening and schema validation to de-
fend against cyber-attacks exploiting WSs’ specific security vulnerabilities 
are as follows: 
 Attack obfuscation: validating the decrypted message [32]. 
 XML Injection: a strict schema validation on SOAP messages, includ-
ing data type validation, to eliminate the possibility of an attacker get-
ting access to restricted data [32]. 
 Oversized Cryptography: to only accept the security elements that 
are explicitly defined in the security policy (this approach is called 
Strict WS-SecurityPolicy Enforcement) [32]. However, more security 
tokens may be added to the SOAP message than those defined in the 
WS-Security Policy, making the system vulnerable to unbounded 
number of additional tokens that an attacker may add to a SOAP mes-
sage, which may cause costly cryptographic computations. This side 
effect can be mitigated by putting a limit on the number of security to-
kens that the SOAP message may contain and rejecting messages 
exceeding this limit [32], [52]. 
 Oversize Payload: restricting the message size to a pre-defined limit 
and rejecting any larger messages. Currently, .NET 2.0 framework 
employs this method and rejects any message larger than 4MB, by 
default [32]. A more appropriate approach is to modify the XML sche-
ma used in the WS’s description then validate incoming SOAP mes-
sages against this schema [51]. 
 Coercive Parsing: using schema validation to defend against deeply 
nested XML [32]. 
 SOAP Array: enforcing strict schema validation on the maximum 
number of array elements. If it is not possible to put a limit on the 
number of array elements, comparing and validating the declared and 
existing number of elements in a SOAP array thereafter dropping the 
SOAP packet at the WS layer if the validation is failed [44]. 
 XML Attribute Count and XML Element Count: to put a limit on the 
size of the components (e.g., elements and attributes) within an XML 
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tag by the developers of the WS since the XML standard doesn't im-
pose such limit [45], [53]. 
 SOAPAction Spoofing: identifying the requested operation based on 
the first child element of the SOAP message. Additionally, the identi-
fied operation should be compared with the SOAPAction value and get 
rejected if it does not match [32]. 
 Metadata Spoofing: checking all metadata documents for authenticity 
[32]. 
Firewall 
Sometimes an XML firewall is a more appropriate countermeasure 
against the attacks exploiting the WSs’ XML-related security vulnerabilities, 
such as: 
 WSDL Scanning: all request messages (internal and external) have 
the same destination IP address, TCP port, and HTTP URL. There-
fore, to reject invocation of the internal operation by the external cli-
ents, only a WS-aware XML firewall can distinguish whether an opera-
tion should be accessed by an external client [32]. 
 BPEL State Deviation: Gruschka et al. [54] proposed a firewall for 
processing and rejecting the invalid messages using as few computa-
tional resources as possible. 
 BPEL Scanning: enforcing appropriate access control mechanisms 
on the internal operations [23]. 
Other countermeasure approaches 
 Establishment of trust relationship prior to the communication (coun-
termeasure against Metadata Spoofing) [32]. 
 Deploying internal and external operations on separate WSs, prefera-
bly on different servers (countermeasure against WSDL Scanning 
and BPEL Scanning) [32] 
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Limitations of the Introduced Countermeasures 
 Here, we present a number of the limitations related to the counter-
measure approaches introduced previously: 
 Equipping a SOAP message with WS-* security standards may re-
quire changes to the structure of the message since their use may in-
troduce additional elements which did not exist previously. 
 If the employed standard is revoked, the message structure may re-
quire significant changes. 
 The difficulty, variety, and limitations of the WS-* standards as well as 
unfamiliarity of the developers with all of these standards have result-
ed in the development of WSs that are still vulnerable to cyber-attacks 
[18]. For example: 
o McIntosh and Austel [12] have shown that the content of a 
SOAP message, which is protected by an XML Signature (as 
specified in WS-Security) can be changed without invalidating 
the signature. The authors have shown that a signed element 
can be replaced with a fake element so that the signature re-
mains valid. 
o The WS-Security standard is an important defence against the 
WSs’ specific cyber-attacks but only when its corresponding 
WS-SecurityPolicy is defined correctly. Otherwise, it may cause 
integrity and confidentiality vulnerabilities, for example, it may 
no longer require the SOAP message to contain all the security 
tokens as a minimum (see Section 2.2.2 for more details) [12], 
[55]. 
o WS-SecurityPolicy header schema allows any kind and amount 
of security tokens and the encrypted blocks are allowed nearly 
everywhere within the SOAP message, which may cause costly 
cryptographic computations [32]. 
o Improper use of SOAPAction standard opens a window to 
SOAPAction Spoofing attack. 
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 Schema validation may cause high CPU load and large memory con-
sumption [32]. 
 In XML specifications, there is no limit specified for the number of 
namespace declarations per XML element and for the length of the 
namespace URIs (which enables Coercive Parsing attack). Arbitrary 
restrictions can be enforced on the number and length of the 
namespaces to defend WSs against the attacks misusing namespace 
declarations. However, it can result in unpredictable rejection of the 
messages [32]. 
 Often validators rely on XSD derived from WSDL document or hand-
coded by programmers, which may make them prone to cyber-attacks. 
 Similar to the previous limitation, manual unguided schema updates 
that rely entirely on the skills of a programmer may also make the vali-
dator prone to cyber-attacks. 
 If the schema used by the validator is loosely defined, it may allow ma-
licious messages to pass through. 
 Schema restriction and validation cannot safeguard against some 
cyber-attacks exploiting XML-related security vulnerabilities. For ex-
ample, Jenson et al. [13] have shown that even the most restrictive 
XML Schema validators may fail to defend against XML Signature 
Wrapping attacks. 
 The approaches explained above will be effective only when event-
based message processing (e.g., SAX) is employed [32]. Otherwise, 
these protection systems themselves will be vulnerable to similar at-
tacks [32]. 
 Each countermeasure only defends against specific cyber-attacks. 
2.2.3 Summary 
This section presented the security issues related to the WSs and a 
number of the existing countermeasures against WSs’ specific security vul-
nerabilities (since the focus of the work presented in this dissertation is on 
the WSs’ XML-related security vulnerabilities). It then explained a number of 
limitations related to the presented approaches.  
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In addition to all the discussions presented in this section, the security 
issue gets more challenging when OTSWSs are employed since they are 
ready-made black boxes of unknown quality and their security is out of the 
control of their clients. Hence, ITWS is a more appropriate approach to toler-
ating the security issues when OTSWSs are used, which is about making the 
system to live with the security vulnerabilities of its constituent OTSWSs to 
ensure delivery of sufficiently dependable service. This approach is the moti-
vation for the work presented in this dissertation, and one of its key benefits 
is the possibility of ensuring correct behaviour in the presence of attacks. The 
next section gives a concise overview of the concepts and techniques of de-
pendability and its relation to intrusion-tolerance. 
2.3 Dependability and Intrusion-Tolerance 
Dependability of a computing system is the capability to avoid failures 
that are more frequent or more severe, and outage durations that are longer 
than is acceptable to the user(s) [56]. It consists of threats to, the attributes 
of, and the means by which the dependability is attained (see Figure 2.8). 
Sections 2.3.1-2.3.4 present the dependability means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: The Dependability Tree [56] 
2.3.1 Fault-Prevention 
Faults may be prevented through utilization of quality control tech-
niques during the process of design and manufacturing hardware and soft-
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ware. These approaches may prevent operational physical faults, interaction 
faults and malicious faults [56]. 
2.3.2 Fault-Tolerance 
Initially, practical techniques (e.g., error control code, diagnostics to 
locate failed components, etc.) were used to improve the reliability of the ear-
ly computers [56]. At the same time Neumann, Moore, Shannon, and their 
successors developed theories of using redundant less reliable components 
to create reliable logics and structures [56]. Then Pierce unified these theo-
ries to the concept of failure tolerance and Avizienis [57] integrated redun-
dancy with practical techniques (e.g., error detection and recovery) into the 
concept of Fault-Tolerance systems. Thereafter, Randell [58] introduced 
software Fault-Tolerance, which was later complemented by N-version pro-
gramming [59].  
The objective of Fault-Tolerance is to retain the delivery of correct 
service in the presence of active faults (faults that cause an error). It is gen-
erally implemented using error detection and subsequent system recovery 
approaches [56]: 
 Error detection: it generates error signals or messages (within the 
system) and is divided into concurrent and preemptive error detection 
techniques, which operate at the run time and while service delivery is 
suspended, respectively. 
 Recovery: it transforms the system state containing error(s) and/or 
fault(s) into a state without any discovered errors and faults. It consists 
of:  
o Error handling: eliminates errors from the system state and 
may have the following forms: 
 Rollback: returning the system back to a checkpoint 
state (the state saved prior to error detection). 
 Compensation: eliminating error through redundancies 
within an erroneous state. 
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 Roll-Forward: transforming the system state to a new 
state with no detected errors. 
o Fault handling: prevents determined faults from being activat-
ed again in four steps: 
 Fault diagnosis: identifying and recording the location 
and type of the cause(s) of error(s). 
 Fault isolation: excluding the faulty component(s), 
physically or logically, from further participation in service 
delivery. 
 System reconfiguration: switching to use spare com-
ponent(s) or appointing the task(s) to fit component(s). 
 System re-initialization: checking, updating and record-
ing the new configuration and updating system data and 
records. 
The classes of faults that can be tolerated and the choice of Fault-
Tolerance implementation are directly related to the underlying fault assump-
tion [56]. However, redundancy is widely employed to implement Fault-
Tolerance and is surveyed in the various literature [60]–[62]. Assuming that 
hardware components have an independent failure, channels with identical 
design may be used to tolerate operational physical faults. Whereas, to toler-
ate solid design faults, channels providing the same functionalities via sepa-
rate designs and implementations (design diversity) should be used [56]. 
Redundancy 
Antonio Carzaniga and his colleagues [63] describe redundancy as a 
system's capability of executing the same functionality in several execution 
environments or various ways (e.g., using different execution paths). Redun-
dancy is believed to be a valid defence against physical faults. Running mul-
tiple replicas of the system and switching to the functioning one when a fail-
ure occurs is an example of using redundancy to overcome hardware faults 
[64]–[66]. Redundancy can also be applied to the code, data, and environ-
ment of a software system to overcome its non-physical faults (e.g., partial or 
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complete replication of the code, input data or execution environment, includ-
ing the execution processes themselves) [67].  
Redundancy from Architectural Viewpoint 
From a software architecture point of view, redundancy can be divided 
into intra-components, which only changes the structure of a single compo-
nent (e.g., wrappers that filter component interactions) and inter-components 
groups [63]. The Figures 2.9-2.11 present three different inter-component 
redundancy patterns: Sequential Alternative Pattern, Parallel Selection, and 
Parallel Evaluation. 
Sequential Alternative Pattern 
 
Figure 2.9: Sequential Alternative Pattern [63] 
In Sequential Alternative pattern (see Figure 2.9), an alternative pro-
gram will be executed if the execution of the current program fails. In this de-
sign, a separate Adjudicator (e.g., a voting system) is connected to the end of 
each program to detect its failure and to validate its output. This pattern is 
employed in recovery blocks, service substitution approaches, etc. [63]. 
Parallel Selection Pattern 
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Figure 2.10: Parallel Selection Pattern [63] 
Parallel Selection pattern (Figure 2.10), consists of the concurrent ex-
ecution of several programs. In this pattern, a separate Adjudicator (e.g., a 
voting system) is connected to the end of each program to detect its failure 
and to validate its output. This pattern is employed in self-checking pro-
gramming [63]. 
Parallel Evaluation Pattern  
Parallel Evaluation pattern (Figure 2.11), consists of the concurrent 
execution of several systems/programs and an Adjudicator (e.g., a voting 
system), which evaluates the result from those parallel executions to produce 
a correct result. This pattern is employed in N-version programming [63]. 
 
Figure 2.11: Parallel Evaluation Pattern [63] 
 
N-version programming 
N-version programming is a technique that concurrently executes N 
different systems/programs, which provide the same functionality but are im-
plemented differently and are fed with the same input configuration, then 
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forms a consensus on the output from all these systems/programs to produce 
the final output  [68]. The purpose of this technique is to achieve fault toler-
ance, assuming that these different systems/programs will exhibit failure di-
versity [68]. 
Diversity 
In 1975, Randell [58] introduced design diversity as a mechanism for 
software fault tolerance. He proposed using backup components (with an in-
dependent design from the main components) when main components are 
failed. Design diversity is now a recognised defence against design faults, 
and a comprehensive survey of its benefits is presented in [69]. 
 Joseph and Avizienis [70] proposed the use of diversity as a means 
of improving security and discussed the feasibility of using diverse compilers 
(implemented using N-version programming) to detect and mask Trojaned 
compilers that infect the generated executables with viruses. Later, Forrest et 
al. [71], [72] and Littlewood and Strigini [73] argued the validity and effective-
ness of using diversity to mitigate the effects of cyber-attacks. Classifications 
of diversity techniques for improving security are presented in [74], [75]. 
2.3.3 Fault-Removal 
Fault-Removal may be performed during the development phase and 
operational life. The fault removal process during the development phase 
starts by checking whether the system adheres to given properties (verifica-
tion phase). If it does not, the diagnosis phase starts checking for identifica-
tion of the fault that is preventing the verification condition to be fulfilled. Fol-
lowing on identification of the fault, necessary corrections are performed (cor-
rection phase). Finally, the system goes through verification again to make 
sure that the correction has not caused any undesirable consequences. 
Fault-Removal during the operational life of a system can be divided into two 
groups of corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance. The correc-
tive maintenance removes the faults after they have produced an error. 
Whereas, the preventive maintenance uncovers and removes the faults be-
fore they produce an error [56]. 
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2.3.4 Fault-Forecasting 
Fault-Forecasting is about the evaluation of the system behaviour 
(through modelling and testing, e.g., fault injection) with respect to fault oc-
currence or activation and has two aspects [56]: 
 Qualitative, or ordinal, evaluation (e.g., failure mode and effect 
analysis): identification, classification, and ranking of the failure 
modes or the events that would lead to system failures. 
 Quantitative, or probabilistic, evaluation (e.g., Markov chains and 
stochastic Petri nets): evaluation in terms of probabilities of the ex-
tent to which some of the attributes of dependability are satisfied. 
2.3.5 Intrusion-Tolerance 
Fault-Tolerance is not restricted to accidental faults [56]. Research on 
the integration of fault tolerance and the defences against deliberately mali-
cious faults (e.g., security threats) was started in the mid-80’s [70], [76], [77] 
and since, designs have been proposed for the tolerance of intrusions, mali-
cious logic and viruses [56]. Hence, dependability approaches may also be 
employed to implement Intrusion-Tolerance. 
2.3.6 Summary 
This section presented an overview of the concepts and techniques of 
dependability. It briefly introduced Fault-Prevention, Fault-Tolerance (includ-
ing redundancy, N-version programming, and diversity), Fault-Removal and 
Fault-Forecasting concepts and explained that dependability approaches 
could also be employed to implement Intrusion-Tolerance.  
As discussed previously, WSs allow companies and organizations to 
implement their core business only and outsource other service components 
(e.g., OTSWSs) over the Internet, either pre-selected or on-the-fly. WSs are 
at risk of security vulnerabilities related to their specific implementation tech-
nologies such as XML as well as those of their underlying platforms (e.g., 
operating systems and frameworks) and their applications (e.g., vulnerability 
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to SQL Injection attacks). Security issues become more challenging when 
OTSWSs are used since they are beyond the control of their clients. Hence, 
tolerating their security vulnerabilities through dependability techniques is a 
more appropriate approach. 
In this work, the focus is on tolerating XML-related security vulnerabili-
ties of WSs when OTSWSs are employed. It utilizes WSs’ composability, 
PCA, CA and penetration testing to implement an ITWS formed by N-version 
programming and diversity, providing Fault-Tolerance and Fault-Prevention. 
Also, the penetration test results of the OTSWSs give the providers of these 
services an opportunity to improve their security (Fault-Removal) in the future 
releases. The following sections briefly introduce each of these concepts and 
explain their role in this work. 
2.4 Penetration Testing 
Penetration testing is an attempt to break into a system not to exploit 
it, but rather to identify its weaknesses [78]. According to Tran and Dang [79], 
penetration testing is the simulation of attacks (that could be performed by 
real hackers) to identify security vulnerabilities of the target system. However, 
penetration testing is not a measure of true security, but it enables improving 
security by eliminating the anticipated security vulnerabilities. Despite ad-
vantages such as identifying security vulnerabilities hence providing coun-
termeasures for them and assisting organizations to acknowledge the effec-
tiveness or ineffectiveness of the implemented security measures, penetra-
tion testing may cause information disruption, denial of services, and infor-
mation leakage, as the individuals performing penetration tests, are usually 
granted access to substantial amounts of sensitive information [80]. Hence, it 
might not be performed on the actual operational environment, which in turn 
may affect the test results. It also has other limitations, such as limitations of 
known exploit and experiment. 
There are two types of penetration testing, black-box and white-box 
[78]. The black-box approach is commonly employed to test WAs. Regarding 
the WSs these tests are performed as follows: 
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 Black-box penetration testing: the service under test is seen from 
the point of view of an attacker. The tester maliciously manipulates the 
SOAP messages being sent to the WS, then analyses the WSs’ re-
sponse and its program execution. 
 White-box penetration testing: similar to static code analysis, this 
approach looks into the source code of the WS to identify its potential 
vulnerabilities. 
Both black-box and white-box techniques can be used to assess the 
security of a WS [81]. However, the former approach enables the under-
standing of what an unknown attacker can achieve. It can be scripted and 
performed automatically by a penetration testing tool [18], [82]. Regarding the 
WSs’, automatic penetration testing tools can be divided into tools testing the 
security vulnerabilities specific (e.g., WS-Attacker [18]) and nonspecific (e.g., 
w3af  [83]) to WSs. Otherwise, penetration testing can be done manually us-
ing other tools such as SoapUI [84]. 
In the work presented in this dissertation, penetration testing is used 
to identify the security vulnerabilities of the candidate OTSWSs, which ena-
bles the selection of the optimal set (set of OTSWSs with the most diverse 
security vulnerabilities) to implement the Intrusion-Tolerance. Diversity is par-
ticularly important because any common security vulnerabilities among 
OTSWSs (participating in ITWS) opens a window of opportunity for compro-
mising all the OTSWSs, suffering from the targeted security vulnerability, at 
the same time. Hence, such effect should be diminished as much as possi-
ble. 
2.5 Principal Component and Cluster Analysis 
This section briefly introduces the PCA and CA and their role in the 
work presented in this dissertation. 
2.5.1 Cluster Analysis 
 When dealing with large amounts of data, it is very important to be 
able to classify and group them according to various criteria. CA allows split-
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ting a group of objects (e.g., data) into a number of homogeneous subgroups 
(or clusters) using various clustering algorithms [85]. Clustering is widely 
adopted in a variety of fields, ranging from engineering (e.g., machine learn-
ing and pattern recognition), computer sciences (e.g., web mining), medical 
sciences (e.g., genetics), to earth sciences (e.g., geography), social sciences 
(e.g., psychology), and economics (e.g., marketing) [86]. 
There is no universally agreed selection of features and clustering 
schemes [87]. Most researchers describe a cluster based on the internal ho-
mogeneity (within objects in each cluster) and the external separation 
(among the objects in different clusters) [88], [89]. Xu and Wunsch [86] have 
classified the clustering algorithms (each having various descriptions), some 
of which are presented below: 
 Hierarchical: organizing data into a hierarchical structure according to 
the proximity matrix, which can be further divided to: 
o Agglomerative: starting with n clusters each containing only 
one object, followed by a series of merge operations until one 
cluster containing all the objects is left. Based on the different 
definitions for the distance between two clusters (e.g., single 
linkage, complete linkage), there are many agglomerative clus-
tering algorithms. 
o Divisive (e.g., MONA and DIANA [90]): in contrast to agglom-
erative analysis, the divisive analysis starts with a cluster con-
taining all the objects then follows a series of divisive opera-
tions, dividing objects among different clusters until only one 
object is left in each cluster.  
 Squared Error-Based (e.g., K-means [91]): aims to partition 
n objects into k clusters so that each object belongs to the cluster with 
the nearest mean. 
 pdf Estimation via Mixture Densities (e.g., GMDD [92]): from the 
probabilistic point of view, data objects are assumed to be generated 
according to several probability distributions. Hence, pdf Estimation 
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algorithm uses the probability distributions of the data objects to form 
clusters. 
 Graph Theory-Based (e.g., Chameleon [93]): this algorithm uses 
graph theory to distribute objects among different clusters. 
 Combinatorial Search Techniques-Based: aims to find the global or 
approximate optimum global for combinatorial optimization. 
 Fuzzy (e.g., FCM [94]): in the fuzzy algorithm, there is no restriction 
for each object to only belong to one cluster, and an object can belong 
to all the clusters with certain membership degree. 
 Neural Networks-Based (e.g., SOFM [95]): this algorithm uses neu-
ral networks to distribute objects among different clusters. 
2.5.2 Principal Component Analysis 
PCA [96], is a useful statistical technique for analysing datasets with 
high dimensions (when patterns are difficult to be found) by reducing their 
dimensions while retaining the variations among their data as much as pos-
sible [97]. Hence, it has found application in fields such as face recognition 
[98] and is a common technique for finding patterns in data of high dimen-
sions [99]–[101].  
Principal Components (PCs) are linear transformations of the original 
set of variables, which are uncorrelated and are ordered in a way that the first 
few PCs contain the most variation within the original dataset [97]. 
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2.5.3 Application of PCA in Cluster Analysis 
 
Figure 2.12: PCA in CA [102] 
Sometimes (when the first few PC’s contain cluster information) in lit-
erature, PCA is employed to reduce the dimensions of the dataset before CA, 
hoping to reduce the running time for CA’s computation using a fewer num-
ber of PCs [102]. However, the first few PC’s may not always contain cluster 
information [103]. Figures 2.12a and 2.12b illustrate two fictitious situations 
where the PCA pre-processing step before CA may and may not help, re-
spectively. Figure 2.12a shows that the projection of the data points on the 
first PC (the diagonal line) clearly highlights the separation between the two 
clusters in the data. Whereas, in Figure 2.12b, the projection of the data 
points on the first PC (in the direction of x2) does not preserve the separation 
between the two clusters in the data. Therefore, there is a need to investigate 
the effectiveness of PCA as the pre-processing step to CA before adopting 
such approach. 
2.5.4 Summary 
This section briefly introduced the concepts of CA and PCA. It then 
explained the utilization of PCA, prior to CA, as a means of extracting the 
structure of the clusters through reduction of dimensions of the dataset and 
showed (Figure 2.12) that such approach may not always be useful and its 
effectiveness should be investigated before being adopted. Hence, for the 
purpose of this work first, the effectiveness of PCA as a pre-processing step 
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to CA on results from penetration testing candidate OTSWSs is investigated. 
Then both PCA and CA along with further penetration testing are used to 
identify the optimal (most diverse in terms of their security vulnerabilities) set 
of OTSWSs for implementation of Intrusion-Tolerance. 
2.6 WS Orchestration and Choreography 
SOA enables the composition of several services with complementary 
functionalities to form a single value-added composite service and offer it to 
the clients through a single interface. Hence, a composite WS may consist of 
various other single and/or composite WSs.  
The constituent services of a composite WS may become unreacha-
ble for various reasons (e.g., becoming the victim of a DoS attack), which 
may impact its dependability (e.g., its integrity as it may not be able to pro-
vide the requested service). Also, more suitable (in terms of their QoS) ser-
vices, offering similar functionality as covered by composite WS’s constituent 
services, may become available. Hence, WSs capable of dynamic reconfigu-
ration would be a practical solution to address such changes. In this way, 
composite WSs can react to the changes in a timely manner while using the 
most suitable available resources and avoiding long service disruptions due 
to off-line repairs. Therefore, an increasing number of today’s services are 
developed using dynamic composition of the available resources to address 
the clients’ complex demands. 
Each building block of a composite service consists of its constitutive 
WSs (among which the tasks are divided) and a description of data, man-
agement and control flow between them [104].  Hence, a variety of specifica-
tions and standards has been introduced to support the implementation of 
composite WSs. This section reviews Web Service Choreography Interface 
(WSCI) [105], Business Process Modelling Language (BPML) [106], and 
BPEL [35]. 
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2.6.1 WSCI  
 
Figure 2.13: WSCI Collaboration [107] 
Sun, SAP, BEA, and Intalio developed the WSCI specification, which 
enables the description of the message to flow between the aggregated WSs 
in XML format. However, it does not support the definition of executable 
business processes. WSCI choreography is an extension to WSDL and de-
scribes the interactions between the operations described in the WSDL. It 
requires a WSCI interface for each WS participating in the interaction. It also 
supports conditional looping, parallel and sequential processing, and excep-
tion handling [107]. Figure 2.13 illustrates WSCI collaboration. 
2.6.2 BPML 
BPML is developed by Intalio, Sterling Commerce, SUN, and CSC. It 
has the underlying process execution as WSCI and similar process flow con-
structs and activities as BPEL. A developer can describe the public interac-
tions between the WSs and develop private implementations using WSCI 
and BPML, respectively [107]. 
2.6.3 BPEL 
Initially, Microsoft and IBM developed XLANG [108] and Web Services 
Flow Language [109], respectively, to support business flow design. Later 
Microsoft, IBM, Siebel Systems, and SAP combined these standards and 
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formed version 1.1 of the BPEL4WS, called BPEL. BPEL is a de-facto stand-
ard and an executable business process modelling language for implement-
ing composite WSs. It is a workflow language used for composition, orches-
tration, and coordination of WSs. It provides an XML-grammar to model the 
behaviour of a composite WS, for example, sharing the tasks between the 
aggregated WSs and describing the control logic among them [107]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: BPEL4WS Process Flow [107] 
BPEL is a layer on top of WSDL. It communicates with other WSs 
through their WSDL interfaces. In standard BPEL processes, the interactions 
with other WSs are modelled as PartnerLinks, which are defined statically. 
Each PartnerLink has a PartnerLinkType, indicating two WSDL PortTypes, 
one to be used by the external WS (partner) to communicate with the BPEL 
and the other to be used by the BPEL to communicate with the external WS.  
BPEL only abstractly refers to other WSs, and it is the responsibility of the 
execution engine to indicate which port (and therefore binding) should be 
used for each PortType [110]. In contrast with WSDLs, BPEL-based WSs are 
stateful and may have long-running interactions with other WSs. Hence, 
BPEL also supports the correlation of application data to the process in-
stances. 
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BPEL supports modelling of executable2 and abstract3 business pro-
cesses and offers basic (e.g., receive, reply, assign, invoke, etc.), structural 
(e.g., sequence, pick, while, forEach, etc.) and exceptions-handling activities 
[107]. It also supports synchronous and asynchronous processes [111]. Fig-
ure 2.14 presents a BPEL4WS process. 
BPEL Basic Activities  
A BPEL process starts with a receive activity, which accepts the ser-
vice request. The reply activity returns the response from the BPEL process, 
in the request-response processes. BPEL’s invoke and assign activities, in-
voke a partner WS and copy data from one location within the BPEL process 
to another, respectively.  
BPEL Structural Activities  
BPEL’s structural activities consist of other BPEL activities (basic or 
structural) and define the business logic among them. BPEL supports se-
quential (through sequence activity) and parallel (e.g., forEach activity) pro-
cesses, which are the aggregation of activities that will be executed in an or-
dered sequence and simultaneously, respectively:  
 pick activity: enables the selection of one of the alternative BPEL 
paths [111]. 
 if activity: is a conditional construct for implementing a BPEL branch 
[111].  
 while and forEach activities: provide loop constructs [111]. 
 flow activity: provides concurrent execution of BPEL activities [111]. 
BPEL Variables 
BPEL’s variables are typed (WSDL message type, XML schema primi-
tive type or XML schema element) and are used to store messages that are 
                                                          
2 Behaviour of the web services in a specific business process that can be executed by an 
orchestration engine 
3 Message exchange between the participating web services 
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exchanged within the business process or to hold data that relates to the 
state of the process [111]. 
BPEL Fault and Compensation Handling  
A BPEL process can be divided into hierarchically organized parts us-
ing scope activities, which provide behavioural context for other BPEL activi-
ties [111]. Scope activities allow the definition of faults, compensations, ter-
mination and event handlers for activities within their boundary. When a fault 
occurs within a business process (e.g., a fault is thrown by the BPEL pro-
cess), the process may successfully complete its operation only if the fault is 
handled by a scope [111].  BPEL allows defining fault-handling activities 
(catch or catchAll) within a faultHandler construct. When a fault handler 
catches a fault, the execution of the activities within the scope (to which it is 
related) stops, and exception handling process begins. If no catch is selected 
and catchAll is not present, the fault will be re-thrown to the immediately en-
closing scope, if present. Otherwise, the process will terminate abnormally 
[111]. 
In business processes, the compensation behaviour must be explicitly 
defined to reverse the effects of non-completed processes. A compensa-
tionHandler gathers all activities that have to be carried out to compensate 
the fault. If a compensationHandler is not defined for any given scope, the 
BPEL engine implicitly creates a default compensationHandler, which com-
pensates all inner scopes [111]. 
BPEL Extensibility  
BPEL is extensible and supports the inclusion of Java code snippets 
directly into the BPEL process. The benefits of this approach are speed and 
transactionality. However, the best practice is to incorporate only small seg-
ments of Java code (short utility-like operations rather than business code). 
Otherwise, the separation of the business logic from implementation will be 
lost [112]. 
 
60 | P a g e  
 
BPEL Development Tool  
There are different providers of BPEL engines (open source and 
commercial). Open source BPEL engines include ActiveBPEL [113], 
ApacheODE [114], Open ESB [115] and jBPM [116]. Commercial BPEL en-
gines include Oracle BPEL Process Manager [117], SAP Exchange Infra-
structure [118] and WebSphere Process Server [119]. 
2.6.4 Summary 
This section briefly explained the composition of WSs and introduced 
three composition approaches (BPEL, WSCI, and BPML) among which 
BPEL and BPML support development of the executable business processes 
and WSCI provides a more choreographed approach [107]. As it is ex-
plained, BPEL enables concurrent invocation of WSs, which is used in this 
work to implement Intrusion-Tolerance (through N-version programming and 
diversity) in ApacheODE BPEL.  
Also, OTSWSs may be updated (which may increase or decrease 
their security) or more secure OTSWSs (offering the same required function-
ality) may become available. Therefore, their clients should be able to re-
place them with more secure OTSWS, if they wish to. The replacement for a 
more secure OTSWS may need to be done dynamically as switching off the 
client’s system might not be acceptable. But, BPEL constructs only allow in-
vocations of OTSWSs that either already have a statically defined Part-
nerLinks or have exactly the same interface matching an existing Part-
nerLink. Otherwise, to perform the replacement, the BPEL process has to be 
redeployed. However, dynamic invocations may still be achieved through Ja-
va snippet activities that are available as BPEL extensions. Hence, this work 
also demonstrates the reconfiguration of the ITWS using a combination of 
BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL extension approach as well as using on-
ly Java as BPEL extension approach, in Oracle BPEL.  
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter first presented the overview of WSs’ architecture and in-
troduced their main technologies (SOAP, WSDL, and UDDI). It then ex-
plained that WSs are at risk of security vulnerabilities related to their specific 
implementation technologies (e.g., XML) as well as those, of their underlying 
platforms (e.g., operating systems) and WAs (e.g., vulnerability to SQL Injec-
tion attacks).  
Afterward, it presented a number of existing countermeasures against 
attacks targeting XML-related vulnerabilities followed by a list of their limita-
tions. It then argued that the issue gets more challenging when OTSWSs are 
employed, as they are ready-made black boxes of unknown quality and their 
security is out of the control of their clients, thus, tolerating their security vul-
nerabilities through a reconfigurable ITWS is a more appropriate approach.  
Then, it briefly introduced dependability approaches and explained 
that ITWS could be achieved using these techniques which (Fault-Tolerance 
and Fault-Prevention), in this work, are achieved through utilization of WSs’ 
composability, PCA, CA and penetration testing. Finally, it briefly introduced 
each of these concepts and explained the motivation for their adoption in this 
work. Next chapter presents the architecture of this reconfigurable ITWS. 
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Chapter 3 Architecture of Reconfigurable ITWS framework 
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                                  Architecture of Reconfigurable ITWS 
                        Framework 
 
 
The previous chapter briefly introduced Web Services (WSs) and their 
related security issues and discussed that a reconfigurable Intrusion-Tolerant 
Web Service (ITWS) is a suitable solution to their security issues, especially 
when Off-The-Shelf Web Services (OTSWSs) are employed.  
This chapter presents the architecture of the proposed self-
reconfigurable ITWS, which can be deployed by the clients of OTSWSs to 
diminish the impact of WSs’ (specifically XML-related) security vulnerabilities. 
It begins by explaining the overall objective (Section 3.1) followed by as-
sumptions made (Section 3.2), the overview of the architecture (Section 3.3) 
and a summary of the discussions presented in this chapter (Section 3.4). 
3.1 Objective 
The objective of this architecture is to enable the transformation of an 
ordinary BPEL process that employs OTSWS(s) into a self-reconfigurable 
ITWS as depicted in Figure 3.1.Through this architecture, every OTSWS can 
be replaced by its equivalent self-reconfigurable4 ITWS (a group of OTSWSs 
from various vendors, offering the desired functionality with security vulnera-
bilities diversity, that majority vote on their responses is considered as the 
final response). 
                                                          
4 If one group of OTSWSs fails the business process switches to an alternative group 
3 
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Framework’s Objective 
The steps to achieve the above objective are as follows: 
1. Finding as many OTSWSs (offering the desired functionality) as pos-
sible. 
2. Penetration testing each of these services to identify their security vul-
nerabilities. 
3. Performing statistical analysis on the penetration test results (from 
step 2) to form groups of 2f+1 services with security vulnerabilities di-
versity. This is because, with 2f+1 services, the majority of the re-
sponses remain correct even after as many as f failures (e.g., unavail-
ability as a result of DoS attacks in the context of this work) [120], 
[121]. A system consisting of a number of distinct components is f-
fault-tolerant if it satisfies its specification provided that no more than f 
of those components become faulty during some interval of interest 
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[120]. The f-fault-tolerant is a measure of the Fault-Tolerance support-
ed by the system architecture [120]. 
4. Penetration testing each group (from step 3) to identify the optimal set 
(the most secure among the groups) as well as to order each group in 
terms of their overall security vulnerabilities (ascending order starting 
with the most secure group). 
5. Starting the business process with the first group (most secure group) 
and switch to the next group if the first group fails and so on. 
6. Perform majority voting on the responses from OTSWSs within the 
running group to indicate the response of the ITWS. 
3.2 Assumptions 
This section presents the assumptions made in this framework: 
 There are a sufficient number of candidate OTSWSs (offering the de-
sired functionality) to implement Intrusion-Tolerance. 
 Permission is granted by the owners of OTSWSs to perform penetra-
tion testing on these services since it may cause information disrup-
tion, denial of services and/or information leakage. 
 It is possible to integrate the external penetration testing tool into this 
framework. 
3.3 Architecture 
 
Figure 3.2: General Architecture, the dotted lines indicate the external systems 
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The architecture (see Figure 3.2) of this framework consists of various 
repositories, an Administrator, a Services Manager (SM), a Service-Groups 
Manager (SGM), a Business Process (BP) and two other business processes 
(one for testing OTSWSs and one for testing groups of OTSWSs). It is nec-
essary to test OTSWSs inside a business process as they may eventually 
participate in the BP. Hence, any effect from the business process engine 
should be taken into account when testing OTSWSs. Also, separate business 
processes (with the exact setup as BP) than BP should be used for testing 
purposes to eliminate the effects of penetration testing on the operation of BP 
that executes the business logic. 
Based on the case studies presented in Chapter 7, the dynamic adap-
tation using Java as BPEL extension only, and a combination of Java snip-
pets and BPEL constructs can be implemented using about 400 and 260 
lines of codes, respectively. The service selection is performed manually in 
the case studies (Chapters 4-6) aiming to evaluate the proposed service se-
lection approach. 
Repositories 
 This architecture consists of the following repositories: 
 Services Repository (Table 3.1): is managed by the Administrator 
and is used by SM, SGM, and BP. It stores required information for in-
voking candidate OTSWSs. Each OTSWS may offer more than one 
service, which may be invoked at different stages of the BP, or have 
different versions. Hence, this repository stores each of these services 
separately with a unique Id. 
o ID: a unique Id is assigned to each service. 
o Service Name: stores the name of the OTSWS. 
o Endpoint: stores the web address (URL) of the OTSWS 
through which the operations provided by the OTSWS are ac-
cessible. 
o Target Namespace: stores the namespace of the OTSWS.  
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o Invocation Id: indicates at which stage of the BP this service 
may be invoked. 
o Operation Name: each OTSWS may offer more than one ser-
vices (operations). This column stores the name of the service 
that could be used in the BP. 
o Input: stores the type and order of the service’s inputs parame-
ters. 
o Output: stores the type of the service’s output parameter. 
 Penetration Tests Repository (Table 3.2): is managed by the Ad-
ministrator and is used by SM and SGM. It stores information about 
available penetration tests and their settings (the Administrator makes 
these decisions). 
o Test Id: each test may be performed with various settings (e.g., 
Coercive Parsing may be performed with various numbers of 
open tags). Hence, this repository stores each test separately 
with a unique Id. 
o Test Name: stores the name of the test. 
o Test Setting: stores the setting to be used for the test. 
 Services Penetration Tests Results Repository (Table 3.3): is 
managed by SM and is used by SGM. It stores the information about 
penetration test results of each OTSWS. 
o Service Id: stores the Id of the tested OTSWS. 
o Test Id: stores the Id of the penetration test performed on the 
OTSWS. 
o Test Date: stores the date when the penetration test is per-
formed on the OTSWS. 
o Test Result: stores the penetration test result (e.g., whether 
the penetration test has been successful or not). 
 Service-Groups Repository (Table 3.4): is managed by SGM and is 
used by BP. Recall (see section 3.1) that in this framework OTSWSs 
are grouped based on their penetration test results and that the result-
ant groups are ordered in terms of their overall security vulnerabilities 
(ascending order starting with the most secure group), this repository 
stores information about service groups. 
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o Service-Group Id: it associates services to different service 
groups identified by a Service-Group Id. 
o Service Id: stores the Id of the OTSWSs enabling BP to re-
trieve, from the SR, the required information for invoking them. 
o Invocation Id: indicates at which stage of the BP the services 
from this group should be invoked. 
o Order Number: indicates the order of the selection of the 
groups. The service group with the lowest orderNumber has the 
highest overall security among other groups, and the business 
process should start with that group and switch to the next 
group if it fails and so on. 
 Groups Penetration Tests Results Repository (Table 3.5): is man-
aged and used by SGM. It stores the information about penetration 
test results of each group of OTSWS. 
o Service-Group Id: stores the Id of the tested service group. 
o Test Id: stores the Id of the penetration test performed on the 
service group. 
o Test Date: stores the date when the penetration test is per-
formed on the service group. 
o Test Result: stores the penetration test result (e.g., whether 
the penetration test has been successful or not). 
 Failure Records Repository (Table 3.6): is managed by BP and is 
used by the Administrator. It stores information about runtime failures 
of each OTSWS. 
Table 3.1: Services Repository (SR) 
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Table 3.2: Penetration Tests Repository (PTR) 
Test Id Test Name Test Setting 
T1 Coercive Parsing 1500 open tags 
T2 Coercive Parsing 2000 open tags 
: : : 
Tn Hash Collision  1000 colliding attributes 
 
Table 3.3: Services Penetration Tests Results Repository (SPTRR) 
Service Id Test Id Test Date Test Result 
S1 T1 dd/mm/yyyy Passed 
S1 T2 dd/mm/yyyy Failed 
: : : : 
Sn Tn dd/mm/yyyy Failed 
 
Table 3.4: Service-Groups Repository (SGR) 
Service-Group Id Service Id Invocation Id Order Number 
G1 S1 Inv1 1 
G1 S2 Inv1 1 
: : : : 
Gn Sn Inv1 x 
 
Table 3.5: Groups Penetration Tests Results Repository (GPTRR) 
Service-Group Id Test Id Test Date Test Result 
G1 T1 dd/mm/yyyy Passed 
G1 T2 dd/mm/yyyy Failed 
: : : : 
Gn Tn dd/mm/yyyy Failed 
 
Table 3.6: Failure Records Repository (FRR) 
Failure Id Service Id Failure Date Failure Time 
F1 S1 dd/mm/yyyy .. : .. 
: : : : 
Fn S1 dd/mm/yyyy .. : .. 
 
Administrator 
 An Administrator is a person (the only human in this architecture) who 
is in charge of: 
 Instantiating the framework. 
 Designing the BP. 
 Finding desired OTSWSs and adding their records to the SR. 
 Recording new versions of an existing OTSWS as a new service into 
SR (it facilitates N-version programming). 
 Removing the record of OTSWSs from SR, FRR, and SPTRR, if they 
should no longer be used (are no longer available or their number of 
failures, reported by BP, is very high). 
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 Recording the information about available penetration tests along with 
their setting (a separate record for each setting) into the PTR. 
 Removing the records for penetration tests (that are no longer availa-
ble) from the PTR and SPTRR. 
Services Manager 
The role of the SM is to test the services and record the test results 
through the following steps: 
1. Retrieves the information about the service from the SR.  
2. Adds to the ‘Service Test Business Process’, the information required 
for invoking the service.  
3. Retrieves the information about penetration tests and their settings 
from PTR. 
4. Uses the ‘Service Test Business Process’, tests information collected 
in step 3, and the external penetration testing tool to test the service.  
5. Records the test result into SPTRR. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Combined SM and SGM Operation Intervals. The solid lines and dotted lines indicate 
SM and SGM operation intervals, respectively 
SM performs steps 1-5 above in the following cases: 
 Periodically (refer to Figure 3.3, every i time units) tests all services 
recorded in SR. OTSWSs may go under un-versioned updates, which 
may affect their security vulnerabilities, for example, switching off the 
schema validation through WS’s source code: [(BindingProvider) 
wsClient).getRequestContext().put("set-jaxb-validation-event-handler", 
"false"]. Or services may be removed from SR. Hence, SM periodically 
tests all the services available in SR and updates SPTRR. 
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 Periodically (refer to Figure 3.3, every j time units) checks whether a 
new service or a new failure is recorded in SR and FRR, respectively, 
and if it is, it tests that particular service. The runtime failure of an 
OTSWS, reported by BP, might be as a result of un-versioned chang-
es to that service. Hence, it should be tested. 
Service-Groups Manager  
The role of the SGM is to group and test services having the same in-
vocationId. It fulfils this task through following steps: 
1. Retrieves, from the SPTRR, the penetration tests results of all the 
OTSWSs having the same invocationId. 
2. Performs statistical analysis and groups OTSWSs based on their se-
curity vulnerabilities diversity and record the result into SGR. 
3. For every group: 
a. Retrieves from the SR the record of every OTSWS in that 
group.  
b. Adds the information required for invoking the group to the 
‘Group Test Business Process’.  
c. Retrieves the information about penetration tests and their set-
tings from PTR. 
d. Uses the ‘Group Test Business Process’, tests information col-
lected in the previous step, and external penetration testing tool 
to test the group.  
e. Records the test result into GPTRR. 
f. Assigns an orderNumber to each group after comparing their 
penetration test results. 
SGM repeats the above steps for every invocationId. Also, every k 
time units (Refer to Figure 3.3) it checks SPTRR for changes related 
to the addition of a new penetration test record or deletion of an exist-
ing one. In the event of these changes, SGM repeats the above steps 
for all the services having the same invocationId as the service that 
the change is related to. It then performs the grouping process from 
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scratch since addition or removal of an OTSWS requires the re-
creation of all related groups. 
Business Process 
BP uses SR and SGR to add groups of OTSWSs into the business 
process. It starts with the groups having the lowest orderNumber (the most 
secure among other groups). To catch any failure, BP invokes each group of 
OTSWSs from inside a scope activity (introduced in the previous chapter) 
and uses its faultHandler facility. In the event of group’s execution failure, BP 
repeats their execution one more time, and if it fails again, BP records the 
failure and switches to the group with the next orderNumber. BP adopts the 
same approach throughout the business process execution cycle.  
3.4 Summary 
 This chapter presented the architecture for the proposed framework 
along with its objectives and the assumptions made. It then explained the 
role of each of its components and the interactions among them. The next 
chapter evaluates this framework through various case studies.  
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Chapter 4 ITWS Formed Based on Penetration Test Results of Candidate WSs  
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                                     ITWS Formed Based on Penetration Test 
                       Results of Candidate WSs 
 
Previous chapters have presented the background and motivations, 
and the architecture for the proposed framework. As discussed previously, 
diversity is a valid and effective approach to mitigating the effects of cyber-
attacks. In this work, diversity is achieved through penetration testing candi-
date OTSWSs. This chapter uses a case study to evaluate the feasibility of 
using penetration test results of candidate OTSWSs as a means of achieving 
diversity for implementation of ITWS.  
In particular, Section 4.1 briefly introduces the third-party penetration 
testing tool that is used in the case studies presented in this work. Section 
4.2 demonstrates the feasibility of ITWS; formed based on penetration tests 
results of candidate OTSWSs, in terms of mitigating the XML-related security 
vulnerabilities. Section 4.3 provides the summary of the discussions present-
ed in this chapter. 
4.1 Penetration Testing Tool, WS-Attacker 
The proposed framework is not based on any specific penetration test-
ing tool or method (the penetration testing tool itself is not part of the frame-
work). Therefore, the type of penetration tests and how they should be per-
formed depends on the selected penetration testing tool. 
For evaluation of the proposed framework, a third-party penetration 
testing tool was required. WS-Attacker [18], SoapUI [84], WSFuzzer [122], 
4 
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and WSFAggressor (which is also based on WS-Attacker) [123] enable pene-
tration testing WSs for XML-related security vulnerabilities, which is the focus 
of this work. However, except WS-Attacker, they either support fewer num-
bers of attack types and do not provide attack evaluation (in the case of 
SoapUI and WSFuzzer) or require access to the system under test (in the 
case of WSFAggressor) [40]. Hence, WS-Attacker is selected, which also 
enables automatic penetration testing.  
WS-Attacker is an open source penetration testing tool, which enables 
automatic tests for XML-specific security vulnerabilities. It consists of a 
framework and plugin architecture (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of WS-Attacker and Its Processing Steps [18] 
Figure 4.2 presents the component diagram for WS-Attacker, which 
shows that each plugin connects to its framework through an interface.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Component Diagram for WS-Attacker 
< component > 
Plug-in n 
< component > 
Plug-in 2 
< component > 
Plug-in 1 
< component > 
WS-Attacker 
Plug-in 1 API Plug-in n API Plug-in 2 API 
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4.1.1 WS-Attacker Framework 
WS-Attacker’s framework is based on SoapUI [84] and sets up an en-
vironment for attacking WSs to identify their XML-related security vulnerabili-
ties. It requires the user to load the Web Service Description Language 
(WSDL) document of the WS that should be tested. It then parses the loaded 
WSDL, presents the extracted operations to the user and generates Simple 
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) requests based on the extracted information. 
To setup the WS-Attacker’s environment, the user should: 
1. Select the target operation 
2. Send a test request to the target operation through the user interface 
provided by WS-Attacker. From the response of the WS to the test re-
quest, WS-Attacker can identify the normal state of the WS and ana-
lyse the attack results accordingly.  
3. Select and configure the attack plugins related to the attacks against 
which the WS should be assessed. 
4. Run the framework to perform the selected attacks on the WS. 
Upon successful attack completion, WS-Attacker presents the attack re-
sult to the user. The attack result indicates whether the attack has been suc-
cessful and its criticality score [18]. The attack‘s success (true or false) de-
pends on whether a security vulnerability is detected. The score indicates the 
potential damage the attack can cause and is calculated by WS-Attacker in 
different ways for each attack plugin (for example, see SOAPAction Spoofing 
attack plugins in Section 4.1.2). 
4.1.2 WS-Attacker Plugin  
In WS-Attacker, the attacks are implemented as plugins. Each plugin 
is an implementation of a model of an adversary performing one type of at-
tack and allows the user to set various parameters, such as the number of 
parallel attack threads, number of requests per thread, milliseconds between 
every test-probe request, and milliseconds between every attack request. 
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WS-Attacker is extendable and provides a plugin interface enabling 
new attack plugins to be added [18]. A number of attack plugins have been 
developed for WS-Attacker by its developers and other researchers [18], [40], 
[41].  
SOAPAction Spoofing Attack Plugins 
SOAPAction Spoofing is one of the attack plugins of WS-Attacker [18]. 
It provides automatic and manual attack options. In the automatic mode, it 
generates attack requests with all possible SOAPAction headers and sends 
them to the WS under test. However, in manual mode, the user is allowed to 
set the SOAPAction header manually. According to the developers of this 
attack plugin, possible responses from a WS to a SOAPAction Spoofing at-
tack are as follows: 
a) A SOAP fault message, which is the proper response to a SOAPAc-
tion Spoofing attack. 
b) A server error or misconfiguration message. 
c) Execution of the first operation in the body of the message, meaning 
that the SOAPAction header is only checked by the HTTP firewall 
while it is ignored by the WS’s logic. 
d) Execution of the operation defined in the SOAPAction header, mean-
ing that the operation to be executed is solely selected based on the 
SOAPAction value. 
This plugin interprets (b), (c) or (d) responses (listed above) as a success-
ful attack [18]. It also rates the vulnerability to the performed attack in per-
centage, based on the difficulty of the execution of the attack and the impact 
it may have on the WS under test. For example, response (d) indicates a 
more vulnerable WS because the attack is easier to execute, it only requires 
changes to the SOAPAction element [18].  
Mainka et al. [18] have tested this plugin on Apache Axis2 v1.6.1, 
JBossWS Native 6.0, JBossWS CXF 7.0 and .Net WSs 3.0, WS frameworks 
and the results have shown the vulnerability of all these frameworks to this 
type of attack. Within the named frameworks, Apache Axis2 and .Net WSs 
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are identified as the most vulnerable frameworks, as they always execute the 
operations defined in the SOAPAction header. 
Denial of Service Attack Plugins 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are one of the most popular attacks, 
which can be performed through a variety of techniques [40]. History of such 
attacks, targeting well-known companies, such as VISA and PayPal, indi-
cates that they can be a serious threat to today’s IT infrastructure [40]. Other 
examples of this type of attacks are called HashDoS attacks, which exploit 
the weakness of a hash-mapping algorithm implementation [42], [43]. Re-
garding the WSs, DoS attacks can exploit the vulnerabilities in XML-based 
documents (e.g., SOAP messages) targeting the parsing mechanisms and 
other resources, affecting the availability of the WS. 
Falkenberg et al. [40] have developed a number of fully automatic DoS 
attack plugins for WS-Attacker enabling the identification of the WSs’ vulner-
ability to Coercive Parsing, SOAP Array, XML Attribute Count, XML Element 
Count, XML Entity Expansion, XML External Entity, XML Overlong Names 
and HashDoS attacks. In implementing these plugins, they have assumed 
that the tester does not have direct access to the WS under attack, and can 
only examine its vulnerability by sending payloads to its server then evaluat-
ing its response time. They have defined the response time as the time when 
the last byte of the request is sent to the server until the first byte of the re-
sponse is received from the server. These attack plugins test a WS for vul-
nerability to DoS attacks as follows [40]: 
1. They send the user-defined untampered requests (extended to the 
size of the tampered requests) to the WS then log the response times. 
According to the developers of these attack plugins, the extension to 
the size of the untampered requests does not cause DoS attack and if 
it does it will be clearly indicated in the result to eliminate false posi-
tive. 
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2. After a user-defined elapsed time, they send the tampered requests 
(with the same load patterns as the untampered ones) to the WS then 
log the response times. 
3. They calculate the ratio of the median of the response times of the last 
10 (or the maximum number of requests if less than 10 requests are 
sent) tampered requests to the median of the last 10 (or the maximum 
number of requests if less than 10 requests are sent) untampered re-
quests (see Equation 4.1). The attack success is decided according to 
the threshold values (see Table 4.1) that are chosen based on pre-
tests on vulnerable and non-vulnerable WSs. 
𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑅 =  
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 10 𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 10 𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
          (4.1) 
Table 4.1: WS-Attacker’s DoS Attack Success Metrics [40] 
Metric Value Rating 
ARTR < 3 Payload ineffective 
3 ≤ ARTR < 6 Payload effective 
6 ≤ ARTR Payload highly effective 
 
In designing these attack plugins, all major errors, such as the in-
crease in response time because of various message sizes or various net-
work loads, are eliminated [40]. 
These plugins also test for DoS attack’s effect on third-party users 
(who visit the WS under attack) by continuously sending test requests to the 
target WS at constant user-defined intervals and in parallel to testing the WS 
for vulnerability to DoS attack. The attack’s effect on the third-party users is 
decided by comparing the median of the response times of all simulated 
third-party requests (MRTTPR), after starting to send first tampered request, 
with the threshold values (see Table 4.2) that are considered an acceptable 
response time by the developers of these attack plugins. They believe that 
longer response times than these thresholds exponentially increases the us-
ers’ annoyance level [40].  
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Table 4.2: WS-Attacker’s DoS Attack’s Effect Metrics on Third-Party Users [40] 
Metric Value Rating 
MRTTPR < 2 sec no or small effect on third-party users 
2 ≤ MRTTPR < 5 third-party users are affected 
5 ≤ MRTTPR third-party users are highly affected 
 
Falkenberg et al. [40] have tested a number of these attack plugins on 
Apache Axis2, Apache CXF, Metro, and ASP .Net frameworks as well as the 
IBM DataPower XI50 XML Security Gateway. The results of these tests (see 
Table 4.3) show that ASP .Net and IBM XI50 are not vulnerable to any of 
these DoS attacks while Apache Axis2, Apache CXF, and Metro frameworks 
are vulnerable to at least one of these DoS attack. 
Table 4.3: Results of Testing DoS Attack Plugins on a Number of Web service Frameworks [40] 
 
 
 
 
Attack Name 
 
 
Axis2 
 
 
CXF 
 
 
Metro 
 
 
ASP .Net 
 
 
IBM XI50 
Coercive Parsing Yes Yes x x x 
DJBX31A Hash Collision Yes Yes Yes x x 
DJBX33A Hash Collision x x x x x 
DJBX33X Hash Collision x x x x x 
XML Attribute Count Yes Yes Yes x x 
XML Element Count x Yes x x x 
XML Entity Expansion x x x x x 
XML External Entity x x x x x 
XML Overlong Names x x x x x 
 
4.2 Case Study: Feasibility of ITWS Formed Based on 
Penetration Test Results of Candidate WSs 
This section uses a case study (the author’s work published in [124]), 
to demonstrate the feasibility of using penetration test results of candidate 
OTSWSs as a means of achieving diversity for implementation of ITWS. 
The objective of this case study is to exemplify the implementation of 
an ITWS using WSs selected based on their security vulnerabilities identified 
through penetration testing, and testing its effectiveness as a defence against 
XML-related DoS attacks. The remainder of this section presents the proce-
dure of this case study. 
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4.2.1 WSs Preparation 
For this case study the following stock purchase WSs is developed: 
 Two WSs developed using Apache Axis2 1.5.1 framework and were 
deployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 running on Intel® Core™ i5-
3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit 
Operating System. 
 Two WSs developed using .NET 4.0 framework and were deployed on 
Intel® Core™ 2 Duo CPU P8400@ 2.26GHz system with 3.00GB 
RAM and 32-bit Operating System. 
Also, one third-party ASP.NET WS [125], which provides similar stock 
purchase functionality, is employed.  
4.2.2 Penetration Tests Settings 
In this study, Coercive Parsing attack is performed on these services 
with WS-Attacker’s settings presented in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4: WS-Attacker’s Settings 
 
Test Message Settings 
 
WS-Attacker’s other Settings 
 
 
Coercive Parsing with 75,000 open 
tags plotted in the body of the SOAP 
message 
 
2 parallel attack threads, 
4 requests per thread, 
500 milliseconds between every testprobe request, 
750 milliseconds between every attack request, 
4 seconds server recovery time, 
5 seconds stop after the last tampered request 
 
4.2.3 WSs’ Penetration Test Results 
Each WS is tested individually for security vulnerability to Coercive 
Parsing attack, using WS-Attacker’s settings shown in Table 4.4. The pene-
tration test results of these WSs are presented in Table 4.5.  In this table, 
100% indicates that the WS is vulnerable to Coercive Parsing attack and 1% 
shows that it does not have this security vulnerability. 
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4.2.4 ITWS Implementation 
The ITWS is implemented through the composition of the three 
ASP.NET services and one of the Axis2 services (four highlighted services in 
Table 4.5), using BPEL 2.0 plugin for Eclipse 3.4. It is then deployed on 
Apache Ode 1.2 runtime (on top of Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 server) on the 
same machine that is hosting the Axis2 WSs (Intel® Core™ i5-3320M CPU 
@ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Operating System). 
Figure 4.3 presents the overview of this BPEL process.  
 
Figure 4.3: BPEL Diagram of the ITWS 
The operation of this ITWS is as follows: 
1. Receives client’s request. 
2. Initializes variable associated to each concurrent invocation process 
(each invocation process is responsible for invoking one of the ITWS’s 
four constituent services) to 0. 
3. Passes the client’s request to each of the parallel invocation process-
es. 
4. Each concurrent invocation process invokes its associated WS. 
5. Each concurrent invocation process sets its associated variable to 1 
upon receiving a response from its associated WS. 
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6. Once three responses are returned by three of the constituent ser-
vices (three of the variables associated to the invocation processes 
are having the value of 1), the BPEL scope (the concurrent invocation 
processes are wrapped within a BPEL scope which provides excep-
tion handling, see Section 2.6 for further details) throws an exception. 
7. The exception handler terminates the concurrent invocation process-
es. 
8. The business process replies to the client. 
4.2.5 ITWS’s Penetration Test Results 
The ITWS is tested for security vulnerability to Coercive Parsing attack 
using WS-Attacker with the same settings that were used to test individual 
services (see Table 4.4).  
Table 4.5: Penetration Tests Results 
               
                 WS Framework 
 
 
 
Axis2 
WS 
 
Axis2 
WS 
 
ASP.Net 
WS 
 
ASP.Net 
WS 
 
ASP.Net 
WS 
 
 
 
 
ITWS 
Penetration test result for 
Coercive Parsing attack 
 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
 
 
1% 
 
The last column of Table 4.5 presents the penetration test result for 
this ITWS and indicates that it is not vulnerable to Coercive Parsing DoS at-
tack (1% denotes that the WS under test does not have this security vulnera-
bility). 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter briefly introduced the penetration testing tool that is used 
in the case studies presented in this work. It then demonstrated the feasibility 
of ITWS formed using WSs with security vulnerabilities diversity (identified 
through penetration testing) using a case study. Chapter 8 uses the outcome 
of this case study to evaluate the proposed framework. 
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Chapter 5 Effects of BPEL on WSs’ XML-Related Security Vulnerabilities  
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                                      Effects of BPEL on WSs’ XML-Related 
                   Security Vulnerabilities                       
 
In this work, Intrusion-Tolerance is implemented using Business Pro-
cess Engineering Language (BPEL). Hence, the effect of BPEL on the secu-
rity vulnerabilities of Off-The-Shelf Web Services (OTSWSs) should be con-
sidered in the selection of these services. This chapter uses a case study to 
demonstrate that BPEL could affect the security vulnerabilities of WSs. 
Hence, penetration testing for service selection should be performed while 
OTSWSs are wrapped in a BPEL process.  
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate the case study and the summary of 
the discussions presented in this chapter, respectively. 
5.1 Case Study: Effects of BPEL on WSs’ XML-
Related Security Vulnerabilities 
This section uses a case study to demonstrate (from the point of view 
of WS-Attacker) that BPEL could affect the XML-related security vulnerabili-
ties of WSs. The remainder of this section presents the procedure of this 
case study. 
5.1.1 WS Preparation 
For this case study, a simple WS is developed using the source code 
presented in Code 5.1 and Axis2 1.6.1 WS framework. This service is de-
ployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 server running on Intel® Core™ i5-3320M 
5 
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CPU @ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Operating Sys-
tem. This WS provides two simple sum and factorial services (see Code 5.1). 
Code 5.1: Source Code for the Developed WSs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.2 WS Wrapped within BPEL process 
 
Figure 5.1: BPEL Process for Wrapping the Developed WSs. 
 
package Axis_Tom_6; 
public class Axis_Tom_6_sum { 
    public int addIntegers (int firstNum, int secondNum) { 
        return firstNum + secondNum; 
    }     
    public int factorial(int n) { 
        int result = 1;         
        for (int i = 1; i <= n; i++) { 
            result = result * i; 
        }         
        return result; 
    } 
} 
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The service from Section 5.1.1 is wrapped in a BPEL process (see 
Figure 5.1) developed using BPEL 2.0 plugin for Eclipse Neon.2 4.6.2. And 
was deployed on Apache 1.3.4 runtime (on top of Tomcat  5.5.26 server) 
running on Intel® Core™ i5-3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB 
usable RAM and 64-bit Operating System. The operation of this BPEL pro-
cess is as follows: 
1. Receives client’s request. 
2. Assigns the client’s request to the invocation process that invokes the 
WS (from Section 5.1.1). 
3. Invokes the WS. 
4. Assigns the response from the WS to the output of the BPEL process. 
5. Replies the response from the WS to the client. 
5.1.3 Penetration Tests Settings 
In this study, Coercive Parsing, DJBX31A Hash Collision, and XML At-
tribute Count attacks are performed on these services (WSs from Sections 
5.1.1 and 5.1.2). Table 5.1 presents the WS-Attacker’s settings for each of 
these tests.  
Table 5.1: WS-Attacker’s Settings 
 
Test ID 
 
Test Message Settings 
 
WS-Attacker’s other Settings 
 
Test 1 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 3,000 
open tags plotted in the header of the 
SOAP message 
 
 
2 parallel attack threads, 
4 requests per thread, 
500 milliseconds between every testprobe 
request, 
750 milliseconds between every attack 
request, 
4 seconds server recovery time, 
5 seconds stop after the last tampered 
request 
 
 
Test 2 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 11,000 
open tags plotted in the body of the 
SOAP message 
 
Test 3 
 
DJBX31A Hash Collision attack with 
2,000 paired keys/values plotted in the 
header of the SOAP message 
 
Test 4 
 
XML Attribute Count attacks with 
50,000 paired keys/values plotted in the 
header of the SOAP message 
 
5.1.4 Attack Elements for Test SOAP Messages 
 In the penetration tests performed on these services, the attack ele-
ment is either plotted in the header or the body of the test SOAP message as 
presented in Message 5.1 and Message 5.2, respectively.  
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Message 5.1: Test SOAP Message with Attack Element Plotted in its Header 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Message 5.2: Test SOAP Message with Attack Element Plotted in its Body.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In each type of attack, the attack element is replaced as follows: 
 Coercive Parsing Attack: AttackElement is replaced with various 
number of open tags (e.g., <X><X>…</X></X>). 
 DJBX31A Hash Collision Attack: AttackElement is replaced with 
<attackElement $$PAYLOADATTR$$> test </attackElement> and 
$$PAYLOADATTR$$ element is replaced with various number paired 
keys/values (e.g., tttttt="0" ttttuU="1" ttttv6="2").  
 XML Attribute Count Attack: AttackElement is replaced with <at-
tackElement $$PAYLOADATTR$$> test </attackElement> and 
 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:axis="http://Axis_Tom_6"> 
   <soapenv:Header> AttackElement </soapenv:Header> 
   <soapenv:Body> 
      <axis:addIntegers> 
         <axis:firstNum>1</axis:firstNum> 
         <axis:secondNum>2</axis:secondNum> 
      </axis:addIntegers> 
   </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:axis="http://Axis_Tom_6"> 
   <soapenv:Header></soapenv:Header> 
   <soapenv:Body> 
       AttackElement       
      <axis:addIntegers> 
         <axis:firstNum>1</axis:firstNum> 
         <axis:secondNum>2</axis:secondNum> 
      </axis:addIntegers> 
   </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
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$$PAYLOADATTR$$ element is replaced with various number paired 
keys/values (e.g., a0="0" a1="1" a2="2"). 
5.1.5 Penetration Tests Results 
The services developed in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are tested using 
WS-Attacker’s settings shown in Table 5.1. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the 
component diagram for direct penetration testing the Axis2 WS (WS from 
Section 5.1.1) and for penetration testing this WS while it is wrapped in a 
BPEL process (WS from Section 5.1.2), respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.2: The Component Diagram for Direct Penetration Testing of the  
WS in this Case Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The Component Diagram for Penetration Testing of the WS in this Case Study while 
it is wrapped in a BPEL Process. 
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Figures 5.4a-5.4d and 5.5a-5.5d show the penetration test results for 
each test attack performed on Axis2 WS (WS from Section 5.1.1) when it is 
tested directly and when it is tested while wrapped in a BPEL process (WS 
from Section 5.1.2), respectively.  The penetration test results show the vul-
nerability of these WSs to the performed attacks in percentage so that 100% 
indicates that the WS is very vulnerable to the attack and 1% shows that it 
does not have this security vulnerability.  
Each test is repeated ten times (to increase the confidence of the out-
come of these tests) and the average of the results is considered. Because, 
these test plugins decide on the security vulnerability of the WSs based on 
their response times that slightly differs every time the same test is per-
formed. The vertical and horizontal lines in these graphs (Figures 5.4a-5.4d 
and 5.5a-5.5d) show the result of the penetration test every time the same 
test is performed and the average of the penetration test results for each test, 
respectively. 
These results demonstrate that BPEL affects the XM-related security 
vulnerabilities of WSs (from the point of view of WS-Attacker). In some cases 
(Coercive Parsing plotted in the header, DJBX31A Hash Collision, and XML 
Attribute Count attacks) it has improved the vulnerability, and in other cases, 
it has worsen it (Coercive Parsing plotted in the body attack). Hence, it is a 
better approach to perform penetration testing while OTSWSs are wrapped in 
a BPEL process, as in this framework the ITWS is implemented using BPEL 
so its effects on the security vulnerabilities of the OTSWSs should also be 
taken into account. 
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Figure 5.4: Results from Direct Penetration Testing Axis2-1.6.1 WS(for information about each 
test see Table 5.1) 
 
Figure 5.5: Penetration Test Results for Axis2-1.6.1WS while it was wrapped in a BPEL Process 
(for information about each test see Table 5.1)
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5.2 Summary 
This chapter used a case study to demonstrate (from the point of view 
of WS-Attacker) that BPEL could affect the XML-related security vulnerabili-
ties of WSs. It improved the security vulnerabilities to Coercive Parsing (plot-
ted in the header), DJBX31A Hash Collision and XML Attribute Count at-
tacks while increasing security vulnerability to Coercive Parsing (plotted in 
the body) attack. The outcome of this case study is used in the service se-
lection case study, presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Security-Aware Selection of Optimal Group of WSs using PCA and CA, for Implemen-
tation of TWS  
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                                      Security-Aware Selection of Optimal Group 
                       WSs using PCA and CA, for       
                   Implementation of ITWS                  
 
In this work, ITWS is achieved through penetration testing candidate 
OTSWSs, grouping these services based on their security vulnerabilities di-
versity (using PCA and CA), ordering the groups according to their overall 
security vulnerabilities (identified through penetration testing), and starting 
the ITWS with services from the most secure group and switch to the next 
group if it fails and so on.  
This chapter uses a case study to explain and exemplify the proposed 
service selection framework. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate the case 
study and the summary of the discussions presented in this chapter, respec-
tively. 
6.1 Case Study: Security-Aware Selection of Optimal 
Group of WSs using PCA and CA, for Implementation 
of ITWS 
This section uses a case study to evaluate the effectiveness of PCA 
and CA utilization in security-aware service selection based on penetration 
tests results of the candidate OTSWSs. The objective of this case study is to 
explain and exemplify the proposed service selection framework. The re-
mainder of this section presents the procedure of this case study. 
6 
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6.1.1 WS Preparation 
As previously discussed, this framework is based on diverse 
OTSWSs (open source WSs). However, OTSWSs could not be used for this 
case study because 
1. There was not an adequate number of third-party WSs offering similar 
services (e.g., third-party WSs offering stock purchasing service). 
2. We did not have permission to perform penetration testing on the 
available third-party WSs.  
Hence, for this case study, six WSs are developed using the source 
code presented in Code 5.1 (Chapter 5) and various WSs’ frameworks. 
These services are deployed on either Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 or Apache 
Tomcat 7.0.72 servers running on Intel® Core™ i5-3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz 
system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Operating System. However, in 
the utilization of this framework if more in-house WSs should be used (e.g., 
lack of adequate number of OTSWSs), these WSs can be run on different 
servers (other than the one running the ITWS) to avoid scalability issues. 
The details of the six services developed for this case study are as 
follows: 
 S1: Axis1 4 deployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 server 
 S2: Axis2 1.5.1 deployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 server 
 S3: Axis2 1.6.1 deployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 server 
 S4: CXF 2.3.10 deployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 server 
 S5: CXF 2.5.11 deployed on Apache Tomcat 7.0.72 server 
 S6: CXF 2.6.3 deployed on Apache Tomcat 7.0.72 server 
The Web Service Description Language (WSDL) files of these ser-
vices are presented in Appendices A-F. 
6.1.2 WSs Wrapped within BPEL processes 
Recall from the result of the case study presented in Chapter 5 that 
penetration testing should be performed on the services while they are 
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wrapped in a BPEL process (to also take into account the effects of the 
BPEL on the security vulnerabilities of the WSs), each of the WSs developed 
in the previous section are wrapped in the BPEL process as presented in 
Section 5.1.2 (see Chapter 5).  
These business processes are developed using BPEL 2.0 plugin for 
Eclipse Neon.2 4.6.2 and are deployed on Apache 1.3.4 runtime (on top of 
Tomcat  5.5.26 server) running on Intel® Core™ i5-3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz 
system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Operating System. 
6.1.3 Penetration Tests Settings 
Table 6.1: WS-Attacker’s Settings 
 
Test ID 
 
Test Message Settings 
 
WS-Attacker’s other Settings 
 
Test 1 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 8,000 open tags plotted 
in the header of the SOAP message 
 
 
 
2 parallel attack threads, 
4 requests per thread, 
500 milliseconds between every 
testprobe request, 
750 milliseconds between every 
attack request, 
4 seconds server recovery time, 
5 seconds stop after the last 
tampered request 
 
Test 2 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 9,000 open tags plotted 
in the header of the SOAP message 
 
Test 3 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 10,000 open tags plotted 
in the header of the SOAP message 
 
Test 4 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 11,000 open tags plotted 
in the header of the SOAP message 
 
Test 5 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 12,000 open tags plotted 
in the header of the SOAP message 
 
Test 6 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 13,000 open tags plotted 
in the header of the SOAP message 
 
Test 7 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 8,000 open tags plotted 
in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 8 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 9,000 open tags plotted 
in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 9 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 10,000 open tags plotted 
in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 10 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 11,000 open tags plotted 
in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 11 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 12,000 open tags plotted 
in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 12 
 
DJBX31A Hash Collision attack with 2,000 paired 
keys/values plotted in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 13 
 
DJBX31A Hash Collision attack with 3,000 paired 
keys/values plotted in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 14 
 
XML Attribute Count attack with 40,000 paired 
keys/values plotted in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 15 
 
XML Attribute Count attack with 50,000 paired 
keys/values plotted in the body of the SOAP message 
 
Test 16 
 
XML Attribute Count attack with 60,000 paired 
keys/values plotted in the body of the SOAP message 
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In this study, Coercive Parsing, DJBX31A Hash Collision, and XML 
Attribute Count attacks are performed on these services. Table 6.1 presents 
the WS-Attacker’s settings for each of these tests. In the remainder of this 
section, these tests are referenced by their Id as presented in Table 6.1. 
6.1.4 Attack Elements for Test SOAP Messages 
In the penetration tests performed on these services, the test SOAP 
messages and their attack elements were set as it is explained in Section 
5.1.4.  
6.1.5 Penetration Test Results of Candidate WSs 
The services developed in Sections 6.1.2 are tested using WS-
Attacker’s settings shown in Table 6.1. Figures 6.1-6.12 show the penetra-
tion test results for test attacks performed on these services (every two fig-
ures show the tests results related to one of these services).  Due to the 
space limitation, the Id of the penetration tests are used in these graphs, for 
information about each test, see Table 6.1. 
The penetration test results show the vulnerability of these WSs to the 
performed attacks in percentage so that 100% indicates that the WS is very 
vulnerable to the attack and 1% shows that it does not have this security 
vulnerability.  
Each test is repeated ten times (to increase the confidence of the out-
come of these tests) and the average of the results is considered. Because, 
these test plugins decide on the security vulnerability of the WSs based on 
their response times that slightly differs every time the same test is per-
formed. The vertical and horizontal lines in these graphs (Figures 6.1-6.12) 
show the result of the penetration test every time the same test is performed 
and the average of the penetration test results for each test, respectively. 
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Figure 6.1: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 1-8 Performed on Axis1-4 WS (for information 
about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively) 
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Figure 6.2: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 9-16 Performed on Axis1-4 WS for information 
about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.3: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 1-8 Performed on Axis2-1.5.1 WS for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.4: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 9-16 Performed on Axis2-1.5.1 WS for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.5: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 1-8 Performed on Axis2-1.6.1 WS for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
 
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1%
0%
1%
2%
Figure 6.5a: Results from Test 1
Test1 Results Average of tests results
5
6
%
6
3
% 5
2
%
6
3
% 56
%
5
4
%
5
8
%
6
1
%
6
3
% 55
%
58.1%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.5b: Results from Test 2
Test2 Results Average of tests results
9
2
% 85
%
9
1
%
8
7
%
9
0
% 82
%
8
6
%
8
8
%
8
7
%
8
4
%
87.2%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.5d: Results from Test 4
Test4 Results Average of tests results
7
5
% 6
4
%
7
0
%
7
2
%
6
8
%
6
7
%
7
3
% 64
%
6
0
%
6
6
%
67.9%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.5c: Results from Test 3
Test3 Results Average of tests results
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
100%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.5f: Results from Test 6
Test6 Results Average of tests results
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
100%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.5e: Results from Test 5
Test5 Results Average of tests results
5
5
%
5
9
%
6
2
%
5
8
%
5
9
%
5
7
%
6
0
%
5
6
%
5
8
%
6
0
%
58.4%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.5h: Results Test 8
Test8 Results Average of tests results
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1
%
1%
0%
1%
2%
Figure 6.5g: Results from Test 7
Test7 Results Average of tests results
99 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 6.6: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 9-16 Performed on Axis2-1.6.1 WS for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.7: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 1-8 Performed on CXF-2.3.10 WS for information 
about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.8: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 9-16 Performed on CXF-2.3.10 WS for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Test 15 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.8f: Results from Test 14
Test 14 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.8e: Results from Test 13
Test13 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.8d: Results from Test 12
Test12 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.8c: Results from Test 11
Test11 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.8b: Results from Test 10
Test10 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.8a: Results from Test 9
Test9 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.9: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 1-8 Performed on CXF-2.5.11 WS for information 
about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.9h: Results from Test 8
Test 8 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.9g: Results from test 7
Test 7 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.9f: Results from Test 6
Test 6 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.9e: Results from Test 5
Test 5 Results Average of tests results
6
3
%
6
4
%
7
5
% 69
%
7
5
% 6
5
%
6
9
%
6
8
%
7
0
%
7
3
%
69.1%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.9d: Results from Test 4
Test 4 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.9c: Results from Test 3
Test 3 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.9b: Results from Test 2
Test 2 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.9a: Results from Test 1
Test 1 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.10: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 9-16 Performed on CXF-2.5.11 WS for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.10h: Results from Test 16
Test 16 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.10g: Results from Test 15
Test 15 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.10f: Results from Test 14
Test 14 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.10e: Results from Test 13
Test 13 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.10d: Results from Test 12
Test 12 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.10c: Results from Test 1
Test 11 Results Average of tests results
9
8
%
8
2
%
1
0
0
%
9
8
%
7
8
%
7
6
%
7
8
%
1
0
0
%
9
8
% 8
7
%
89.5%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.10b: Results from Test 0
Test 10 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.10a: Results from Test 9
Test 9 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.11: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 1-8 Performed on CXF-2.6.3 WS for information 
about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.11h: Results from Test 8
Test 8 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.11g: Results from Test 7
Test 7 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.11f: Results from Test 6
Test 6 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.11e: Results from Test 5
Test 5 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.11d: Results from Test 4
Test4 Results Average of tests results
5
4
%
5
5
%
5
4
%
5
5
%
5
1
%
5
9
%
5
5
%
5
0
%
5
5
%
5
9
%
54.7%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.11c: Results from Test 3
Test3 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.11b: Results from Test 2 
Test2 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.11a: Results from Test 1
Test1 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.12: Penetration Tests Results for Tests 9-16 Performed on CXF-2.6.3 WS for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively 
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Figure 6.12h: Results from Test 16
Test 16 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.12g: Results from Test 15
Test 15 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.12f: Results from Test 14
Test 14 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.12e: Results from Test 13
Test 13 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.12c: Results from Test 11
Test 11 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.12b: Results from Test 10
Test 10 Results Average of tests results
6
6
%
6
4
%
6
8
% 5
8
%
6
8
% 62
%
5
7
%
5
9
%
6
7
% 60
%
62.9%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 6.12a: Results from Test 9
Test 9 Results Average of tests results
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Figure 6.12d: Results from Test 12
Test 12 Results Average of tests results
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6.1.6 Principal Components Analysis of Candidate WS’s 
Penetration Test Results 
The objective of the service selection framework in this dissertation is 
to select group of OTSWSs with security vulnerabilities diversity (identified 
through penetration testing) for implementation of ITWS. To facilitate this 
service selection approach, OTSWSs should be divided into a number of 
groups according to their security vulnerabilities similarity, so that ITWS can 
be formed using services selected from these diverse groups.  
Division of the OTSWSs can be achieved through CA. However, most 
CA algorithms cannot deal with data with high dimensionality (e.g., in the 
case of the proposed service selection framework, more than one OTSWSs 
each with various penetration test results) [86]. Hence, dimensionality reduc-
tion is important in CA, which reduces the computational costs and provides 
users with visual examination of the data. However, it causes loss of infor-
mation. One practical approach for dimensionality reduction is to extract im-
portant components from the original data, which can contribute to forming 
the clusters [86]. 
PCA is one of the typical dimensionality reduction approaches, which 
is mainly used to reduce the dimensionality of the dataset while retaining the 
maximum information. Also, it is a common technique for finding patterns in 
data of high dimensions. Consequently, Principal Components (PCs) may be 
used as inputs for CA.   
This section explains the steps for finding PCs of the WSs’ penetra-
tion test results, obtained in Section 6.1.5. It also demonstrates the effec-
tiveness of PCA in reducing the computational complexity of CA in the pro-
posed service selection approach. 
Step1: Collecting the Dataset 
The first step in PCA is about collecting the dataset (e.g., observa-
tions in an experiment). In this work, the input to the PCA is the penetration 
test results of the WSs from Section 6.1.5, which has 16x6 dimensions (six-
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teen penetration test results for each of the six WSs). Table 6.2 and Figure 
6.13 show the tabular and graphical representations of this data, respective-
ly. 
 
Figure 6.13: Plot of Candidate WSs’ Penetration Tests Results, to be used as PCA inputs (for 
information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively) 
Step2: Subtracting the Mean 
For PCA to work properly, the mean (the average across each data 
dimension) should be subtracted from each of the data dimensions to ensure 
that the first PC describes the direction of maximum variance, which elimi-
nates misleading directions. The mean matrix (average of each test’s re-
sults) and mean adjusted penetration test results are presented in Tables 
6.3 and 6.4, respectively. 
Step3: Calculating the Covariance Matrix 
PCA uses correlation/covariance matrices of the original variables to 
find new directions. In literature, a number of authors prefer to use correla-
tion matrix to find principal components [102]. However, the general rule of 
thumb is to use correlation matrix if the variables are of different units (scale) 
as it standardises the data (see [97] for further information and examples). 
Since in this case study the penetration test results are of the same unit, the 
covariance matrix (presented in Table 6.5) is used for PCA calculation, and it 
is worked out using mean adjusted penetration test results (from Table 6.4) 
and MATLAB’s cov() command. 
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Table 6.2: WSs’ Penetration Test Results to be used as PCA input (for information about each test and WS see Table 6.1 and Section 6.1.1, respectively) 
 
Table 6.3: Mean Matrix of the Penetration Test Results 
Average 
of Test1 
results 
Average 
of Test2 
results 
Average 
of Test3 
results 
Average 
of Test4 
results 
Average 
of Test5 
results 
Average 
of Test6 
results 
Average 
of Test7 
results 
Average 
of Test8 
results 
Average 
of Test9 
results 
Average 
of Test10 
results 
Average 
Test11 
results 
Average 
Test12 
results 
Average 
Test13 
results 
Average 
Test14 
results 
Average 
Test15 
results 
Average 
Test16 
results 
1.0000 19.6000 41.4333 63.6833 95.0000 100.00 1.0000 29.4333 68.9000 93.7167 100.00 50.3833 99.4500 40.3667 86.7500 100.0000 
1.0000 19.6000 41.4333 63.6833 95.0000 100.00 1.0000 29.4333 68.9000 93.7167 100.00 50.3833 99.4500 40.3667 86.7500 100.0000 
1.0000 19.6000 41.4333 63.6833 95.0000 100.00 1.0000 29.4333 68.9000 93.7167 100.00 50.3833 99.4500 40.3667 86.7500 100.0000 
1.0000 19.6000 41.4333 63.6833 95.0000 100.00 1.0000 29.4333 68.9000 93.7167 100.00 50.3833 99.4500 40.3667 86.7500 100.0000 
1.0000 19.6000 41.4333 63.6833 95.0000 100.00 1.0000 29.4333 68.9000 93.7167 100.00 50.3833 99.4500 40.3667 86.7500 100.0000 
1.0000 19.6000 41.4333 63.6833 95.0000 100.00 1.0000 29.4333 68.9000 93.7167 100.00 50.3833 99.4500 40.3667 86.7500 100.0000 
 
Table 6.4: Mean Adjusted Penetration Test Results 
Test1 - 
Average 
of Test1 
results 
Test2 - 
Average 
of Test2 
results 
Test3 - 
Average of 
Test3 
results 
Test4 - 
Average of 
Test4 
results 
Test5 - 
Average 
of Test5 
results 
Test6 - 
Average 
of Test6 
results 
Test7 - 
Average 
of Test7 
results 
Test8 - 
Average of 
Test8 
results 
Test9 - 
Average 
of Test9 
results 
Test10 - 
Average 
of Test10 
results 
Test11 - 
Average 
of Test11 
results 
Test12 - 
Average of 
Test12 
results 
Test13 - 
Average 
of Test13 
results 
Test14 - 
Average of 
Test14 
results 
Test15 - 
Average 
of Test15 
results 
Test16 - 
Average of 
Test16 
results 
0 -18.6 -40.4333 -62.6833 -21.2 0 0 26.5667 6.6 4.8833 0 16.1167 0.55 24.3333 13.25 0 
0 35.9 27.2667 23.7167 5 0 0 29.7667 6.1 3.4833 0 -49.3833 -1.25 47.3333 13.25 0 
0 38.5 26.4667 23.5167 5 0 0 28.9667 6.6 3.9833 0 -49.3833 -0.95 46.4333 13.25 0 
0 -18.6 -40.4333 5.6167 1.2 0 0 -28.4333 -6.7 -4.1167 0 14.1167 0.55 -39.3667 -15.05 0 
0 -18.6 13.8667 5.4167 5 0 0 -28.4333 -6.6 -4.2167 0 34.6167 0.55 -39.3667 -12.65 0 
0 -18.6 13.2667 4.4167 5 0 0 -28.4333 -6 -4.0167 0 33.9167 0.55 -39.3667 -12.05 0 
 
 
 Test1 Test2 Test3 Test4 Test5 Test6 Test7 Test8 Test9 Test10 Test11 Test12 Test13 Test14 Test15 Test16 
S1 1 1 1 1 73.8 100 1 56 75.5 98.6 100 66.5 100 64.7 100 100 
S2 1 55.5 68.7 87.4 100 100 1 59.2 75 97.2 100 1 98.2 87.7 100 100 
S3 1 58.1 67.9 87.2 100 100 1 58.4 75.5 97.7 100 1 98.5 86.8 100 100 
S4 1 1 1 69.3 96.2 100 1 1 62.2 89.6 100 64.5 100 1 71.7 100 
S5 1 1 55.3 69.1 100 100 1 1 62.3 89.5 100 85 100 1 74.1 100 
S6 1 1 54.7 68.1 100 100 1 1 62.9 89.7 100 84.3 100 1 74.7 100 
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Table 6.5: Covariance Matrix of the Mean Adjusted Penetration Test Results 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0.831 0.5995 0.5271 0.1116 0 0 0.6553 0.1419 0.0835 0 -1.1022 -0.0245 1.0462 0.2957 0 
0 0.5995 1.0164 0.742 0.2426 0 0 0.1765 0.0348 0.0115 0 -0.5892 -0.0178 0.4119 0.0899 0 
0 0.5271 0.742 1.025 0.3242 0 0 -0.1435 -0.0427 -0.0387 0 -0.5852 -0.0156 0.0162 -0.0822 0 
0 0.1116 0.2426 0.3242 0.1102 0 0 -0.1176 -0.0295 -0.0225 0 -0.0952 -0.0033 -0.0976 -0.058 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0.6553 0.1765 -0.1435 -0.1176 0 0 0.9713 0.2194 0.14 0 -0.9645 -0.0194 1.3517 0.4521 0 
0 0.1419 0.0348 -0.0427 -0.0295 0 0 0.2194 0.0498 0.0319 0 -0.2095 -0.0042 0.3031 0.1025 0 
0 0.0835 0.0115 -0.0387 -0.0225 0 0 0.14 0.0319 0.0205 0 -0.1261 -0.0024 0.191 0.0655 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 -1.1022 -0.5892 -0.5852 -0.0952 0 0 -0.9645 -0.2095 -0.1261 0 1.537 0.0326 -1.4984 -0.4308 0 
0 -0.0245 -0.0178 -0.0156 -0.0033 0 0 -0.0194 -0.0042 -0.0024 0 0.0326 0.0007 -0.031 -0.0087 0 
0 1.0462 0.4119 0.0162 -0.0976 0 0 1.3517 0.3031 0.191 0 -1.4984 -0.031 1.9276 0.6259 0 
0 0.2957 0.0899 -0.0822 -0.058 0 0 0.4521 0.1025 0.0655 0 -0.4308 -0.0087 0.6259 0.2117 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6.6: Eigenvectors for the Covariance Matrix of the Mean Adjusted Penetration Test Results 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0339 0.0174 -0.0362 0.1167 0 0 0 0 0.0006 -0.1694 -0.0402 -0.2966 -0.8257 -0.0988 -0.1697 0.3807 
-0.1008 -0.0308 -0.1167 0.0391 0 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0452 -0.1483 0.1586 0.0608 0.7843 -0.5047 0.2256 
0.2816 0.1795 0.0716 -0.1005 0 0 0 0 -0.0005 0.273 0.2111 -0.322 0.289 -0.33833 -0.6572 0.143 
-0.1041 -0.1006 0.6527 -0.2149 0 0 0 0 -0.0003 -0.6069 0.1838 0.2198 0.0305 -0.04 -0.2315 0.0152 
0 0 0 0 0.9855 0.1696 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0.1696 -0.9855 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.1848 0.4519 0.3634 -0.0884 0 0 0 0 -0.0003 -0.0378 -0.4979 -0.2606 0.2091 0.1362 0.3125 0.3803 
-0.2299 0.5635 0.2689 0.1189 0 0 0 0 0.0007 0.4139 0.3973 0.3895 -0.2186 0.041 0.0762 0.0839 
-0.085 -0.0802 -0.0784 -0.9334 0 0 0 0 -0.005 0.2485 -0.0401 0.0497 -0.1915 0.0249 0.056 0.0513 
0 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0052 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0 0 
0.1904 0.1146 0.1894 -0.068 0 0 0 0 -0.0002 -0.005 0.3341 -0.5359 -0.1456 0.4571 0.0989 -0.5209 
-0.0097 -0.5628 0.5519 0.1743 0 0 0 0 0.0017 0.5402 -0.2088 -0.0437 -0.1033 0.0028 0.005 -0.0113 
-0.2173 -0.2832 -0.0499 0.009 0 0 0 0 0.0002 -0.0083 0.5401 -0.2829 0.2522 0.1238 0.3032 0.5722 
0.849 -0.1346 -0.0192 -0.0155 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0025 0.2094 0.379 -0.0798 0.1176 0.1502 0.1742 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6.7: Ordered Eigenvalues 
5302.7 2021.2 376.3 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6.8: Ordered Eigenvectors 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0.3807 -0.1697 -0.0988 -0.8257 -0.2966 0.0339 -0.0402 0.0174 -0.1694 -0.0362 0.1167 0.0006 0 0 0 0 
0.2256 -0.5047 0.7843 0.0608 0.1586 -0.1008 -0.1483 -0.0308 0.0452 -0.1167 0.0391 0.0001 0 0 0 0 
0.1433 -0.6572 -0.3383 0.289 -0.322 0.2816 0.2111 0.1795 0.273 0.0716 -0.1005 -0.0005 0 0 0 0 
0.0152 -0.2315 -0.04 0.0305 0.2198 -0.1041 0.1838 -0.1006 -0.6069 0.6527 -0.2149 -0.0003 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9855 0.1696 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1696 -0.9855 0 0 
0.3803 0.3125 0.1362 0.2091 -0.2606 0.1848 -0.4979 0.4519 -0.0378 0.3634 -0.0884 -0.0003 0 0 0 0 
0.0839 0.0762 0.041 -0.2186 0.3895 -0.2299 0.3973 0.5635 0.4139 0.2689 0.1189 0.0007 0 0 0 0 
0.0513 0.056 0.0249 -0.1915 0.0497 -0.085 -0.0401 -0.0802 0.2485 -0.0784 -0.9334 -0.005 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001 -0.0004 0 0.0011 0.0052 -1 0 0 0 0 
-0.5209 0.0989 0.4571 -0.1456 -0.5359 0.1904 0.3341 0.1146 -0.005 0.1894 -0.068 -0.0002 0 0 0 0 
-0.0113 0.005 0.0028 -0.1033 -0.0437 -0.0097 -0.2088 -0.5628 0.5402 0.5519 0.1743 0.0017 0 0 0 0 
0.5722 0.3032 0.1238 0.2522 -0.2829 -0.2173 0.5401 -0.2832 -0.0083 -0.0499 0.009 0.0002 0 0 0 0 
0.1742 0.1502 0.1176 -0.0798 0.379 0.849 0.2094 -0.1346 -0.0025 -0.0192 -0.0155 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Table 6.9: Calculated Principal Components 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12 PC13 PC14 PC15 PC16 
-6.770 89.713 8.129 -0.009 -0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90.429 -15.185 -1.152 1.443 0.082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90.454 -15.547 -2.15 -1.439 -0.081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-59.471 -2.828 -36.263 0.029 -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-57.446 -28.594 15.897 0.208 -0.533 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-57.195 -27.556 15.545 -0.232 0.539 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Step4: Calculating the Eigenvectors and Eigenvalues of the Covariance 
Matrix 
Eigenvectors and eigenvalues are important, as they provide useful 
information (e.g., patterns in the data) about the dataset. In this case study, 
they are worked out using covariance matrix of the mean adjusted penetra-
tion test results (from Table 6.5) and following MATLAB’s command:  
[eigenvector,eigenvalue] = eig(covarience_matrix); 
The calculated eigenvectors are presented in Table 6.6. In general, to 
order the PCs according to their significance, the eigenvalues should be 
sorted in descending order. The ordered eigenvalues should be used to sort 
the eigenvectors. The ordered eigenvalues and eigenvectors are presented 
in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, respectively and are calculated using following 
MATLAB’s commands:  
% sorting eigenvalues in descending order 
[sorted_eigenvalue,index]=sort(-abs(diag(eigenvalue))); 
% sorting eigenvectors using eigenvalues 
sorted_eigenvector=eigenvector(:,index); 
 
Step5: Calculating the PCs 
PCs are the outputs of the PCA and are a set of linearly uncorrelated 
variables created from the original observation values. In this case study, 
they are calculated from the multiplication of the ordered eigenvectors (from 
Table 6.8) and mean adjusted penetration test results (from Table 6.4) and 
are presented in Table 6.9. 
Step6: Choosing the PC’s 
This is the final step in PCA where the dimensionality reduction takes 
place. At this stage, the PCs with lesser significance can be ignored. There 
are some common rules of thumb to choose the number of PCs while retain-
ing maximum information: 
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1. The first common rule is to choose the smallest number of PCs such 
that the desired percentage of explained variation is exceeded [102]. 
The total variance is the sum of variances of all PCs and the variance 
explained by a PC is the ratio between the cumulative variance of that 
PC and the total variance. For example,  in this case study, the per-
centage of variance explained by PC1 and PC2 can be calculated as 
follows: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝐶1 = 5302.655 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝐶2 = 2021.133 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝐶𝑠 = 7701.035 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝐶1 =  
5302.655
7701.035
∗ 100 = 68.86% 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝐶2 =  
5302.655 + 2021.133 
7701.035
∗ 100 = 95.10% 
2. The second common approach is to use a scree graph, in which the 
eigenvalues are plotted against their respective component numbers. 
The number of PCs is then chosen so that the line in the scree graph 
is “steep” to its left but not to its right (elbow point) since the remaining 
eigenvalues (on the right-hand side of the elbow point) are relatively 
small and all about the same size [102].  
 
Figure 6.14: Variance Explained by each PC 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Number of Principal Component
V
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 E
x
p
la
in
e
d
 b
y
 e
a
c
h
 P
C
 (
%
)
113 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 6.15: Scree Graph 
Figures 6.14 and 6.15 illustrate the plots of the percentage of variance 
explained by each PC (from Table 6.9) and scree graph for this case study, 
respectively. As presented in Figure 6.14, the first three PCs have about 
100% of the variations in the penetration test results. Hence, they are se-
lected as inputs to CA.  
 
Figure 6.16: The WSs’ Original Penetration Test Results against the First Two PCs 
Recall from Section 2.5 that sometimes in literature PCA is employed 
to reduce the dimensions of the dataset before CA, hoping to reduce the 
running time for CA’s computation using a fewer number of PCs. Figure 6.16 
illustrates the plot of the original penetration test results of the WSs, in this 
case study, against the first two calculated PCs (from Table 6.9), which have 
about 95% of the variations in penetration test results (see Figure 6.14). The 
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and the second PC (the horizontal axis) clearly highlight the separation be-
tween two clusters in the data, in each case (three clusters in total). It shows 
that PCA has successfully identified the patterns among this 16x6 dimension 
dataset. Hence, based on this information, the first three PCs (containing the 
majority of variations in penetration test results as explained previously) can 
be divided into three groups using CA (see next section). 
6.1.7 Cluster Analysis based on Principal Component Analy-
sis Results 
As discussed previously, CA enables splitting up the data into a cer-
tain number of clusters, based on their similarities or dissimilarities [86]. 
Clustering approaches can be divided into two main groups of hierarchical 
and partitional [86]. The hierarchical approach groups data objects after a 
sequence of partitions, either from singleton clusters to a cluster containing 
all data objects or vice versa, while partitional clustering directly divides data 
objects into some pre-specified number of clusters without any hierarchical 
structure [86]. The hierarchical approaches are not suitable for large-scale 
datasets due to their quadratic computational complexities in both execution 
time and storage space [86]. However, K-means algorithm is linear in the 
number of data objects and for the same amount of data it will take much 
less amount of computational time [86]. Hence, in this framework, K-means 
is adopted as CA algorithm.  
One of the issues in CA is to determine the number of clusters, which 
is called “the fundamental problem of cluster validity” by Dubes [126]. How-
ever, in this framework, the number of clusters are selected through PCA on 
the penetration test results of the OTSWSs (as presented in the previous 
section) and such that 2f+1 (2f+1 replicas can tolerate f simultaneous faults) 
fault-tolerance condition is satisfied (enabling majority voting).  
In this case study, the selected PCs are split up into three clusters 
(see the previous section for further information) using following MATLAB’s 
commands: 
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first_three_pcs = [ -6.7709   89.7131    8.1297   
                             90.4291  -15.1858   -1.1527     
                            90.4547  -15.5472   -2.1560    
                           -59.4717   -2.8288  -36.2632     
                          -57.4461  -28.5946   15.8972    
                         -57.1951  -27.5567   15.5451]; 
[idx,C,sumd,D] = kmeans(first_three_pcs,3); 
In the above MATLAB command idx vector, C matrix, sumd vector 
and D matrix contain cluster indices for each WS, centroid location of each 
cluster, within-cluster sums of point-to-centroid distances and distances of 
each WS to every cluster’s centroid, respectively.   
The result of WSs clustering based on their security vulnerabilities di-
versity and the distances of each WS to the centre of each cluster are shown 
in Tables 6.10 and 6.11, respectively.  
Table 6.10: Results of CA on selected PCs 
WS Cluster 
S1 3 
S2 1 
S3 1 
S4 2 
S5 2 
S6 2 
 
Table 6.11: Distance between Each WS and the Cluster Centres (in 1.0e+04 scales) 
WS Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
S1 2.0588 1.4686 0.0000 
S2 0.0000 2.2063 2.0538 
S3 0.0000 2.2067 2.0638 
S4 2.3829 0.1486 1.3312 
S5 2.2354 0.0387 1.6625 
S6 2.2241 0.0357 1.6350 
 
Recall that the objective of the service selection framework in this dis-
sertation is to select group of OTSWSs with security vulnerabilities diversity 
(identified through penetration testing) for implementation of ITWS. And to 
facilitate this service selection approach, OTSWSs should be clustered ac-
cording to their security vulnerabilities similarity, so that groups of services 
with security vulnerabilities diversity can be formed based on services se-
lected from these clusters (one service from each of the resultant clusters). 
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Hence, using the CA results presented in Table 6.10, the WSs’ are grouped 
such that each group consists of one service from each of the clusters: 
 Group1: S1, S2 and S4 
 Group2: S1, S2 and S5 
 Group3: S1, S2 and S6 
 Group4: S1, S3 and S4 
 Group5: S1, S3 and S5 
 Group6: S1, S3 and S6 
The next section explains the process of ordering these groups ac-
cording to their overall security vulnerabilities. 
6.1.8 WS-Groups Ordering using Penetration Testing 
The final step in this service selection framework is about performing 
penetration testing on each group of services to identify their overall security 
vulnerabilities and using this information to order the groups so that the 
ITWS could be started with the most secure group and switch to the next 
group if the first group fails and so on.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Component Diagram for Penetration Testing Each Group of WSs 
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Figure 6.17 shows the component diagram for this step indicating that 
the ITWS (called CompositeWS in this figure) and WS-Attacker consist of 
OTSWSs and attack plugins, respectively and that the ITWS can be tested 
through WS-Attacker’s interface. 
Each WS-group is developed through the composition of their associ-
ated WSs, using BPEL 2.0 plugin for Eclipse Neon.2 4.6.2. And is deployed 
on Apache 1.3.4 runtime (on top of Tomcat  5.5.26 server) running on the 
same machine that is hosting the WSs (Intel® Core™ i5-3320M CPU @ 
2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Operating System). 
The operation of these WS-groups was as follows: 
1. Receives client’s request. 
2. Passes the client’s request to each of the parallel invocation process-
es (each process invocates one of the three WSs associated with the 
group). 
3. Each concurrent invocation process invokes its associated WS. 
4. The business process replies to the client once a response is re-
turned from each of the invoked WSs. 
For ordering the WS-groups, Coercive Parsing, DJBX31A Hash Colli-
sion, and XML Attribute Count attacks are performed on each group. Table 
6.12 presents the WS-Attacker’s settings for each of these tests. In these 
tests, the attack element was either plotted in the header or the body of the 
test SOAP message as presented in Message 5.1 and Message 5.2, respec-
tively.  
Table 6.12: WS-Attacker’s Settings 
 
Test ID 
 
Test Message Settings 
 
WS-Attacker’s other Settings 
 
Test 1 
 
Coercive Parsing attack with 20,000 open tags 
plotted in the header of the SOAP message 
 
2 parallel attack threads, 
4 requests per thread, 
9999 milliseconds between every 
testprobe request, 
750 milliseconds between every attack 
request, 
4 seconds server recovery time, 
5 seconds stop after the last tampered 
request 
 
Test 2 
 
DJBX31A Hash Collision attack with 4,000 paired 
keys/values plotted in the body of the SOAP 
message 
 
Test 3 
 
XML Attribute Count attacks with 60,000 paired 
keys/values plotted in the body of the SOAP 
message 
 
Figures 6.18-6.23 show the penetration test results for test attacks 
performed on these groups.  
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Figure 6.18: Penetration Test Results for WS-Group1 (for information about each test and WS-group see Table 6.12 and Section 6.1.7, respectively) 
 
 
Figure 6.19: Penetration Test Results for WS-Group2 (for information about each test and WS-group see Table 6.12 and Section 6.1.7, respectively) 
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Figure 6.20: Penetration Test Results for WS-Group3 (for information about each test and WS-group see Table 6.12 and Section 6.1.7, respectively) 
 
 
Figure 6.21: Penetration Test Results for WS-Group4 (for information about each test and WS-group see Table 6.12 and Section 6.1.7, respectively) 
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Figure 6.22: Penetration Test Results for WS-Group5 (for information about each test and WS-group see Table 6.12 and Section 6.1.7, respectively) 
 
 
Figure 6.23: Penetration Test Results for WS-Group6 (for information about each test and WS-group see Table 6.12 and Section 6.1.7, respectively)
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The penetration test results show the vulnerability of these WS-
groups to the performed attacks in percentage so that 100% indicates that 
the group is very vulnerable to the attack and 1% shows that it does not 
have this security vulnerability.  
Each test is repeated ten (to increase the confidence of the outcome 
of these tests) times and the average of the results is considered. Because, 
these test plugins decide on the security vulnerability of the WSs based on 
their response times that slightly differs every time the same test is per-
formed. The vertical and horizontal lines in these graphs (Figures 6.18-6.23) 
show the result of the penetration test every time the same test is performed 
and the average of the penetration test results for each test, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.24: WS-Groups Sorted in Ascending Order According to their Penetration Test Results 
(for information about each test and WS-group see Table 6.12 and Section 6.1.7, respectively) 
Finally, the WS-groups are ordered according to their penetration test 
result for each test (see Figure 6.24). For example, Group2 has the lowest 
penetration test result in each test, so it is the most secure group among 
others. The results for XML Attribute Count test are omitted in these compar-
isons as all these WS-groups have similar level of vulnerability to this attack 
(see Figures 6.18-6.23).  
The penetration test results show the vulnerability of these WS-
groups to the performed attacks in percentage so that 100% indicates that 
the group is very vulnerable to the attack and 1% shows that it does not 
have this security vulnerability.  
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Considering the results presented in Figures 6.24a and 6.24b the WS-
groups can be classified according to their overall security vulnerabilities (in 
descending order) as follows: 
 Group2: S1, S2 and S5 
 Group3: S1, S2 and S6 
 Group5: S1, S3 and S5 
 Group6: S1, S3 and S6 
 Group1: S1, S2 and S4  
 Group4: S1, S3 and S4 
6.2 Summary 
This chapter illustrated the integration of the penetration test results 
of the WSs, PCA, and CA in the selection of security-aware WSs for imple-
mentation of ITWSs (the proposed service selection framework). It also ex-
plained why these approaches are adopted. The result of this case study is 
utilized in Chapter 8 to evaluate this framework. 
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Chapter 7 Dynamic Reconfiguration of ITWS Using BPEL and JAVA as BPEL Extension  
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                                      Dynamic Reconfiguration of ITWS Using 
                           BPEL and JAVA as BPEL Extension 
 
Chapter 6 demonstrated the proposed service selection framework 
through a case study. This chapter uses different sets of case studies to il-
lustrate the feasibility of implementing self-reconfigurable Intrusion-Tolerant 
Web Service (ITWSs) utilizing a combination of Business Process Engineer-
ing Language (BPEL) constructs and Java as BPEL extension, as well as 
using Java as BPEL extension only.  
Section 7.1 presents the common setups for these case studies. Sec-
tions 7.2 and 7.3 demonstrate the implementation of self-reconfigurable IT-
WSs using a combination of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL extension 
approach and utilizing only Java as BPEL extension approach, respectively. 
Finally, Section 7.4 summarizes the work presented in this chapter. 
7.1 Setups for Case Studies 
This section presents the common setups for the case studies 
demonstrated in this chapter. 
7.1.1 WS Preparation 
Recall that in service selection case study OTSWSs were not em-
ployed because we did not have permission to perform penetration tests on 
such services. However, the case studies presented in this chapter did not 
require to perform any penetration test on the involved WSs, and moreover, 
it was a good practice to adopt as many of OTSWSs as possible. For these 
7 
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case studies the following simple calculator Web Services (WSs) are devel-
oped using the source code presented in Code 5.1 (see Chapter 5): 
 WS developed using Apache Axis2 1.5.1 framework and was de-
ployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 running on Intel® Core™ i5-3320M 
CPU @ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Operat-
ing System. 
 WS developed using Apache Axis2 1.5.1 framework and was de-
ployed on Apache Tomcat 6.0.18 running on Intel® Xeon® CPU E3-
1240 V2 @ 3.40GHz system with 16.0GB RAM and 64-bit Operating 
System. 
 WS developed using .NET 4.0 framework and was deployed on Intel® 
Core™ 2 Duo CPU P8400@ 2.26GHz system with 3.00GB RAM and 
32-bit Operating System. 
Also, two third-party ASP.NET WSs [127], [128], which provide similar 
calculator services, are employed.  
7.1.2 DB Preparation 
For these case studies, Oracle Database 12.1.0.1 is utilized and Ta-
ble 7.1 is created to store the necessary information for invocation of the 
ITWS’s constituent WSs. The SERVICEGROUP and PRIORITY are equiva-
lent to invocationId and orderNumber properties in the proposed architecture 
(see Chapter 3 for further information), respectively.  
Table 7.1: Service Table Storing Necessary Information for Invoking Candidate WSs 
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7.1.3 Communication with DB 
In these studies, the dynamic communication between the BPEL pro-
cess and the Database (DB), for collection of the information required for 
invocation of the WSs associated with each group, is done through Java as 
BPEL extension and using Java SQL library (see Appendix G for complete 
Java class). The overview of this communication is as follows: 
1. Receives from the BPEL process the information (invocationId and 
orderNumber) about the group of WSs that should be invoked. 
2. Stablishes connection with the DB. 
3. Runs:  
("SELECT ENDPOINT, TARGETNAMESPACE, OPERATION, INPUT FROM 
HR.WEBSERVICES "+ "WHERE SERVICEGROUP =" + invocationId + "AND PRIORITY = "  + 
orderNumber); 
("SELECT PRIORITY FROM HR.WEBSERVICES"); 
4. From the results of the above queries, it prepares a string (the format 
that could be used by the business process) containing the infor-
mation required for invoking the WSs associated with that group, the 
number of WSs within that group, and the maximum number of 
groups that are available to be used at that particular part of the busi-
ness process. From the last information the business process would 
understand if there are any other groups available that could be used 
if the current group fails. 
5. It returns the prepared information to the business process. 
7.2: Case Study: Dynamic Reconfiguration Using a 
Combination of Java as BPEL Extension and BPEL 
Constructs 
This section uses a case study to demonstrate the feasibility of im-
plementing self-reconfigurable ITWSs utilizing a combination of Java as 
BPEL extension and BPEL constructs. For this study, a self-reconfigurable 
ITWS is developed using the WSs from the Section 7.1.1 and BPEL plugin 
for Oracle SOA Suite 12c running on Intel® Core™ i5-3320M CPU @ 
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2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Operating System. 
Figure 7.1 presents the BPEL diagram for this ITWS.  
 
Figure 7.1: BPEL Diagram of Dynamically Reconfigurable ITWS, Implemented Using a Combi-
nation of Java as BPEL Extension and BPEL Constructs 
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The overview of the operation of the self-reconfigurable ITWS pre-
sented in Figure 7.1 is as follows: 
1. Receives the client’s request (start of the business process). 
2. Stores the start time of the business process, which will be used to 
work out the response time of this self-reconfigurable ITWS. 
3. Executes the Java class (from Section 7.1.3) responsible for retriev-
ing, from DB, the information required for invoking the WSs associat-
ed with the WS-group that should be used (see Code J.1, in Appendix 
J). 
4. Creates parallel process paths, using ForEachN5 activity and the 
number of WSs associated with that group returned by the DB (see 
Section 7.1.3), for invoking the WSs from the previous step. 
5. Each WS invocation path (created in the last step) uses the Code J.2 
(see Appendix J) to execute the Java class (see Appendix H), which 
utilizes Java’s API for XML-based RPC (JAX-RPC) [129] for dynamic 
invocation of its associated WS. The advantage of using a Dynamic 
Invocation Interface is that WSs can be invoked without the need for 
any pre-runtime information or any static operations (e.g., WSDL to 
Java mapping). 
6. Checks whether sufficient (for performing majority voting) responses 
are returned by the WSs. 
 If adequate responses are returned, it performs majority voting 
on the BPEL’s local variables that hold these responses, using 
the Code J.3 (see Appendix J) then executes step 7. 
 Else, it throws an exception 
 BPEL’s CatchAll construct catches the thrown excep-
tion. 
 It uses Code J.4 (see Appendix J) to check whether an 
alternative group of services is available by comparing 
the  orderNumber (see Chapter 3 for more information) 
                                                          
5 Oracle SOA Suite 12c offers ForEachN activity, which creates parallel process paths at runtime 
[111]. This activity enables to dynamically implement N-version programming when the number of 
constituent WSs is only known at runtime. 
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for the current group and the maximum number of avail-
able groups provided by the DB (see Section 7.1.3). 
 If an alternative group is available, it updates the 
BPEL’s local variable storing the orderNumber for the 
group that should be used next and re-executes the 
ITWS from step 3 
 Else, it throws an exception and terminates the BPEL 
process. 
7. Assigns the result of successful execution of the ITWS to the output 
variable.  
8. Uses Code J.6 (see Appendix J) to execute the Java class (Code J.5 
in Appendix J) that writes the start and end times of the process into a 
file (to work out the response time of the process for evaluation pur-
pose). 
9. Returns the result of the execution of the ITWS to the client. 
 
This ITWS is run once with three and once with five WSs and the re-
sponse times of these executions are recorded (for evaluation purpose). 
These executions are repeated forty nine times (to increase the confidence 
on the evaluation results) and the average of the response times is consid-
ered as the response time of the process in each case. Because, the re-
sponse time slightly varies every time the ITWS is executed.  
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 present the response times for the execution of 
this ITWS running with three and five WSs, respectively. The vertical and 
horizontal lines in these graphs show the response time (ms) every time the 
ITWS is executed and the average of the response times (ms) respectively. 
These results will be used in Chapter 8 to evaluate the work presented in 
this dissertation. 
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Figure 7.2: Process Execution Time (ms) for Dynamic ITWS Implemented using Combination of Java as BPEL Extension and BPEL constructs (ran with three di-
verse WSs) 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Process Execution Time (ms) for Dynamic ITWS Implemented using Combination of Java as BPEL Extension and BPEL constructs (ran with five diverse 
WSs) 
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7.3: Case Study: Dynamic Reconfiguration Using On-
ly Java as BPEL Extension 
 
Figure 7.4: BPEL Diagram of Dynamic Reconfigurable ITWS, Implemented Using a Combination 
of Java as BPEL Extension and BPEL Constructs 
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This section uses a case study to demonstrate the feasibility of im-
plementing self-reconfigurable ITWSs utilizing Java as BPEL extension only. 
For this study, a self-reconfigurable ITWS is developed using the WSs from 
the Section 7.1.1 and BPEL plugin for Oracle SOA Suite 12c running on In-
tel® Core™ i5-3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM 
and 64-bit Operating System. Figure 7.4 presents the BPEL diagram for this 
ITWS.  
The overview of the operation of the self-reconfigurable ITWS pre-
sented in Figure 7.4 is as follows: 
1. Receives the client’s request (start of the business process). 
2. Stores the start time of the business process, which will be used to 
work out the response time of this self-reconfigurable ITWS. 
3. Executes the Java class (from Section 7.1.3) responsible for retriev-
ing, from DB, the information required for invoking the WSs associat-
ed with the WS-group that should be used (see Code J.7, in Appendix 
J). 
4. Uses Code J.8 (see Appendix J) to execute the Java class (see Ap-
pendix I) responsible for dynamic parallel invocation of the WSs from 
last step. This dynamic invocation approach utilizes Java multi-
threading library. 
5. Checks whether sufficient (for performing majority voting) responses 
are returned by the WSs. 
 If adequate responses are returned, it performs majority voting 
on the BPEL’s local variables that hold these responses, using 
the Code J.3 (see Appendix J) then executes step 6. 
 Else, it throws an exception 
 BPEL’s CatchAll construct catches the thrown excep-
tion. 
 It uses Code J.4 (see Appendix J) to check whether an 
alternative group of services is available by comparing 
the  orderNumber (see Chapter 3 for more information) 
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for the current group and the maximum number of avail-
able groups provided by the DB (see Section 7.1.3). 
 If an alternative group is available, it updates the 
BPEL’s local variable storing the orderNumber for the 
group that should be used next and re-executes the 
ITWS from step 3 
 Else, it throws an exception and terminates the BPEL 
process. 
6. Assigns the result of successful execution of the ITWS to the output 
variable.  
7. Uses Code J.6 (see Appendix J) to execute the Java class (Code J.5 
in Appendix J) that writes the start and end times of the process into a 
file (to work out the response time of the process for evaluation pur-
pose). 
8. Returns the result of the execution of the ITWS to the client. 
 
This ITWS is run once with three and once with five WSs and the re-
sponse times are recorded (for evaluation purpose). These executions are 
repeated forty nine times (to increase the confidence of the outcome of 
these tests) and the average of the response times is considered as the re-
sponse time of the process in each case. Because, the response time slight-
ly varies every time the ITWS is executed.  
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 present the response times for the execution of 
this ITWS running with three and five WSs, respectively. The vertical and 
horizontal lines in these graphs show the response time (ms) every time the 
ITWS is executed and the average of the response times (ms) respectively. 
These results will be used in Chapter 8 to evaluate the work presented in 
this dissertation. 
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Figure 7.5: Process Execution Time (ms) for Dynamic ITWS Implemented using Java as BPEL Extension only (ran with three diverse WSs) 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Process Execution Time (ms) for Dynamic ITWS Implemented using Java as BPEL Extension only (ran with five diverse WSs)
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7.4: Summary 
This chapter illustrated the feasibility of implementing self-
reconfigurable ITWSs using a combination of BPEL constructs and Java as 
BPEL extension, as well as utilizing Java as BPEL extension only, through 
two case studies. The results of these case studies are utilized in Chapter 8 
to evaluate this framework. 
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Chapter 8 Evaluation 
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                                      Evaluation  
 
 
Previous chapters have presented the background and motivations, 
the proposed framework architecture, the service selection framework and 
possible dynamic Business Process Engineering Language (BPEL) process 
reconfiguration for the work presented in this dissertation. This chapter uses 
the outcomes of the case studies presented in Chapters 4-7 to evaluate the 
proposed solutions in terms of the central question underlying this work: 
Can a self-reconfigurable Intrusion-Tolerant Web Service 
(ITWS), implemented using N-version programming and diversity formed by 
composing Off-The-Shelf Web Services (OTSWSs) that are selected 
through penetration testing, Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and Clus-
ter Analysis (CA) processes mitigate XML-related security vulnerabilities? 
Section 8.1 evaluates the advantages, and disadvantages of the 
ITWS presented in this dissertation (as a countermeasure against XML-
related cyber-attacks) over other existing countermeasure approaches. Sec-
tion 8.2 evaluates the ITWS; formed based on penetration test results of 
candidate OTSWSs, in terms of mitigating the XML-related security vulnera-
bilities. Section 8.3 evaluates the effectiveness of PCA and CA utilization in 
security-aware service selection based on penetration tests results of the 
candidate OTSWSs. Section 8.4 evaluates the utilization of Java as BPEL 
extension in the implementation of self-reconfigurable ITWS.  
8 
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8.1 Advantages and Limitations of the Presented 
ITWS 
This section evaluates the ITWS framework presented in this disserta-
tion in terms of its advantages, limitations, and extensibility as a counter-
measure against XML-related cyber-attacks. 
8.1.1 Advantages of the Presented ITWS 
Compared to the disadvantages of existing countermeasures against 
XML-related cyber-attacks (presented in Chapter 2), this ITWS has the fol-
lowing advantages: 
 It is independent of any WS-* security standard, hence: 
o It does not require any changes to the structure of the mes-
sages. 
o Revocation, limitations or improper utilization of such standards 
does not affect this framework.   
 It does not require schema validation, hence: 
o It does not cause high CPU load and large memory consump-
tion. 
o It does not require any arbitrary restriction on the number and 
length of the namespaces, which eliminates the unpredictable 
rejection of messages.  
o It does not require manual schema creation and/or update that 
may make Web Services (WSs) prone to cyber-attacks. 
o It does not introduce security vulnerabilities as a result of a 
loosely defined schema. 
o It is not prone to the cyber-attacks targeting a schema valida-
tor.   
8.1.2 Extensibility of the Presented ITWS 
The presented ITWS is extensible so that diversity can also be ap-
plied to penetration testing tools and tests. Furthermore, automation can be 
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applied to its service discovery stage, which is currently the responsibility of 
the system’s administrator.  
8.1.3 Limitations of the Presented ITWS 
However, this ITWS has the following limitations: 
 There may not be enough number of OTSWSs to implement the 
ITWS. 
 Penetration test results may differ if they were performed in the actual 
operational environment. 
 The ITWS is wrapped in a BPEL process, which itself may be a single 
point of failure.   
 Recall that SM tests all OTSWSs every t+i time unit (see Chapter 3), 
the security vulnerabilities of these services may change during these 
time units, which invalidates the existing service groups. However, 
this limitation is inevitable due to the dynamic nature of WS’s operat-
ing environment. But this effect may be diminished by selecting i as 
smallest time unit that the ITWS system can support.  
8.2 Feasibility of Implementing ITWS Based on Pene-
tration Testing Results of Candidate WSs 
 Research Question One: Does an ITWS, formed based on penetra-
tion test results of candidate WSs, mitigate XML-related security vul-
nerabilities? 
Chapter 4 used a case study to demonstrate the feasibility of an 
ITWS implemented based on the penetration test results of its constituent 
WSs. In this case study, the ITWS was implemented using four WSs one of 
them having security vulnerability to Coercive Parsing DoS attack while oth-
er three WSs did not have this security vulnerability. The outcome of this 
study showed that the resultant ITWS also did not have this security vulner-
ability (see Chapter 4 for further details). Hence: 
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The answer to the research question one is yes, an ITWS, formed 
based on penetration testing results of candidate WSs, mitigates XML-
related security vulnerabilities. 
8.3 Feasibility of PCA and CA Utilization in Security-
Aware Service Selection 
 Research Question Two: Is PCA an effective pre-processing step to 
CA in this service selection framework? 
 Research Question Three: Do PCA and CA improve the process of 
security-aware service selection based on penetration testing results 
of candidate WSs? 
 Research Question Four: Does an ITWS in which N-version pro-
gramming and diversity (formed by composing OTSWSs selected 
through PCA and CA analysis on their penetration testing results) are 
used, mitigate XML-related security vulnerabilities?  
As demonstrated in Section 6.1.6 (Chapter 6), PCA has successfully 
reduced the dimensionality of the penetration test results of the WSs (from 
Section 6.1.2) and the computation complexity of CA. It also has identified 
the patterns among the penetration test results of these WSs and has ena-
bled to determine the number of clusters, which is one of the issues with CA. 
Hence, it has proved to be a practical pre-CA approach in this service selec-
tion framework. Therefore,  
The answer to the research question two is yes, PCA is an effective 
pre-processing step to CA in this service selection framework. 
Recall that CA assigned S4, S5, and S6 to the same cluster (see Sec-
tion 6.1.7), which means that these WSs have the minimum security vulner-
abilities diversity among the services from Section 6.1.2. Hence, to evaluate 
this work in terms of research questions three and four (see above), the WS-
groups formed in Section 6.1.7 are compared with a group containing S4, S5 
and S6 (hereafter referred to as WS-group7).  
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Figure 8.1: Penetration Test Results for WS-Group7 (for information about each test see Table 6.12) 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Average of Penetration Test Results for WS-Groups1-6 against Average of Penetration Test Results for WS-Group7  
(for information about each test see Table 6.12)
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Figure 8.1b: Results from Test 2
Test2 Results Average of tests results
6
9
%
7
4
%
7
3
%
7
5
%
7
2
%
8
1
% 75
%
7
3
%
7
8
%
7
6
%
74.6%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
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WS-group7 is also developed as it is explained in Section 6.1.8 and is 
tested using Coercive Parsing, DJBX31A Hash Collision, and XML Attribute 
Count attacks with WS-Attacker’s settings presented in Table 6.12. In these 
tests, the attack element was either plotted in the header or the body of the 
test SOAP message as presented in Message 5.1 and Message 5.2, respec-
tively.  
Figure 8.1 shows the results of the test attacks performed on WS-
group7. These results show the vulnerability of this WS-group to the per-
formed attacks in percentage so that 100% indicates that the group is very 
vulnerable to the attack and 1% shows that it does not have this security 
vulnerability.  
Each test is repeated ten times (to increase the confidence of the out-
come of these tests), and the average of the test results is considered as the 
final test result since these test plugins decide on the security vulnerability of 
the WSs based on their response times that slightly differs every time the 
same test is performed. The vertical and horizontal lines in these graphs 
(Figures 8.1a-8.1c) show the result of the penetration test every time the 
same test is performed and the average of the penetration test results for 
each test, respectively. 
Figure 8.2 presents the average penetration test results of WS-
groups1-6 against the average penetration test results of WS-group7 for Co-
ercive Parsing and Hash Collision attacks. The results of XML Attribute 
Count attack test are excluded in this comparison as its result is similar for 
all these WS-groups. Comparing the penetration test results of WS-group7 
(non-optimal group) with the optimal WS-groups (identified through PCA and 
CA) show 17.96%-29.36% and 0.61%-3.06% better overall security vulnera-
bility to Coercive Parsing and Hash Collision attacks, respectively.
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Table 8.1: 2-Samples Tests Results for Coercive Parsing Attack   
 
Null hypothesis 
 
Alternative hypothesis 
 
Confidence interval 
 
p-value 
 
Null hypothesis rejected? 
 
Group7 and Group1 are equally vulnerable 
to Coercive Parsing attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Coercive Parsing 
attack than Group1 
 
95% 
 
0.000 
 
Yes 
 
Group7 and Group2 are equally vulnerable 
to Coercive Parsing attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Coercive Parsing 
attack than Group2 
 
95% 
 
0.000 
 
Yes 
 
Group7 and Group3 are equally vulnerable 
to Coercive Parsing attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Coercive Parsing 
attack than Group3 
 
95% 
 
0.000 
 
Yes  
 
Group7 and Group4 are equally vulnerable 
to Coercive Parsing attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Coercive Parsing 
attack than Group4 
 
95% 
 
0.000 
 
Yes  
 
Group7 and Group5 are equally vulnerable 
to Coercive Parsing attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Coercive Parsing 
attack than Group5 
 
95% 
 
0.000 
 
Yes 
 
Group7 and Group6 are equally vulnerable 
to Coercive Parsing attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Coercive Parsing 
attack than Group6 
 
95% 
 
0.000 
 
Yes 
 
Table 8.2: 2-Samples Tests Results for Hash Collision Attack 
 
Null hypothesis 
 
Alternative hypothesis 
 
Confidence interval 
 
p-value 
 
Null hypothesis rejected? 
 
Group7 and Group1 are equally vulnerable 
to Hash Collision attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Hash Collision 
attack than Group1 
 
95% 
 
0.159 
 
No 
 
Group7 and Group2 are equally vulnerable 
to Hash Collision attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Hash Collision 
attack than Group2 
 
95% 
 
0.092 
 
No 
 
Group7 and Group3 are equally vulnerable 
to Hash Collision attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Hash Collision 
attack than Group3 
 
95% 
 
0.085 
 
No 
 
Group7 and Group4 are equally vulnerable 
to Hash Collision attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Hash Collision 
attack than Group4 
 
95% 
 
0.315 
 
No 
 
Group7 and Group5 are equally vulnerable 
to Hash Collision attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Hash Collision 
attack than Group5 
 
95% 
 
0.083 
 
No 
 
Group7 and Group6 are equally vulnerable 
to Hash Collision attack 
 
Group7 is more vulnerable to Hash Collision 
attack than Group6 
 
95% 
 
0.107 
 
No 
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In Statistics, 2-samples t-test is a type of hypothesis test that allows 
comparing the means of two independent groups of observations. To further 
assess the proposed service selection framework; 2-samples t-tests are car-
ried out on the penetration test results of WS-group7 and each of the other 
WS-groups (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). These tables show the null and alter-
native hypothesis as well as the confidence level for these 2-samples tests. 
They also illustrate the p-values and indicate whether the null hypothesis is 
rejected (decided based on the p-value) in each case.  
For 95% confidence level, the p-value should be 0.05 or less for null 
hypothesis to be accepted. Therefore, as shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, WS-
group7 is more vulnerable to Coercive Parsing attack compared with WS-
groups1-6. However, all these WS-groups are similarly vulnerable to Hash 
Collision attack. Hence,  
The answer to the research question four is yes, an ITWS in which N-
version programming and diversity (formed by composing OTSWSs selected 
through PCA and CA analysis on their penetration test results) are used, mit-
igates XML-related security vulnerabilities. 
However, the above conclusion also requires comparison of the pene-
tration test results of WS-groups1-6 with the WS-groups formed using re-
maining combinations of these WSs (identified by PCA and CA as non-
optimal WS-groups according to their overall XML-related security vulnera-
bilities).   
Finally, without utilization of PCA and CA, every combination of these 
WSs (
𝑚!
𝑛!(𝑚−𝑛)!
) had to be tested in order to select the most secure group. 
However, these approaches have reduced the number of required penetra-
tion tests significantly. For example, in this case study six WSs are available, 
and three should be selected so in the normal case, twenty different WS-
groups had to be tested, whereas through utilization of PCA and CA this 
number is reduced to six WS-groups (70% less penetration testing). There-
fore,  
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The answer to the research question three is yes, PCA and CA im-
prove the process of security-aware service selection based on penetration 
test results of candidate WSs. 
8.4 Feasibility of Implementing Self-Reconfigurable 
ITWS Using BPEL and JAVA as BPEL Extension 
 
Figure 8.3: BPEL Diagram of Static ITWS Implemented for Evaluation Purpose 
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 Research Question Five: Does the use of Java as BPEL extension 
enables dynamic reconfiguration of ITWS?  
Chapter 7 demonstrated the implementation of dynamically reconfigu-
rable ITWS using a combination of Java as BPEL extension and BPEL con-
structs, as well as using only Java as BPEL extension. Hence, to evaluate 
this work in terms of research question five (see above), a static ITWS is im-
plemented and is compared with the dynamic ITWSs from Section 7.  
This static ITWS is developed using the WSs from the Section 7.1.1 
and BPEL plugin for Oracle SOA Suite 12c running on Intel® Core™ i5-
3320M CPU @ 2.60GHz system with 7.88GB usable RAM and 64-bit Oper-
ating System. Figure 8.3 presents the BPEL diagram for this ITWS. The 
overview of the operation of this ITWS is as follows: 
1. Receives the client’s request (start of the business process). 
2. Stores the start time of the business process, which will be used to 
work out the response time of this self-reconfigurable ITWS. 
3. Invokes the WSs (from Section 7.1.1) concurrently. Each of the pro-
cess paths of the flow activity invokes one of these WSs that is as-
signed to it at design time.  
4. Checks whether sufficient (for performing majority voting) responses 
are returned by the WSs. 
 If adequate responses are returned, it performs majority voting 
on the BPEL’s local variables that hold these responses, using 
the Code J.3 (see Appendix J) then executes step 5. 
 Else, it throws an exception 
 BPEL’s CatchAll construct catches the thrown excep-
tion. 
 Checks if the pre-defined (by the developer of this 
ITWS) number of re-execution of the invocation process 
it met. 
 Re-executes the ITWS from step 3, if the pre-defined 
number of re-execution of the invocation process is not 
met. 
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 Else, it throws an exception and terminates the BPEL 
process. 
5. Assigns the result of successful execution of the ITWS to the output 
variable.  
6. Uses Code J.6 (see Appendix J) to execute the Java class (Code J.5 
in Appendix J) that writes the start and end times of the process into a 
file (to work out the response time of the process for evaluation pur-
pose). 
7. Returns the result of the execution of the ITWS to the client. 
 
This ITWS is executed once with three and once with five WSs and 
its response times are recorded. These executions are repeated forty nine 
times (to increase the confidence of the outcome of these tests) and the av-
erage of their response times is considered as the response time of the 
ITWS in each case. Because, the response time slightly varies every time 
the ITWS is executed.  
 
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 present the response times for the executions of 
this ITWS running with three and five WSs, respectively. The vertical and 
horizontal lines in these graphs show the response time (ms) every time the 
ITWS is executed and the average of these executions’ response times 
(ms), respectively.  
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Figure 8.4: Process Execution Time (ms) for Static ITWS Implemented using  BPEL Constructs only (ran with three diverse WSs from Section 7.1.1) 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Process Execution Time (ms) for Static ITWS Implemented using BPEL Constructs only (ran with five diverse WSs from Section 7.1.1)
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Figure 8.6: Average of Process Execution Times (ms) for Static ITWS against the Average of 
Process Execution Times (ms) for Dynamic ITWSs 
Figures 8.6a and 8.6b illustrate the average response times for the 
executions of the static ITWS against the average response times for the 
executions of the dynamic ITWSs ran with three and five WSs. Comparing 
these results indicates that the introduction of dynamic reconfiguration has 
introduced execution time overheads (see Table 8.3).  
Table 8.3: Execution Time Overheads 
 
Business Processes 
 
Execution time overhead for 
ITWS ran with three WSs 
 
Execution time overhead for 
ITWS ran with five WSs 
 
BPEL + Java vs BPEL 
constructs only 
 
44% 
 
11% 
 
Java only vs BPEL  
constructs only 
 
62.29% 
 
53.45% 
 
BPEL + Java vs Java only 
 
12.70% 
 
38.25% 
 
To further examine these ITWSs, 2-samples t-tests are carried out on 
their process execution times (see Tables 8.3 and 8.4). These tables show 
the null and alternative hypothesis as well as the confidence level for these 
2-samples tests. They also illustrate the p-values and indicate whether the 
null hypothesis is rejected (decided based on the p-value) in each case.  
For 95% confidence level, the p-value should be 0.05 or less to ac-
cept the null hypothesis. Therefore, as shown in Tables 8.3 and 8.4, the utili-
zation of Java as BPEL extension to implement self-reconfigurable ITWS 
introduces execution time overheads. 
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Table 8.4: 2-Sample Tests Results for ITWS ran with three WSs 
 
Null hypothesis 
 
Alternative hypothesis 
 
Confidence interval 
 
p-value 
 
Null hypothesis rejected? 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using a 
combination of BPEL constructs and Java as 
BPEL extension takes the same time as 
execution of the ITWS implemented using 
BPEL constructs only 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using a 
combination of BPEL constructs and Java as 
BPEL extension takes longer than execution of 
the ITWS implemented using BPEL constructs 
only 
 
 
95% 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
Yes 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using 
Java as BPEL extension only takes the same 
time as execution of the ITWS implemented 
using BPEL constructs only 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using Java 
as BPEL extension only takes longer than exe-
cution of the ITWS implemented using BPEL 
constructs only 
 
 
95% 
 
0.000 
 
Yes 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using 
Java as BPEL extension only takes the same 
time as execution of the ITWS implemented 
using a combination of BPEL constructs and 
Java as BPEL extension 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using Java 
as BPEL extension only takes longer than exe-
cution of the ITWS implemented using a combi-
nation of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL 
extension 
 
 
95% 
 
 
0.006 
 
No 
 
Table 8.5: 2-Sample Tests Results for ITWS ran with five WSs 
 
Null hypothesis 
 
Alternative hypothesis 
 
Confidence interval 
 
p-value 
 
Null hypothesis rejected? 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using a 
combination of BPEL constructs and Java as 
BPEL extension takes the same time as 
execution of the ITWS implemented using 
BPEL constructs only 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using a 
combination of BPEL constructs and Java as 
BPEL extension takes longer than execution of 
the ITWS implemented using BPEL constructs 
only 
 
 
95% 
 
 
2.09 
 
 
No 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using 
Java as BPEL extension only takes the same 
time as execution of the ITWS implemented 
using BPEL constructs only 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using Java 
as BPEL extension only takes longer than exe-
cution of the ITWS implemented using BPEL 
constructs only 
 
 
95% 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
Yes 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using 
Java as BPEL extension only takes the same 
time as execution of the ITWS implemented 
using a combination of BPEL constructs and 
Java as BPEL extension 
 
Execution of the ITWS implemented using Java 
as BPEL extension only takes longer than exe-
cution of the ITWS implemented using a combi-
nation of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL 
extension 
 
 
95% 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
Yes 
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Figure 8.7: Dynamic Reconfiguration Time (ms) for ITWS Implemented using Combination of Java and BPEL Constructs 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Dynamic Reconfiguration Time (ms) for ITWS Implemented using Java only 
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In addition to the previous evaluations, the reconfiguration times of 
ITWS implemented using Java as BPEL extension only and ITWS imple-
mented using a combination of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL exten-
sion are also compared (see Figures 8.7 and 8.8). For this examination, de-
liberate faults (two of the WSs developed in Section 7.1.1 are altered to re-
turn their response in unexpected format) are injected into these ITWSs forc-
ing them to perform reconfiguration. The result shows 34.35% increase in 
the reconfiguration time in the case of ITWS implemented using only Java as 
BPEL extension approach.  
As presented in this section, the answer to the research question five 
is yes, the use of Java as BPEL extension enables dynamic reconfiguration 
of ITWS. 
And the answer to the central question underlying this work (Can a 
self-reconfigurable ITWS, implemented using N-version programming and 
diversity formed by composing OTSWSs that are selected through penetra-
tion testing, PCA, and CA processes mitigate XML-related securi-
ty vulnerabilities?) is: 
Yes, a composite WS implemented in BPEL can be converted to a 
self-reconfigurable ITWS using the proposed approaches, presented in this 
dissertation, to mitigate XML-related security vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 9 Literature Review 
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                           Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter presents work related to this dissertation. Section 9.1 
discusses related security standards, Intrusion Detection (ID) and Intrusion 
Prevention (IP) approaches. It also reviews a number of other Intrusion-
Tolerant systems solutions. Section 9.2 presents other service selection so-
lutions, including those based on PCA and CA approaches and compares 
them to the service selection framework of this dissertation. Finally, Section 
9.3 discusses other works related to the dynamic reconfiguration and adap-
tation of composite WSs.  
9.1 Intrusion Detection, Prevention and Tolerant Sys-
tems 
This section reviews related security standards and a number of re-
lated ID/IP approaches specific to WSs as well as a number of related IT-
WSs. 
9.1.1 Related Security Standards 
Various standards (including WS-Security, WS-Policy, WS-Trust, WS-
Privacy, WS-Federation, WS-SecureConversation, WS-Authorization and 
etc.) have been created to be used as building blocks of the WSs to protect 
them against XML-related cyber-attacks [130]. However, they have limita-
tions; such as their implementation might introduce some complexity and 
9 
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that they may cause security vulnerabilities if not implemented properly (see 
Chapter 2 for more details).  
9.1.2 Related ID/IP Approaches 
Lindstrom [51] proposed to first validate XML documents, using for-
mat and syntax inspection and validation approaches, to conform to the XML 
and SOAP specifications then perform a deeper inspection of the content, 
looking for any policy violations (e.g., oversized documents). Loh et al. [131] 
proposed an ID/IP framework for WSs, which is a combination of syntax 
parsing on SOAP messages (to check the structure of XML for syntax er-
rors), filtering policy to check and restrict the size of the SOAP message ( to 
prevent Oversized Payload attacks) and XML schema validation ( to counter 
SOAP flooding attacks). Similarly, Yee et al. [132] proposed an adaptive 
ID/IP framework for WSs, which consists of agents that act as sensors, data 
mining techniques such as clustering, association and sequential rule cou-
pled with fuzzy logic to detect violations to the normal profile. The anomalies 
are then further analysed using fuzzy logic to determine genuine attacks to 
reduce false alarms. In the event of an attack, the action provider either 
blocks, rejects or terminates the activity. In [133] an ID framework is pro-
posed that detects cyber-attacks on WSs using XML similarity classifiers. 
This framework consists of: (1) monitoring every request/response for identi-
fication of any special characters that may cause SQL/XML Injection attacks; 
(2) a validation scheme using WSDL definition of the WS with the aim of 
preventing XML DoS attacks; and (3) a normal dataset of requests (based 
on the normal behaviours of the previous traces) as a reference for compar-
ing both the structure and the semantics of every input request.  Gorbenko 
et al. [134] proposed a diversity-aware IP framework based on multi-level 
software diversity and dynamic software reconfiguration for deploying WSs 
in a cloud. In this framework, the vulnerability information from sources such 
as NVD and CVE are utilized at real-time to compute the vulnerability scores 
for the available diverse software infrastructures. The infrastructure with the 
less vulnerability score is then chosen and redeployed if a different infra-
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structure is currently deployed. They do not consider replicated systems but 
choose the best single configuration from a pool of diverse options.  
Generally, the ID/IP systems may effectively detect pre-defined at-
tacks but have limitations in responding to continuously created novel at-
tacks. 
9.1.3 Related Intrusion-Tolerant Systems  
A considerable volume of work in this area has focused on imple-
menting Intrusion-Tolerant systems based on diverse redundant compo-
nents [135]–[138]. The basic intuition is that design diversity reduces the 
possibility of common security vulnerabilities that are exploited by an attack. 
These systems are based on active replication techniques. There are proxy 
servers which interface with the external world mediating access to the actu-
al servers. The inputs to the servers and the responses from the servers are 
passed through validity checks. Voting is performed on the responses from 
the servers and any disagreement acts as a trigger for the reconfiguration 
(e.g., bringing in a different server).  
Kalkhoran et al. [139] proposed an ITWS that uses simple primary 
and backup scheme (both services have the same implementation, hence, 
the same security vulnerabilities). In this framework, the available operations 
are extracted from the WSDL of the WS, and then an XML schema is gener-
ated and hardened and used to validate the incoming messages. The objec-
tive of this ITWS is to prevent previously detected attacks from occurring 
continually on the system. For this purpose, the system’s activity patterns 
are utilized to detect misuses or abnormal behaviours. Following detection of 
the malicious requests, the containment module tries to extend these re-
quests to attack patterns and add them to the attack patterns database. In 
the event of a successful intrusion, the compromised services are disabled 
and the reconfiguration manager checks whether the service level is satis-
factory. Otherwise, the online server is restored to a clean state and the hot 
standby copy is promoted to the online server.  
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9.2 Service Selection 
Existing approaches to service discovery and selection are mainly 
based on non-functional properties such as QoS, policies, trust, and reputa-
tion from client perspective [140].In these approaches, the security property 
is defined as a set of high-level QoS attributes (e.g., confidentiality and in-
tegrity) usually claimed by the service providers with no supporting evidence. 
The service selection approach presented in [141] is based on both func-
tional and non-functional requirements and contains a QoS certifier that 
checks the QoS claims made by the service providers. Maximilien and Singh 
[142] proposed a runtime service selection framework that utilizes agents 
(acting as proxies between the clients and the services) discovering services 
based on semantics and QoS policies. Quing et al. [140] present a survey of 
service selection approaches based on non-functional requirements. Yau 
and Yin [143] proposed a service selection framework based on QoS metrics 
integrated into a single satisfaction score. The service selection solutions 
presented in [144] is based on the client’s preferences and WS’s properties. 
It combines logic-based and optimization methods. Chaari et al. [145] pro-
posed a service selection approach based on ontology reasoning and an 
extension to WS-Policy. The service selection framework presented in [146] 
is based on the trust and the reputation of the WSs. This approach evaluates 
the trustworthiness of the providers based on their reputation then provides 
a reputation-based service discovery methodology driven by clients’ QoS 
preferences. Anisetti et al. [147] proposed a service selection framework that 
selects the WSs based on their security certificates that best satisfy the cli-
ent’s preference. Finally, Qi et al. [148] proposed service selection method 
based on weighted PCA. They have argued that the weighted PCA may re-
duce the number of QoS criteria simplifying the service selection process 
and eliminate the correlations between different QoS criteria increasing ser-
vice selection accuracy. 
The service selection framework presented in this dissertation differs 
from the above solutions as it is based on tested security vulnerabilities of 
the WSs (not just the service provider’s claim) 
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9.3 Reconfiguration/Adaptation 
In standard BPEL processes, the interactions with other WSs are en-
abled through PortTypes, which are defined statically during the implementa-
tion of the business process. A much more controllable and hence flexible 
approach is to enable dynamic runtime lookup, selection, and binding to 
such business processes.  
Ezenwoye et al. [149] presented RobustBPEL framework, which can 
generate an adaptable version of an existing BPEL process. The BP gener-
ated through this framework monitors the invocation of partner WSs and in-
vokes a static proxy service in the event of a failure. This proxy looks for an 
equivalent service to replace the failed one. In this approach, the information 
about the equivalent services is hardcoded at proxy generation time. Later 
they proposed RobustBPEL2 [150], which is uses dynamic proxies that ena-
bles the runtime discovery of equivalent services. Furthermore, Robust-
BPEL2 adds self-optimizing capabilities to existing BPEL processes. While 
their work is similar to the reconfiguration approaches presented in this dis-
sertation in respect to their aim to improve reliability in the context of BPEL 
and WSs, they are using a proxy based approach, which requires the inter-
face of the equivalent services to match the proxy service, to monitor pro-
cess execution and improve process performance, whereas the approaches 
presented in this dissertation leverages Java as BPEL extension, which en-
ables invocation of any equivalent service, to improve dependability of the 
BP. Hence, the approaches presented in this dissertation enable better self-
reconfiguration. RobustBPEL2 uses UDDI to discover alternative services in 
the event of a failure. However, it does not incorporate selection criteria 
when multiple services are found, while this work chooses the most secure 
available group of WSs from the database.  
In [151], Baresi et al. proposed a framework enabling self-healing ca-
pabilities for BPEL processes. Their framework is based on implementation 
of the Dynamo [152] framework (a supervision framework), which consists of 
an AOP-extended version of the ActiveBPEL and is built using the JBoss 
Rule Engine. Similarly, they employ BPEL extensions however, of AOP type 
156 | P a g e  
 
not Java. Their solution does not explicitly address the problem of selecting 
alternative services whereas; the solution presented in this work provides a 
viable way to select alternative services.  
AO4BPEL [153] is an extension to BPEL4WS. It is an aspect-oriented 
approach to WSs composition, which provides aspect-oriented modularity 
mechanism. Aspects are defined in XML documents and in the case of 
AO4BPEL they are BPEL activities that implement cross-cutting concerns 
(e.g., security) or workflow changes. To employ the aspect, it must be regis-
tered with the BPEL’s execution engine. This registration can be done during 
the runtime of the BP. However, it requires information such as the WSDL 
and port address of the service, as well as the partnerLinkTypes (necessary 
information for establishing communication with the external WSs) that are 
to be used by the aspect. Then, AO4BPEL can supports dynamically chang-
ing the deployed process through activating/deactivating aspects. Whereas, 
one of the advantages of the self-reconfiguration approaches demonstrated 
in this work is that the BP collects the necessary information for establishing 
communication with the external WSs during its execution time. This feature 
gives the backend of the BP the freedom of updating the services’ records in 
the DB (including adding and deleting services), which enables the ITWS to 
stay up to date.  
In [154], Kongdenfha et al. proposed an aspect-oriented framework 
enabling service adaptation. Their approach uses aspect-based templates to 
automate the task of handling interface mismatches (including protocol mis-
matches). Whereas, the approaches presented in this work utilize self-
reconfiguration to support Intrusion-Tolerance. 
 
 
 
 
 
157 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 10 Conclusions and Future Work 
CHAPTER 
 
 
 
                                  Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
 This dissertation is concerned with improving the dependability of 
Web Services (WSs) especially when Off-The-Shelf Web Services 
(OTSWSs) are employed. It introduced a novel framework to increase de-
pendability by constructing Intrusion-Tolerant Web Services (ITWSs) in 
which N-version programming and diversity, formed by composing OTSWSs, 
are used. It also demonstrated implementation of self-reconfiguration ITWS 
using a combination of Business Process Engineering Language (BPEL) 
constructs and Java as BPEL extension approach and using only Java as 
BPEL extension approach. 
10.1 Summary 
Chapter 1 introduced this work and its context (using an exemplary 
WS). It also briefly discussed the motivation for this work and presented the 
central research question it was going to answer as well as its contributions 
and distinctions. Finally, it briefly outlined the other chapters.  
Chapter 2 presented the overview of WSs’ architecture and intro-
duced its main technologies (SOAP, WSDL, and UDDI). It then explained 
that WSs are at risk of security vulnerabilities related to their specific imple-
mentation technologies (e.g., XML) as well as those, of their underlying plat-
forms (e.g., operating systems) and web Applications (e.g., vulnerability to 
SQL Injection attacks). Afterward, it introduced a number of existing coun-
10 
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termeasures against attacks targeting WSs’ XML-related vulnerabilities fol-
lowed by a list of their limitations and argued that the issue gets more chal-
lenging when OTSWSs are employed as they are ready-made black boxes 
of unknown quality and their security is out of the control of their client thus, 
tolerating their security vulnerabilities through a reconfigurable ITWS is a 
more appropriate approach. It then briefly introduced dependability ap-
proaches and explained that ITWS could be achieved using dependability 
techniques which, is the approach adopted in this work and is achieved 
through the integration of WSs’ composability, Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), Cluster Analysis (CA) and penetration testing. After that, it briefly in-
troduced each of these concepts and explained the motivation for their adop-
tion in this work.  
Chapter 3 presented the architecture for this framework along with its 
objectives and the assumptions made. It then explained the role of each of 
its components and the interactions among them. 
Chapter 4 introduced the penetration testing tool, utilized in the case 
studies presenting the proposed service selection framework. It then 
demonstrated the feasibility of ITWS implementation based on penetration 
test results of the candidate WSs. 
Chapter 5 showed that BPEL could affect the XML-related security 
vulnerabilities of the candidate (for ITWS implementation) WSs and argued 
that these effects should be considered in service selection process.  
Chapter 6 demonstrated, how penetration test results of the candidate 
WSs, PCA, and CA could be used to group WSs based on their XML-related 
security vulnerabilities and how these groups could be sorted using further 
penetration testing.   
Chapter 7 demonstrated the implementation of self-reconfigurable 
WS using a combination of BPEL constructs and Java as BPEL 2.0 exten-
sion approach and utilizing only Java as BPEL extension approach through 
two case studies.  
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Chapter 8 evaluated this work using the experimental results collect-
ed from the case studies that demonstrated different dimensions of the work 
presented in this dissertation. It discussed the advantages, extensibility, and 
limitations of the proposed framework. Finally, it answered the underlying 
central research question. 
 Chapter 9 discussed other related approaches. 
10.2 Future Work 
During this work, the author identified extensions of the current dis-
sertation and future directions of this research as outlined below. 
 Diversity could also be applied to penetration testing tools and tests.  
 XML hardening could be applied to some of the utilized WSs to make 
them more secure aiming to increase diversity among the WSs. 
 Diversity could also be applied at the composition level since the 
BPEL itself could be a single point of failure. 
 Automation could be applied to service discovery stage, which is cur-
rently the responsibility of the system’s administrator. 
 Recall that WS-Attacker’s plugins also simulate concurrent legitimate 
users. These experiments could be repeated while this feature is 
completely switched off (to diminish the fluctuations in the penetration 
testing results).  
 The proposed service selection framework could be further evaluated 
using WS-groups formed based on remaining combinations of the 
WSs (identified by PCA and CA as non-optimal WS-groups according 
to their overall XML-related security vulnerabilities).  
10.3 Conclusions 
This dissertation makes the following main conclusions: 
An ITWS formed based on penetration test results of candidate WSs, 
is a feasible approach to mitigate XML-related security vulnerabilities. 
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PCA and CA improve the process of security-aware service selection 
based on penetration testing results of candidate WSs. 
PCA is an effective pre-processing step to CA in the proposed service 
selection framework. 
An ITWS in which N-version programming and diversity, formed by 
composing SOAP-OTSWSs (elected through PCA and CA analysis on their 
penetration testing results) is used, is a feasible approach to mitigate XML-
related security vulnerabilities. 
Java as BPEL extension enables to implement self-reconfigurable 
ITWS in return for the cost of longer execution time.  
And the answer to the central question underlying this work (Can a 
self-reconfigurable ITWS, implemented using N-version programming and 
diversity formed by composing OTSWSs that are selected through penetra-
tion testing, PCA, and CA processes mitigate XML-related securi-
ty vulnerabilities?) is: 
Yes, a composite WS implemented in BPEL can be converted to a 
self-reconfigurable ITWS using the proposed approaches, presented in this 
dissertation, to mitigate XML-related security vulnerabilities. 
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Appendix A: WSDL of Axis1-4 WS running on 
apache-tomcat-6.0.18 server 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
    <wsdl:definitions targetNamespace="http://Axis_Tom_6"      
    xmlns:apachesoap="http://xml.apache.org/xml-soap" xmlns:impl="http://Axis_Tom_6"       
    xmlns:intf="http://Axis_Tom_6" xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/"  
    xmlns:wsdlsoap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/"  
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
    <!--WSDL created by Apache Axis version: 1.4 
    Built on Apr 22, 2006 (06:55:48 PDT)--> 
    <wsdl:types> 
        <schema elementFormDefault="qualified"  targeNamespace=http://Axis_Tom_6      
         xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
        <element name="factorial"> 
            <complexType> 
                <sequence> 
                    <element name="n" type="xsd:int"/> 
                </sequence> 
            </complexType> 
        </element> 
        <element name="factorialResponse"> 
            <complexType> 
                <sequence> 
                    <element name="factorialReturn" type="xsd:int"/> 
         </sequence> 
             </complexType> 
        </element> 
        <element name="addIntegers"> 
            <complexType> 
                <sequence> 
                    <element name="firstNum" type="xsd:int"/> 
              <element name="secondNum" type="xsd:int"/> 
               </sequence> 
         </complexType> 
     </element> 
     <element name="addIntegersResponse"> 
        <complexType> 
         <sequence> 
           <element name= 
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"addIntegersReturn" type="xsd:int"/> 
         </sequence> 
       </complexType> 
    </element> 
   </schema> 
 </wsdl:types> 
<wsdl:message name="factorialResponse"> 
    <wsdl:part element="impl:factorialResponse" name="parameters"> 
</wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="factorialRequest"> 
  <wsdl:part element="impl:factorial" name="parameters"> 
      </wsdl:part> 
   </wsdl:message> 
   <wsdl:message name="addIntegersRequest"> 
      <wsdl:part element="impl:addIntegers" name="parameters"> 
      </wsdl:part> 
   </wsdl:message> 
   <wsdl:message name="addIntegersResponse"> 
      <wsdl:part element="impl:addIntegersResponse" name="parameters"> 
      </wsdl:part> 
   </wsdl:message> 
   <wsdl:portType name="Axis_Tom_6_sum"> 
      <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
         <wsdl:input message="impl:factorialRequest" name="factorialRequest"> 
       </wsdl:input> 
         <wsdl:output message="impl:factorialResponse" name="factorialResponse"> 
       </wsdl:output> 
      </wsdl:operation> 
      <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
         <wsdl:input message="impl:addIntegersRequest" name="addIntegersRequest"> 
       </wsdl:input> 
         <wsdl:output message="impl:addIntegersResponse" name="addIntegersResponse"> 
       </wsdl:output> 
      </wsdl:operation> 
   </wsdl:portType> 
   <wsdl:binding name="Axis_Tom_6_sumSoapBinding" type="impl:Axis_Tom_6_sum"> 
      <wsdlsoap:binding style="document" 
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/> 
      <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
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         <wsdlsoap:operation soapAction=""/> 
         <wsdl:input name="factorialRequest"> 
            <wsdlsoap:body use="literal"/> 
         </wsdl:input> 
         <wsdl:output name="factorialResponse"> 
            <wsdlsoap:body use="literal"/> 
         </wsdl:output> 
      </wsdl:operation> 
      <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
         <wsdlsoap:operation soapAction=""/> 
         <wsdl:input name="addIntegersRequest"> 
            <wsdlsoap:body use="literal"/> 
         </wsdl:input> 
         <wsdl:output name="addIntegersResponse"> 
            <wsdlsoap:body use="literal"/> 
         </wsdl:output> 
      </wsdl:operation> 
   </wsdl:binding> 
   <wsdl:service name="Axis_Tom_6_sumService"> 
      <wsdl:port binding="impl:Axis_Tom_6_sumSoapBinding" name="Axis_Tom_6_sum"> 
         <wsdlsoap:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/Axis_Tom_6/services/Axis_Tom_6_sum"/> 
      </wsdl:port> 
   </wsdl:service> 
</wsdl:definitions> 
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Appendix B: WSDL of Axis2-1.5.1 WS running 
on apache-tomcat-6.0.18 server 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><wsdl:definitions 
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:ns="http://Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6" 
xmlns:wsaw="http://www.w3.org/2006/05/addressing/wsdl" 
xmlns:mime="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/mime/" 
xmlns:http="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/http/" 
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap12="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap12/" 
xmlns:ns1="http://org.apache.axis2/xsd" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" target-
Namespace="http://Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6"> 
    <wsdl:documentation> 
  Please Type your service description here 
 </wsdl:documentation> 
    <wsdl:types> 
        <xs:schema attributeFormDefault="qualified" elementFormDefault="qualified" target-
Namespace="http://Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6"> 
            <xs:element name="addIntegers"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="firstNum" type="xs:int"/> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="secondNum" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
            </xs:element> 
            <xs:element name="addIntegersResponse"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="return" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
            </xs:element> 
            <xs:element name="factorial"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="n" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
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            </xs:element> 
            <xs:element name="factorialResponse"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="return" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
            </xs:element> 
        </xs:schema> 
    </wsdl:types> 
    <wsdl:message name="factorialRequest"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:factorial"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:message name="factorialResponse"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:factorialResponse"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:message name="addIntegersRequest"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:addIntegers"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:message name="addIntegersResponse"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:addIntegersResponse"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:portType name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <wsdl:input message="ns:factorialRequest" wsaw:Action="urn:factorial"/> 
            <wsdl:output message="ns:factorialResponse" 
wsaw:Action="urn:factorialResponse"/> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <wsdl:input message="ns:addIntegersRequest" wsaw:Action="urn:addIntegers"/> 
            <wsdl:output message="ns:addIntegersResponse" 
wsaw:Action="urn:addIntegersResponse"/> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:portType> 
    <wsdl:binding name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumSoap11Binding" 
type="ns:Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
        <soap:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document"/> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <soap:operation soapAction="urn:factorial" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
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                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <soap:operation soapAction="urn:addIntegers" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:binding> 
    <wsdl:binding name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumSoap12Binding" 
type="ns:Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
        <soap12:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document"/> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <soap12:operation soapAction="urn:factorial" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <soap12:operation soapAction="urn:addIntegers" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:binding> 
    <wsdl:binding name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpBinding" 
type="ns:Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
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        <http:binding verb="POST"/> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <http:operation location="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sum/factorial"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="factorial"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="factorial"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <http:operation location="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sum/addIntegers"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="addIntegers"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="addIntegers"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:binding> 
    <wsdl:service name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sum"> 
        <wsdl:port name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap11Endpoint" bind-
ing="ns:Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumSoap11Binding"> 
            <soap:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6/services/Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sum.Axis2_
1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap11Endpoint/"/> 
        </wsdl:port> 
        <wsdl:port name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap12Endpoint" bind-
ing="ns:Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumSoap12Binding"> 
            <soap12:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6/services/Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sum.Axis2_
1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap12Endpoint/"/> 
        </wsdl:port> 
        <wsdl:port name="Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpEndpoint" bind-
ing="ns:Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpBinding"> 
            <http:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6/services/Axis2_1_5_1_Tom_6_sum.Axis2_
1_5_1_Tom_6_sumHttpEndpoint/"/> 
        </wsdl:port> 
    </wsdl:service> 
</wsdl:definitions> 
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Appendix C: WSDL of Axis2-1.6.1 WS running 
on apache-tomcat-6.0.18 server 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><wsdl:definitions 
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:ns="http://Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6" 
xmlns:wsaw="http://www.w3.org/2006/05/addressing/wsdl" 
xmlns:mime="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/mime/" 
xmlns:http="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/http/" 
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap12="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap12/" 
xmlns:ns1="http://org.apache.axis2/xsd" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" target-
Namespace="http://Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6"> 
    <wsdl:documentation> 
  Please Type your service description here 
 </wsdl:documentation> 
    <wsdl:types> 
        <xs:schema attributeFormDefault="qualified" elementFormDefault="qualified" target-
Namespace="http://Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6"> 
            <xs:element name="addIntegers"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="firstNum" type="xs:int"/> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="secondNum" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
            </xs:element> 
            <xs:element name="addIntegersResponse"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="return" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
            </xs:element> 
            <xs:element name="factorial"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="n" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
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            </xs:element> 
            <xs:element name="factorialResponse"> 
                <xs:complexType> 
                    <xs:sequence> 
                        <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="return" type="xs:int"/> 
                    </xs:sequence> 
                </xs:complexType> 
            </xs:element> 
        </xs:schema> 
    </wsdl:types> 
    <wsdl:message name="factorialRequest"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:factorial"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:message name="factorialResponse"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:factorialResponse"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:message name="addIntegersRequest"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:addIntegers"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:message name="addIntegersResponse"> 
        <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:addIntegersResponse"/> 
    </wsdl:message> 
    <wsdl:portType name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <wsdl:input message="ns:factorialRequest" wsaw:Action="urn:factorial"/> 
            <wsdl:output message="ns:factorialResponse" 
wsaw:Action="urn:factorialResponse"/> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <wsdl:input message="ns:addIntegersRequest" wsaw:Action="urn:addIntegers"/> 
            <wsdl:output message="ns:addIntegersResponse" 
wsaw:Action="urn:addIntegersResponse"/> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:portType> 
    <wsdl:binding name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumSoap11Binding" 
type="ns:Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
        <soap:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document"/> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <soap:operation soapAction="urn:factorial" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
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                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <soap:operation soapAction="urn:addIntegers" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:binding> 
    <wsdl:binding name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumSoap12Binding" 
type="ns:Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
        <soap12:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document"/> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <soap12:operation soapAction="urn:factorial" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <soap12:operation soapAction="urn:addIntegers" style="document"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <soap12:body use="literal"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:binding> 
    <wsdl:binding name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpBinding" 
type="ns:Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumPortType"> 
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        <http:binding verb="POST"/> 
        <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
            <http:operation location="factorial"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="parameters"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="parameters"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
        <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
            <http:operation location="addIntegers"/> 
            <wsdl:input> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="parameters"/> 
            </wsdl:input> 
            <wsdl:output> 
                <mime:content type="text/xml" part="parameters"/> 
            </wsdl:output> 
        </wsdl:operation> 
    </wsdl:binding> 
    <wsdl:service name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sum"> 
        <wsdl:port name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap11Endpoint" bind-
ing="ns:Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumSoap11Binding"> 
            <soap:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6/services/Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sum.Axis2_
1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap11Endpoint/"/> 
        </wsdl:port> 
        <wsdl:port name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap12Endpoint" bind-
ing="ns:Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumSoap12Binding"> 
            <soap12:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6/services/Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sum.Axis2_
1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpSoap12Endpoint/"/> 
        </wsdl:port> 
        <wsdl:port name="Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpEndpoint" bind-
ing="ns:Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpBinding"> 
            <http:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6/services/Axis2_1_6_1_Tom_6_sum.Axis2_
1_6_1_Tom_6_sumHttpEndpoint/"/> 
        </wsdl:port> 
    </wsdl:service> 
</wsdl:definitions> 
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Appendix D: WSDL of CXF-2.5.11 WS running 
on apache-tomcat-7.0.72 server 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><wsdl:definitions 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:tns="http://CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7/" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
name="CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sumService" target-
Namespace="http://CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7/"> 
  <wsdl:types> 
<schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:tns="http://CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7/" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
<import namespace="http://CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7/" schemaLoca-
tion="cxf_2__5_11_tom_7_sum_schema1.xsd"/> 
</schema> 
  </wsdl:types> 
  <wsdl:message name="addIntegers"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:addIntegers" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="factorialResponse"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:factorialResponse" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="addIntegersResponse"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:addIntegersResponse" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="factorial"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:factorial" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:portType name="CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sum"> 
    <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
      <wsdl:input message="tns:addIntegers" name="addIntegers"> 
    </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output message="tns:addIntegersResponse" name="addIntegersResponse"> 
    </wsdl:output> 
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    </wsdl:operation> 
    <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
      <wsdl:input message="tns:factorial" name="factorial"> 
    </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output message="tns:factorialResponse" name="factorialResponse"> 
    </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:portType> 
  <wsdl:binding name="CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sumServiceSoapBinding" 
type="tns:CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sum"> 
    <soap:binding style="document" transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/> 
    <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
      <soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/> 
      <wsdl:input name="addIntegers"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output name="addIntegersResponse"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
    <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
      <soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/> 
      <wsdl:input name="factorial"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output name="factorialResponse"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
  <wsdl:service name="CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sumService"> 
    <wsdl:port binding="tns:CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sumServiceSoapBinding" 
name="CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sumPort"> 
      <soap:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8889/CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7/services/CXF_2__5_11_Tom_7_sumPort
"/> 
    </wsdl:port> 
  </wsdl:service> 
</wsdl:definitions> 
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Appendix E: WSDL of CXF-2.3.10 WS running 
on apache-tomcat-6.0.18 server 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><wsdl:definitions 
name="CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sumService" target-
Namespace="http://CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6/" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
xmlns:tns="http://CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6/" xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <wsdl:types> 
<schema xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
xmlns:tns="http://CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6/" xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
<import namespace="http://CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6/" schemaLoca-
tion="cxf_2_3_10_tom_6_sum_schema1.xsd"/> 
</schema> 
  </wsdl:types> 
  <wsdl:message name="factorial"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:factorial" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="addIntegersResponse"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:addIntegersResponse" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="factorialResponse"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:factorialResponse" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="addIntegers"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:addIntegers" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:portType name="CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sum"> 
    <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
      <wsdl:input message="tns:factorial" name="factorial"> 
    </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output message="tns:factorialResponse" name="factorialResponse"> 
    </wsdl:output> 
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    </wsdl:operation> 
    <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
      <wsdl:input message="tns:addIntegers" name="addIntegers"> 
    </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output message="tns:addIntegersResponse" name="addIntegersResponse"> 
    </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:portType> 
  <wsdl:binding name="CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sumServiceSoapBinding" 
type="tns:CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sum"> 
    <soap:binding style="document" transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/> 
    <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
      <soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/> 
      <wsdl:input name="factorial"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output name="factorialResponse"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
    <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
      <soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/> 
      <wsdl:input name="addIntegers"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output name="addIntegersResponse"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
  <wsdl:service name="CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sumService"> 
    <wsdl:port binding="tns:CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sumServiceSoapBinding" 
name="CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sumPort"> 
      <soap:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8888/CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6/services/CXF_2_3_10_Tom_6_sumPort"/> 
    </wsdl:port> 
  </wsdl:service> 
</wsdl:definitions> 
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Appendix F: WSDL of CXF-2.6.3 WS running on 
apache-tomcat-7.0.72 server 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><wsdl:definitions 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:tns="http://CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7/" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
name="CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sumService" targetNamespace="http://CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7/"> 
  <wsdl:types> 
<schema xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" xmlns:tns="http://CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7/" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
<import namespace="http://CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7/" schemaLoca-
tion="cxf_2_6_3_tom_7_sum_schema1.xsd"/> 
</schema> 
  </wsdl:types> 
  <wsdl:message name="factorial"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:factorial" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="factorialResponse"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:factorialResponse" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="addIntegers"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:addIntegers" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:message name="addIntegersResponse"> 
    <wsdl:part element="tns:addIntegersResponse" name="parameters"> 
    </wsdl:part> 
  </wsdl:message> 
  <wsdl:portType name="CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sum"> 
    <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
      <wsdl:input message="tns:factorial" name="factorial"> 
    </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output message="tns:factorialResponse" name="factorialResponse"> 
    </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
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    <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
      <wsdl:input message="tns:addIntegers" name="addIntegers"> 
    </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output message="tns:addIntegersResponse" name="addIntegersResponse"> 
    </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:portType> 
  <wsdl:binding name="CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sumServiceSoapBinding" 
type="tns:CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sum"> 
    <soap:binding style="document" transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"/> 
    <wsdl:operation name="factorial"> 
      <soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/> 
      <wsdl:input name="factorial"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output name="factorialResponse"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
    <wsdl:operation name="addIntegers"> 
      <soap:operation soapAction="" style="document"/> 
      <wsdl:input name="addIntegers"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:input> 
      <wsdl:output name="addIntegersResponse"> 
        <soap:body use="literal"/> 
      </wsdl:output> 
    </wsdl:operation> 
  </wsdl:binding> 
  <wsdl:service name="CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sumService"> 
    <wsdl:port binding="tns:CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sumServiceSoapBinding" 
name="CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sumPort"> 
      <soap:address loca-
tion="http://localhost:8889/CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7/services/CXF_2_6_3_Tom_7_sumPort"/> 
    </wsdl:port> 
  </wsdl:service> 
</wsdl:definitions> 
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Appendix G: Java Class for Communication be-
tween ITWS and Database 
import java.sql.Connection; 
import java.sql.DriverManager; 
import java.sql.ResultSet; 
import java.sql.Statement; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Collections; 
 
public class DBClass { 
    public static String create(int group, int priority){ 
        String result = ""; 
        try{ 
            Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection 
                ("jdbc:oracle:thin:@//localhost:1521/xe", "sys as sysdba", "Passwor123");  
            Statement stmt = 
conn.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_SENSITIVE,ResultSet.CONCUR_READ
_ONLY); 
            Statement stmt2 = 
conn.createStatement(ResultSet.TYPE_SCROLL_SENSITIVE,ResultSet.CONCUR_READ
_ONLY); 
            ResultSet rset = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT 
ENDPOINT,TARGETNAMESPACE,OPERATION,INPUT FROM HR.WEBSERVICES " + 
                "WHERE SERVICEGROUP =" + group + "AND PRIORITY = " + priority); 
            int i = 0; 
            ArrayList<String> ENDPOINTS = new ArrayList<String>(); 
            ArrayList<String> TARGETNAMESPACES = new ArrayList<String>(); 
            ArrayList<String> OPERATIONS = new ArrayList<String>(); 
            ArrayList<String> INPUTS = new ArrayList<String>(); 
            while (rset.next()) { 
                ENDPOINTS.add(i, rset.getString("ENDPOINT")); 
                TARGETNAMESPACES.add(i, rset.getString("TARGETNAMESPACE")); 
                OPERATIONS.add(i, rset.getString("OPERATION")); 
                INPUTS.add(i, rset.getString("INPUT")); 
                i++; 
                } 
            for (int j = 0; j < ENDPOINTS.size(); j++) { 
                result += ENDPOINTS.get(j) + "," + TARGETNAMESPACES.get(j) + "," + 
OPERATIONS.get(j)  
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                    + "," + INPUTS.get(j) + "]"; 
                } 
            ResultSet rset2 = stmt2.executeQuery("SELECT PRIORITY FROM 
HR.WEBSERVICES"); 
            int x = 0; 
            ArrayList<Integer> PRIORITY = new ArrayList<Integer>(); 
 
            while (rset2.next()) { 
                PRIORITY.add(x, Integer.parseInt(rset2.getString("PRIORITY"))); 
                i++; 
                } 
            result += String.valueOf(Collections.max(PRIORITY)); 
            conn.close(); 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            ex.printStackTrace(); 
            } 
        return result; 
        } 
} 
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Appendix H: Java Class for Dynamic WS Invo-
cation Using RPC Library 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBodyElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPConnection; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPConnectionFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart; 
 
public class Client { 
 
    //Starting point for the SAAJ - SOAP Client Testing 
    public static String create(String serviceInfo) { 
        String result = ""; 
        String[] serviceInformation = serviceInfo.split("\\,"); 
        try { 
            // Create SOAP Connection 
            SOAPConnectionFactory soapConnectionFactory = SOAPConnectionFacto-
ry.newInstance(); 
            SOAPConnection soapConnection = soapConnectionFactory.createConnection(); 
 
            // Send SOAP Message to SOAP Server 
            String url = serviceInformation[0]; 
            SOAPMessage soapResponse = soapConnec-
tion.call(createSOAPRequest(serviceInformation[1], serviceInformation[2], 
                                                                             serviceInformation[3], serviceInfor-
mation[4]), url); 
 
            // Process the SOAP Response 
            result = printSOAPResponse(soapResponse); 
            soapConnection.close(); 
             
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Error occurred while sending SOAP Request to Server"); 
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            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return result; 
    } 
    /** 
     * Method used to print the SOAP Response 
     */ 
    private static String printSOAPResponse(SOAPMessage soapResponse) throws Excep-
tion { 
        String result = ""; 
        SOAPBody responseBody = soapResponse.getSOAPBody(); 
        Iterator it1 = responseBody.getChildElements(); 
         while (it1.hasNext()) { 
             SOAPBodyElement bodyEl = (SOAPBodyElement)it1.next(); 
             Iterator it2 = bodyEl.getChildElements(); 
             while (it2.hasNext()) { 
                 SOAPElement child2 = (SOAPElement)it2.next(); 
                 result = child2.getValue(); 
                 } 
             } 
         return result; 
    } 
private static SOAPMessage createSOAPRequest(String namespace, String operation, 
String input1, String input2) throws Exception { 
        MessageFactory messageFactory = MessageFactory.newInstance(); 
        SOAPMessage soapMessage = messageFactory.createMessage(); 
        SOAPPart soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart(); 
        String serverURI = namespace; 
        // SOAP Envelope 
        SOAPEnvelope envelope = soapPart.getEnvelope(); 
        envelope.addNamespaceDeclaration("example", serverURI); 
        // SOAP Body 
        SOAPBody soapBody = envelope.getBody(); 
        SOAPElement soapBodyElem = soapBody.addChildElement(operation, "example"); 
        SOAPElement soapBodyElem1 = soapBodyElem.addChildElement(input1, "example"); 
        soapBodyElem1.addTextNode("10"); 
        SOAPElement soapBodyElem2 = soapBodyElem.addChildElement(input2, "example"); 
        soapBodyElem2.addTextNode("12"); 
        MimeHeaders headers = soapMessage.getMimeHeaders(); 
        headers.addHeader("SOAPAction", serverURI  + operation); 
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        soapMessage.saveChanges(); 
        /* Print the request message */ 
        System.out.print("Request SOAP Message = "); 
        soapMessage.writeTo(System.out); 
        System.out.println(); 
        return soapMessage; 
    } 
} 
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Appendix I: Java Class for Dynamic WS Invoca-
tion through RPC and Java Multi-Threading Li-
braries 
import java.util.HashSet; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import java.util.List; 
import java.util.Set; 
import java.util.concurrent.Callable; 
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService; 
import java.util.concurrent.Executors; 
import java.util.concurrent.Future; 
 
import javax.xml.soap.MessageFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.MimeHeaders; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBody; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPBodyElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPConnection; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPConnectionFactory; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPElement; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPEnvelope; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPMessage; 
import javax.xml.soap.SOAPPart; 
 
 
public class Client2 { 
 
    public static String create(String input) { 
        String result = ""; 
        ExecutorService executorService = Executors.newSingleThreadExecutor(); 
        Set<Callable<String>> callables = new HashSet<Callable<String>>(); 
        String[] serviceInfo = input.split("\\]"); 
         
        for (int i = 0; i < (serviceInfo.length)-1; i++) { 
            final int counter = i; 
            callables.add(new Callable<String>() { 
                public String call() throws Exception { 
                    return serviceClient(serviceInfo[counter]); 
                } 
            }); 
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        } 
        try { 
            List<Future<String>> futures = executorService.invokeAll(callables); 
            for(Future<String> future : futures){ 
                System.out.println("future.get = " + future.get()); 
                result += future.get() + ","; 
                } 
            executorService.shutdown(); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
         
        return result;     
        } 
 
public static String serviceClient(String input) { 
        String result = ""; 
        String[] serviceInfo = input.split("\\,"); 
        try { 
            // Create SOAP Connection 
            SOAPConnectionFactory soapConnectionFactory = SOAPConnectionFacto-
ry.newInstance(); 
            SOAPConnection soapConnection = soapConnectionFactory.createConnection(); 
            // Send SOAP Message to SOAP Server 
            String url = serviceInfo[0]; 
            SOAPMessage soapResponse = soapConnec-
tion.call(createSOAPRequest(serviceInfo[1], serviceInfo[2], 
                                                                             serviceInfo[3], serviceInfo[4]), url); 
            result = printSOAPResponse(soapResponse); 
            soapConnection.close(); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.err.println("Error occurred while sending SOAP Request to Server"); 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return result; 
        } 
    private static SOAPMessage createSOAPRequest(String namespace, String operation, 
String input1, String input2) throws Exception { 
        MessageFactory messageFactory = MessageFactory.newInstance(); 
        SOAPMessage soapMessage = messageFactory.createMessage(); 
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        SOAPPart soapPart = soapMessage.getSOAPPart(); 
        String serverURI = namespace; 
        SOAPEnvelope envelope = soapPart.getEnvelope(); 
        envelope.addNamespaceDeclaration("example", serverURI); 
        SOAPBody soapBody = envelope.getBody(); 
        SOAPElement soapBodyElem = soapBody.addChildElement(operation, "example"); 
        SOAPElement soapBodyElem1 = soapBodyElem.addChildElement(input1, "example"); 
        soapBodyElem1.addTextNode("10"); 
        SOAPElement soapBodyElem2 = soapBodyElem.addChildElement(input2, "example"); 
        soapBodyElem2.addTextNode("12"); 
        MimeHeaders headers = soapMessage.getMimeHeaders(); 
        headers.addHeader("SOAPAction", serverURI  + operation); 
        soapMessage.saveChanges(); 
        System.out.print("Request SOAP Message = "); 
        soapMessage.writeTo(System.out); 
        System.out.println(); 
        return soapMessage; 
        } 
// Method used to print the SOAP Response 
    private static String printSOAPResponse(SOAPMessage soapResponse) throws Excep-
tion { 
        String result = ""; 
        SOAPBody responseBody = soapResponse.getSOAPBody(); 
        Iterator it1 = responseBody.getChildElements(); 
         while (it1.hasNext()) { 
             SOAPBodyElement bodyEl = (SOAPBodyElement)it1.next(); 
             Iterator it2 = bodyEl.getChildElements(); 
             while (it2.hasNext()) { 
                 SOAPElement child2 = (SOAPElement)it2.next(); 
                 result = child2.getValue(); 
                 } 
             } 
         return result; 
        } 
        } 
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Appendix J: Remaining Java Codes for Chapter 
7 
 
Code J.1 Java as BPEL Extension for Executing Database Query Class 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code J.2 Java as BPEL Extension for Executing Dynamic Service Invocation Class 
 
 
 
 
 
Code J.3 Java Code for Performing Majority Voting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
String value = (String) getVariableData("Invocation-Result");           
String[] values = value.split(",");    
int maxValue = 0, maxCount = 0; 
for (int i = 0; i < values.length; i++) {           
    int count = 0; 
    for (int j = 0; j < values.length; ++j) { 
        if (values [j] == values [i]) { 
            ++count; 
        } 
        if (count > maxCount) { 
            maxCount = count; 
            maxValue = values[i]; 
        } 
}           
setVariableData("output", maxValue);      
String priority1 = (String) getVariableData("Priority");          
String group1 = (String) getVariableData("Service-Group");         
int priority = Integer.parseInt(priority1);          
int group = Integer.parseInt(group1);         
     
String result = DBClass.create(group, priority);        
setVariableData("DB-Result", result);   
          
 String[] counter = result.split("\\[");            
setVariableData("Loop-Cycles", Integer.parseInt(counter[1]));             
String[] result2 = counter[0].split("\\]");        
setVariableData("Max-Priority-From-DB",result2[(result2.length)-1]); 
String input = (String) getVariableData("DB-Result");          
int counter = (int) getVariableData("ForEach1Counter");        
String[] result = input.split("\\]");     
setVariableData("Invocation-Result",getVariableData("Invocation-Result") + Cli-
ent.create(result[counter-1]) +","); 
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Code J.4 Java Code for Performing Fault-Tolerance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code J.5 Java code for Writing BP’s Start and End Times into a File 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code J.6 Java Code for Writing the BP’s Start and End Times into a File 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 String priority1 = (String) getVariableData("Priority");       
int priority = Integer.parseInt(priority1);    
   
String maximum1 = (String) getVariableData("Max-Priority-From-DB");       
int maximum = Integer.parseInt(maximum1);   
   
if(priority <= maximum) {   
  setVariableData("Priority", String.valueOf(priority+1));   
} else {   
  setVariableData("Flag", String.valueOf(0));   
} 
StringTampering.test((String)getVariableData("Start"),(String)getVariableData("End")); 
import java.io.BufferedWriter; 
import java.io.FileWriter; 
public class StringTampering { 
    public static void test(String start, String end) { 
        try { 
            FileWriter fstream = new FileWriter("C:\\Users\\...", true); 
            BufferedWriter out = new BufferedWriter(fstream); 
            String start1 = start.replace(":", "."); 
            String end1 = end.replace(":", "."); 
            Float result = Float.valueOf(end1)-Float.valueOf(start1); 
            out.write(String.format("%.3f", result)); 
            out.newLine(); 
            //close buffer writer 
            out.close(); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            System.out.println(e); 
        } 
    } 
} 
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String priority1 = (String) getVariableData("Priority");         
String group1 = (String) getVariableData("Service-Group");        
int priority = Integer.parseInt(priority1);         
int group = Integer.parseInt(group1);        
       
String result = DBClass.create(group, priority);       
setVariableData("DB-Result", result);           
             
String[] result2 = result.split("\\]");       
setVariableData("Max-Priority-From-DB",result2[result2.length-1]); 
String input = (String) getVariableData("DB-Result");               
setVariableData("Invocation-Result",Client2.create(input)); 
